Journal of International & Global Studies

Mission Statement: The Journal of International and Global Studies provides a multidisciplinary forum for the critical discussion and reflections on the consequences of globalization throughout the world. The editors welcome essays and book reviews that deal with globalization from economists, historians, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, geographers, linguists, religious, ethnic, or environmental studies specialists, cross-cultural education, media and communication researchers, or other humanities or social science scholars that have an international and global focus. One of our goals is to help undermine the fragmentation of specialization within the international academy by emphasizing broad interdisciplinary approaches to the comprehension of globalization in all of its many different forms and implications for different regions of the world.

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Introduction

Welcome to the Volume 4 Number 1 issue of the *Journal of International and Global Studies*. We continue to increase our subscriptions to this peer reviewed and free open access online interdisciplinary journal. If you would like to subscribe to the journal, just click on the tab at the top of the page below the journal title. We will be sure to send you the web link to the journal so that you can read and download the essays in accordance with your interests. You will also provide us with a data base so that we can draw on your expertise for peer reviewing essays for the journal.

This Fall issue for Volume 4 Number 1 features the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary essays, a review essay, and book reviews on globalization topics (defined broadly) that is a predominant theme of the journal.

The lead essay “Neoliberal Globalization and the Politics of Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa” by Saul Tobias continues an important theme of this journal in investigating the global impact of migration on different communities throughout the world. Tobias explores how anti-immigration policies have created negative conditions for economic exploitation, violence, and harassment on migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Tobias emphasizes, this is not a north-south problem. Modeling the post-Cold War neoliberal policies of the global north, the countries of Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa have produced economic and political elites who adopt anti-immigration mentalities that exacerbate the problems for migrants. This paper has both a critical edge and an alerting function that can serve human rights activists, development specialists, diplomats, and scholars of migration who want to offer improvements in these conditions. The second essay “State sponsored famine: Conceptualizing politically induced famine as a crime against humanity” by Jlateh Vincent Jappah and Danielle Taana Smith is also a critical paper with an alerting function for development and human rights activists. The essay illuminates how state policies can induce famines and offers suggestive solutions for criminalizing these politically-based faminogenic policies. Applying Foucault’s concept of governmentality and critically evaluating Amartya Sen’s notions of famine, these scholars provide a format for criminalizing these state policies. They agree that currently some argue against such criminalization because there is no clear consensus on how to designate a famine as state-sponsored. However, they demonstrate that there are precedents in the UN declarations about genocide and deliberate attempts to starve populations that can be used to promote the criminalization of these faminogenic policies.

Aidan Borcan addresses questions regarding diplomacy, globalization, and cosmopolitanism in the third essay, another theme discussed in earlier issues of the journal. Borcan draws on the work of Hannerz, Simmel, Merton, Luckmann, Nussbaum, and Stonequist to provide a framework for analyzing the relationships among diplomacy, cosmopolitanism, and globalization. The diplomat occupies a position as an individual representing their own society and culture, but within a perspective shaped by knowledge of the world. The diplomat’s identification with both local and global worlds reminds one of the epistemological position of the anthropologist. The fourth essay by Nadja Johnson, a recent PhD, focuses on diasporic studies and global issues. She synthesizes the traditional sociological theories of migration with the diaspora theories that have emerged from the cultural studies arena. Johnson describes how diasporic communities have evolved in the academic literature from “victim” diasporas such as the Jewish or Palestinian diasporas to a more generalized transnational era in which agency and mobilization are featured in both the homeland and host areas. Johnson calls for a
multidisciplinary approach to study diasporic communities that differ from one another in various areas of the world.

The final essay by Linsun Cheng investigates the development of the city of Shanghai in order to shed light on economic globalization processes in China. Tracing the history of globalization, deglobalization, and re-globalization of Shanghai’s economy since the nineteenth century Opium War, Cheng demonstrates how a part state-owned-part private and part multinational enterprises hybrid economy with a strong manufacturing base as well as a solid tertiary sector has evolved. He shows how Shanghai has weathered the recent financial downturn since 2008 with wise policies led by the current mayor. The full embrace of these economic trends has led Shanghai and China towards more integration into the global economy. The essay provides an up-to-date empirical account of Shanghai’s role in this development.

We have one review essay of two Routledge published books on China’s development and crisis management by Raviprasad Narayanan who is based in Taipei. As in the past, we have a number of book reviews for those scholars who have an interest in interdisciplinary research and in globalization and its consequences throughout the world. Again, as we stated in our first issue of the journal, we intend to maintain this standard of generalized interdisciplinary readability for all of our essays and book reviews in future issues of our journal. We hope that you will subscribe to our journal to read future essays, review essays, and book reviews. We also invite you to submit essays, review essays, book reviews, and suggest possible book reviews for the journal.

Sincerely,

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Neoliberal Globalization and the Politics of Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

Over the last few decades, many states in sub-Saharan Africa have adopted draconian anti-migrant policies, leaving refugees and migrants vulnerable to violence, harassment, and economic exploitation. These policies represent a shift from the relatively hospitable attitude shown by many African nations in the immediate post-colonial period. Explanations at the local level do not adequately explain the pervasiveness of these changes or why many developing states are now replicating the migration discourse and practices of the global north. Drawing on scholarship and data from a number of states in the region, including Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, this paper argues that owing to the widespread implementation of neoliberal economic policies, these states are now subject to many of the same incentives and constraints that operate in the developed north. As a result, political parties and business elites have used national migration policy as an instrument for enhancing their political and economic positions. Insofar as neoliberal globalization continues to exacerbate inequality within the developing world, the harsh measures taken by governments of developing countries against their refugee and migrant populations are likely to increase. It is therefore important that scholars of migration and human rights begin to reassess the prevailing, nearly exclusive emphasis in many globalization studies on the dehumanizing policies and exploitation of southern migrants by states in the global north, as such an emphasis risks obscuring the emergence of more complex patterns of migration and anti-migrant practices in the developing world.
Introduction

For a number of decades now, scholars of globalization have taken the post-Cold War repartitioning of the globe along a north-south axis as a basic framework for understanding global movements of capital, commodities, and people. Much of their work has built on economic models that, beginning with dependency theory (Frank, 1967; Baran, 1975) and World-Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 2004) and continuing in the work of critics of neoliberal globalization such as Joseph Stiglitz (2003) and Naomi Klein (2008), emphasize the imbalance of power between the global north and the global south. In the field of migration studies, this framework supports an understanding of the world as divided between a migrant-generating south (comprising Latin America, Africa, and parts of South and South-East Asia) and a migrant-resisting post-industrial north (comprising Western and Southern Europe, the United States, and Australia). Because this model of neoliberal globalization entails the southward flow of money and the northward flow of people, much of the analysis of the exploitation and unequal treatment of refugees and migrants has been framed in terms of northern treatment of southern migrants (Chimni, 2000; Bacon, 2009; Solimano 2010).

However, the north-south framework simplifies a far more complicated global situation. In particular, it overlooks the extent to which states within the developing world, many of them victims of the anti-migration regimes of the global north, have come to replicate the North’s policies and popular rhetoric at a regional level. In this respect, sub-Saharan Africa provides a particularly salient example. Over the last two decades, much more restrictive migration policies and practices have been adopted in many countries in the region. These policies and practices represent a shift from the relatively hospitable attitude shown by many African nations in the immediate post-colonial period (Milner, 2009). Prior to the 1980s, borders were rarely closed to large refugee influxes, and few serious cases of forced repatriation occurred (Westin, 1999; Dev, 2003). The more open attitude was codified in the 1969 Convention of the Organisation of African Unity, which included a definition of refugee that encompassed a broader range of involuntary migrants than the more restrictive UNHCR definition (Milner, 2009). While such tolerance was due, in part, to the limited capacity of states to control migration, it was also prompted by a governing philosophy of anti-colonial pan-Africanism that emphasized the ‘brotherhood’ of all Africans and the obligations they owed to one another. However, such attitudes and practices are rarely found in Africa today, raising the question of why the migration regimes of many African states, including Botswana, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, and Kenya, to name but five of the most prominent, are beginning to resemble those more commonly associated with Australia, the United States, and Europe.

While explanations on the domestic or local scale are important to understand these changed migration policies in the sub-continent, they do not adequately explain the uniformity or pervasiveness of this change. In order to understand such developments, it is necessary to view these local environments as situated within a global economic and political system that has affected many countries in both the developed and developing world in comparable, though uneven, ways. In seeking to advance their positions economically and politically, countries in sub-Saharan Africa find themselves subject to many of the same incentives and constraints that operate in the developed north as a result of the widespread implementation of neoliberal economic policies. Neoliberalism is a multifaceted phenomenon, but it may be succinctly defined as a “project to expand and universalize free-market social relations” (Harrison, 2005, p. 1306). The neoliberal project has reshaped the political and economic landscape of the region,
affecting states’ attitudes towards border-security, labor supply, land use, urban demographics, development aid, and other factors that have impacted the lives of migrants and refugees.

Furthermore, while national responses to regional and global conditions provide part of the necessary analytical framework, this approach can be more finely honed, as it does not fully address the particular role of specific political and economic classes in promoting and enacting anti-migration policy. In his critical account of neoliberalism, David Harvey poses the question: “In whose particular interests is it that the state take a neoliberal stance, and in what ways have those interests used neoliberalism to benefit themselves, rather than, as is claimed, everyone, everywhere?” (2007, p. 24). This question applies also to the pursuit of neoliberal policies in the sub-Saharan context and, more specifically, to the advocacy of specific policies pertaining to migrants and refugees. Current migration policies of a number of African states cannot be understood apart from their relation to the particular interests of an elite class that has played the leading role in advocating for and implementing policies concerning the rights of migrants and refugees. When we consider migration in light of this approach, it becomes apparent that the fluid and competitive nature of neoliberal globalization greatly complicates the dominant image of a migrant-generating south and a migrant-resisting north. Indeed, a more dynamic and complicated picture is revealed, in which states of the global south, and specifically members of their political elite, use a variety of means to respond to the vicissitudes of neoliberal globalization, frequently replicating the policies of their northern counterparts, often at a cost to humane migration and asylum policies.

**Neoliberal Globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa**

For nation-states of the global north, neoliberalism has entailed a contraction of the welfare state and a restructuring of national economies to exploit the realities of global competition. However, whereas neoliberalism can be examined through the lens of nation-states competing in a global economy, it should be borne in mind that the impact of neoliberalism has had differential impacts on different classes, with business and political elites amassing greater wealth, and decreased standards of living accruing to the working and lower-middle classes in many of the states where such policies have been applied (Harvey, 2007). Indeed, it can be argued that neoliberalism has been driven in most of the world by an elite class intent on ensuring its continuing prosperity (Duménil & Lévy, 2011). As such, it is important to consider how specific classes, and not merely specific states, have benefited from global neoliberal policies.

While sub-Saharan Africa is beset by specific economic challenges that are different from those facing the post-industrial economies of the north, the region is part of the same global economy and is therefore subject to many of the same pressures and forces. The global economic shift towards neo-liberalism that has occurred since the late 1970s has impacted sub-Saharan Africa in two phases. The first phase is associated with the structural adjustment programs implemented across the continent during the 1980s and early 1990s. By 1989, eighty-four structural adjustment loans had been agreed between the World Bank and sub-Saharan African states (Harrison, 2005). These loans restructured emerging economies for insertion into the global market by scaling back public programs, reducing consumer subsidies and price controls, discouraging import substitution, and privatizing state industries (Akokpari, 2006). The continuing impact of the structural adjustment programs is felt throughout Africa in the curtailment of state investment in the public sphere, and the replacement of public sector jobs by
jobs in export agriculture and manufacturing. These jobs have tended to lack the security or benefits that accompany employment in the public sector (Mohan, Brown, Milward, & Zack-Williams, 2000).

The second phase of neoliberal reforms, coinciding with increased economic globalization following the end of the Cold War, has been concerned primarily with building global systems and global capacity within nation states, as well as encouraging multi-party democracy and free elections on the continent. This has entailed the reorganization of the state as the facilitator and protector of private capital flows within a competitive global economy (Sassen, 2003). The last three decades have seen many African states jettison large-scale programs of modernization and industrialization in favor of courting international investment in commercial enterprises that have unpredictable life expectancies, resulting in increased economic instability throughout the region (Edi, 2006; Obi, 2010). Trade unions and workers’ rights have been eroded through much of the sub-continent, and the destruction of tariffs or other trade barriers has been disastrous for a number of local agricultural industries (Schiller, 2009).

The changes wrought by neoliberal policies have had a significant impact on urban populations. A perceived urban bias that had accompanied the immediate post-colonial phase of nation-building was replaced in many structural adjustment programs by policies that attempted to reduce the economic power of the urban areas in favor of rural development. This led to dramatic rises in the costs of urban services and products, as state subsidies to urban areas and state support of the urban middle class were withdrawn (Campbell, 2005). The decline in purchasing power on the part of these urban middle-classes had a negative impact on local artisanal production, as small-scale producers could no longer find buyers for their products. With increasing emphasis on international trade and open markets, these local artisans were also confronted by cheaper imports of textiles, shoes, and utensils ((Roberts, 1989). So while the disappearance of public sector jobs and the instability of private sector employment have increased the role of the informal sector in most sub-Saharan economies, with a declining base of middle class earners to purchase their goods and services, the incomes of those in this sector have declined. It is therefore in the cities that middle and working class citizens have experienced most starkly the decline in wages and job security, while simultaneously witnessing the enrichment of political elites through their control of privatized state assets and their successful leverage of foreign investment (Francis, 2002).

These various transformations in the economies of sub-Saharan Africa have been exacerbated by changes in regional relations. Notwithstanding the various instance of regional cooperation such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD) that have been fostered in parts of the continent, the virtual disappearance of pan-Africanism, the non-aligned movement, and international Marxism as serious political projects has ensured that competition within the global economy now entails competition between African states. NEPAD has been driven by those states that see most advantage in opening the continent to investment, such as Senegal, South Africa, and Nigeria (Taylor, 2003). One of the most significant regional partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), began as early as 1975 to establish pro-business and pro-trade policies that would enable the free movement of capital, goods, and people between the 15 participating states and has since agreed to act as the principle agent for the implementation of NEPAD in the region (Edi, 2006). With their importance as pawns and proxies in the Cold War diminished, and given the flexibility with which sought-after international investment can enter and exit a country, African
states now have strong incentives to leverage whatever political or economic advantages they may have to improve their relative positions within the global economy. The states of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly those with higher levels of development and a greater degree of integration into the global economic system, have proved eager to follow the example of leading industrial states and adopt the policies and discourses that improve their competitive positions in the international field, including their ability to influence the rules governing global trade. Ghana’s Gateway Project, which aims at attracting foreign investment, and South Africa’s GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) economic policy, are exemplary of this shift to competitive, investment focused policies (Essuman-Johnson, 2005; Iheduru, 2008).

However, given the mixed results of neoliberalism to improve the standard of living for most citizens, it is misleading to cast the policy choices of these states as functions of pure national interest. Throughout the sub-continent, these changes have been driven by an elite class, comprising an older generation of political leaders who were well positioned to benefit from the privatization of state entities, and a younger generation, educated in the west, who brought home the skills and international connections to facilitate and profit from the push for foreign investment. While multinational organizations have increasing power over developing economies, these political elites have been successful in establishing themselves as gatekeepers to international transactions and agreements, in many cases establishing themselves as major players in the global economy. In fact, in almost all of sub-Saharan Africa, access to political power now involves access to the powers of brokering trade and investment. Mirroring the position of political elites in the global north, these elites justify their endorsement of increased foreign investment and privatization in the region on the basis of the rewards that will flow to all citizens, even though the benefits of foreign investment have been unevenly distributed and have fostered growing income inequality across much of the continent. For example, the South African government’s policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) ties investor access to the country to the development and enrichment of a black capitalist class, with little measurable effect on the poverty of most South Africans (Iheduru, 2008).

Neoliberalism and Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

The impact of neoliberalism on both the global north and the global south is experienced most directly in the economy, but its effects are felt farther afield, in areas such as migration policy. Such effects are well documented in the United States and in countries of Western and Southern Europe. Migrants and refugees have become convenient targets for citizens of these countries who have seen their economic security decline, jobs disappear, and welfare provisions decrease under the neoliberal policies that have been implemented in these countries since the 1980s (Harvey, 2007). While protectionist sentiments have contributed to the increasing reluctance of developed countries to admit and support migrants, countervailing economic pressures require the presence of such migrants in order to keep these economies competitive (Bacon, 2009). Faced with shifts from industrial to service economies and with the need to procure flexible and cheap workers to remain competitive with the offshore production and service provision economies of South America, China, and South Asia, the United States and Europe have become increasingly dependent on migrant labor in agriculture, domestic service, hotel and food services, and construction. The restructuring of major urban economies towards the financial, service, consumer, entertainment, and tourism industries has similarly relied on the flexible and largely un-unionized migrant workforce to keep costs low. Without legal status,
skilled individuals are categorized as unskilled and are therefore subject to wages appropriate to this status, creating a productive, but also flexible and low-wage workforce (Schiller, 2009). The vilification and criminalization of migrants increase their marginalized social status, which further helps to ensure their limited bargaining power when it comes to negotiating wage and labor conditions. Hence, both rhetorical and legislative measures taken against migrants have the economic benefit of increasing their utility as flexible labor. Douglas Guilfoyle neatly encapsulates this contradictory state of affairs, noting, “High- and medium-income States may become structurally dependent upon this externalized ‘ghetto’ of low-cost foreign [labor], thus profiting from irregular migration while denouncing it” (2010, p. 1).

This pattern of balancing popular antagonism towards migrants with the interests of business elites in procuring cheap labor and extracting foreign aid and investment is now evident in the states of sub-Saharan Africa. The various transformations in the economies of these states, including the decline in public sector jobs, the growing insecurity of the urban middle class, and the rise of the informal economy have increased opposition towards migrants across the region. While a parochial distrust of foreigners is not new in African societies, this distrust has been transformed into a more insidious anti-migrant mentality characterized by the kind of rhetoric associated with attitudes in the global north. Surveys have found that citizens across the continent show increasingly high levels of xenophobia, characterized by grossly inflated perceptions of the number of foreigners in the country, and characterizations of foreigners as job stealers, criminals, and purveyors of disease, despite few of those surveyed having had personal contact with migrants (Crush & Pendleton, 2007). In Kenya, migrants’ dominance in certain sectors of the informal economy has provoked resentment and even violence from established small business holders, who view them as a threat to their livelihoods (Campbell, 2005). And on the streets of Johannesburg, foreign street-traders have been repeatedly subject to verbal abuse and violence by local competitors (Landau, 2007). This heightened antagonism is in part understandable, as the retreat of the formal labor market through the liberalization and informalization of the economy since the 1990s has coincided with increasing movements of people across Africa’s borders. As Campbell notes in regard to Kenya:

The rise of the service economy and the ‘black’ market, in which refugees are concentrated, do indeed threaten the ‘formal’ economy in which many Kenyans are employed. This is not however because of the influx of refugees but rather the consequences of economic globalization that has squeezed out well-paying, long-term ‘formal’ jobs in favor of short-term, temporary, low-paid work. (Campbell, 2005, p. 274)

Along similar lines, Morapedi notes that rising xenophobia in Botswana is connected to a declining economy increasingly focused on informal labor (2007). Such sentiments, widespread across the region, reflect a public response to continental economic changes prompted by decades of neoliberal policies, even if the effects of the changes are experienced at a local level.

Growing antagonism towards migrants in sub-Saharan Africa has been exploited by elite groups, who have an interest in maintaining pressure on migrant populations while doing relatively little to stem the steady stream of migrants crossing national borders. A number of states have passed legislation restricting the access of migrants and refugees to legal and particularly public sector work. Such policies do little to effectively exclude migrants from the workforce but are successful in weakening migrants’ legal position. For example, although the ECOWAS protocols on free movement enable visa-free travel and the right to eventual residence and then establishment of all citizens, only the provision of visa-free travel has been implemented, though it is not widely understood by citizens, who frequently cross borders
without the correct documents. The protocols give participating countries almost complete discretion in refusing entry to non-citizens or expelling them when their presence is deemed contrary to national interest (Boulton, 2009). As Adepoju notes, most member countries of ECOWAS have retained or passed laws restricting the economic activity of migrants, including citizens of member states, and have freely deported migrants in periods of economic decline (2003).

The overlapping and sometimes contradictory laws and policies concerning the travel and domicile rights of ECOWAS citizens and the rights of refugees have given rise to what Alexander Betts calls ‘strategic inconsistency’: a situation in which “contradictory rules are created in a parallel [legal] regime with the intention of undermining a rule in another agreement” (2010, p.14). In Ghana, for instance, an official open door policy towards migrants and refugees under the terms of the ECOWAS Protocols on free movement and rights of domicile has not prevented the Ghanaian leadership from pursuing anti-migrant policies when this served its political or financial interests. Refugees have faced persistent difficulties in accessing the labor market and this, along with declining humanitarian aid, has meant that many camp refugees in Ghana have resorted to working “illegally” in the informal sector (Porter et. al., 2008). When protests erupted in 2007 and 2008 among Liberian refugees over these conditions, the Ghanaian government carried out mass arrests and detentions and forcibly repatriated thousands (Holzer, 2012). The fear and uncertainty generated by such inconsistencies in government practices and policies reduces the ability of migrants to compete with locals on an equal playing field, while nonetheless ensuring their status as a reserve and flexible labor force. Such conditions make migrants and refugees particularly valuable in the low-wage and short-term contract labor-market (Kweka, 2007).

One legal maneuver that sometimes contributes to migrants remaining in this state of legal limbo is the granting of ‘prima facie’ or ‘ad hoc’ refugee status, an increasingly common component of refugee legislation and practice in the subcontinent. The precise legal implications of ‘prima facie’ status are unclear, as the concept has not been defined in any international refugee treaties or in communiques of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR. Greater clarity is emerging in recent scholarship about the repercussions of prima facie status designation, but the notion is still interpreted differently by different national governments and agencies (Albert, 2010). The designation of prima facie refugee is generally used to provide refugee status to large numbers of people without going through the formal individual status determination required by international refugee law, usually because the granting agency is unequipped to process individual applications in periods of large refugee influxes (Albert, 2010). While the status of prima facie refugee should arguably entitle designees to most of the same protections of regular refugee status, many governments argue that because this designation does not follow treaty procedure, countries granting such status are not bound to respect all parts of international refugee law, such as the rights of refugees to move freely. Those with prima facie refugee status frequently find themselves living with this status for many years and often without the documentation that would have been obtained through individual refugee status determination, a situation which contributes to their tenuous political status and, therefore, their weak economic bargaining position in the local labor market (Hyndman, 1999).

Another policy that contributes to the ambiguous legal and economic position of migrants is the increased use of camps. Both Tanzania and Kenya have adopted policies that officially confine all refugees to camps (Kweka, 2007; Schmidt, 2006). When drafting its new Refugee Act in 1998, the South African government seriously considered instituting such a system, only
to relent in the face of pressure from human rights groups (Smith, 2003). The increased use of camps is, in part, a response to increasing pressures on native rural populations as a consequence of neoliberal reforms. Much agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa depended on subsidies from the state in the form of seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides and through the provision of rural social services. As such, subsidies have largely disappeared, and rural life has become much more tenuous for native farmers. The privatization of rural land has further diminished the farmland available to poor farmers. This situation has been exacerbated by the return of urban dwellers to the rural areas, a process driven by the rise of unemployment in the urban areas and the decline in public services. All these factors have encouraged governments to confine refugees to camps provisioned largely by the UNHCR, where they can no longer compete with natives for farmland, government subsidies, and other dwindling rural resources.

While restricting refugees to camps appeases local rural population, it also benefits small-scale employers and local elites. Refugees confined to camps are usually forbidden to seek outside employment or to trade in neighboring village markets. Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda all forbid or strongly discourage refugees from leaving camps for work in the cities, policies which in effect criminalize the presence of refugees in urban areas (Campbell, 2005; Schmidt, 2006). The prohibition on free movement, external employment, and trade, combined with declining food rations in the camp, compels many camp-dwellers to seek external employment as sharecroppers or informal laborers in surrounding villages, but to do so under conditions of illegality, which greatly advantage native employers. The Somali refugee camps in Kenya, for example, have boomed into bustling towns, providing cheap services and labor for the booming local village of Dadaab. The ineffective enforcement or under-enforcement of laws governing camp residents gives governments flexibility in the provision of cheap, exploitable labor as local demand fluctuates. As such, the segregation of refugees in camps reinforces their lower status in the competitive economy (Kibreab, 1996).

One other function of the camps is to supply the increasingly important market in graft and corruption. With the decline of the public sector that has accompanied neoliberal reforms throughout the sub-continent, many public sector employees have become reliant on other forms of informal income generation, including the use of bribery as a common means of supplementing diminishing salaries. A lucrative market has emerged in the illegal assistance and transportation of camp residents to urban areas, and in the provision of accommodation for refugees and illegal migrants in cities. Truckers, landlords, and obliging camp guards and police who facilitate the illegal movement of migrants to the cities in defiance of national law all benefit from the vulnerable legal position of these jobseekers. Among state employees, the Kenyan police forces have become notorious for the degree to which they rely on bribery as a form of income (Verdirame, 1999). Here refugees and migrants play an important role. An entire industry has arisen in which police, court officials, and municipal bureaucrats have come to depend on the bribes of refugees as they move through the asylum process, seek passage from camps to cities, apply for various permits, or attempt to avoid arbitrary imprisonment and deportation (Campbell, 2005). In South Africa, police and border guards have become similarly reliant on bribes by refugees to supplement their incomes (Landau, 2007). In West Africa, the ECOWAS protocols on free movement enabling visa-free travel have not prevented underpaid border guards and custom officials from profiting from bribes extracted from increased flows of migrants unsure of their rights (Boulton, 2009). Needless to say, the market in bribery is “greased” by the diminished legal status of refugees and migrants in most parts of the sub-continent, and by negative attitudes to foreigners that justifies extortion in the eyes of nationals.
Officials in a number of government departments, including city departments that issue building and business permits, or process residence or work permits, have also benefited from the bribes extracted from migrants, who often have no legal access to these services. While those benefiting from the informal market in bribes do not necessarily constitute the elite, they are usually members of state institutions run by political appointees whose position depends on maintaining conditions that benefit their employees.

**Neoliberalism and the Plight of Urban Migrants**

Just as neoliberal globalization has affected the demographic composition and economic life of North American and European cities, its impact on urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa has shaped relations between urban residents and migrants, and the policies of governments concerning migrants in urban areas. As is the case with most of the world, cities are now the main destination of migrants within sub-Saharan Africa, with major regional centers such as Gabarone, Johannesburg, Khartoum, Kampala, Nairobi, and Dakar becoming magnets for migrants from across the region. These migrants come both from rural and urban areas. Small scale farmers removed from their land by private appropriation or industrialized export agriculture frequently move to the cities, and this often involves crossing national borders (Akokpari, 2006). Increasingly, however, migration in the subcontinent now takes the form of inter-urban, rather than rural-urban migration, often between neighboring states. The growth in this form of migration is exacerbated by the instability and fluidity of the labor market in African urban centers, leading to increased migration between cities as the economy of one urban center declines and another improves.

Migrants face particular difficulties in accessing the professional and formal labor markets in many African countries. They face legislation that forbids their working or residing in urban areas; the lack of recognition of certificates and qualifications; and social barriers, including xenophobia and lack of network connections (Kibreab, 1996; Campbell, 2005). As a consequence, foreigners are less successful than natives in seeking jobs in the formal and public sectors, a factor that forces them to accept informal employment at low wages or to attempt self-employment (Aregbeshola, 2010). As in the industrialized north, many migrants in the cities of sub-Saharan Africa provide labor in the service sector, such as in hotels and restaurants, or serve the higher income lifestyles of the professional and political elites, by performing domestic work, such as gardening, driving, or childcare. Many natives are therefore able to improve their living standards due to the availability of cheap domestic labor. Middle class urban citizens have also supplemented their declining standard of living by renting accommodation to migrants, frequently on exploitative terms to which “illegal” migrants have little redress (Campbell, 2005).

When not employed in low wage occupations, migrants frequently become entrepreneurs, in part because of the difficulty of obtaining jobs in the formal sector, and in part because urban areas provide greater security and anonymity than residence in rural locales (Aregbeshola, 2010). Migrants hence play a vital role in the informal economies of the region, utilizing their international connections and skills to establish small businesses or trading operations. In fact, international entrepreneurs are job creators, absorbing surplus labor in the local population. For example, the Eastleigh neighborhood in Nairobi, which has become the city’s center of informal businesses and is dominated by migrants, is described by residents as “the global capital of Nairobi” (Campbell, 2005, p. 144). The removal of the migrant population...
from cities such as Nairobi would have a devastating effect on the informal market, on which Nairobi citizens have come to depend as their income and purchasing power decline.

Despite the contributions made by migrants to the economic life of African cities, the public perception of urban-dwellers across the sub-continent mirrors that of the perception held in Europe and the United States, where such migrants are increasingly viewed as a threat to jobs. Such attitudes have legitimated ambiguous policies whereby governments officially criminalize migrants’ presence in cities while doing little to enforce these laws. The Kenyan government rarely prosecutes foreigners living “illegally” in Nairobi but gives free reign to local officials and police to harass and arrest foreigners with impunity (Campbell, 2005). In South Africa, the official policy of “community enforcement,” which encouraged citizens to report irregular migrants in the workplace, led to very few workplace arrests and little cooperation from businesses in terms of identifying illegal laborers. The policy was successful, however, in keeping migrant workers in the shadows but not in preventing their being hired by businesses in search of cheap labor (Vigneswaran, 2008). They are also left vulnerable to exploitation by landlords, police arrest, and xenophobic violence on the part of the native population.

The growing inequality that has resulted from neoliberal policies has led to popular protests in many cities in Africa, particularly over jobs, housing, and service provision. In the face of this rising urban discontent, elites have mobilized anti-migrant sentiment and in many cases fueled xenophobia as a way of deflecting popular frustration over the declining standards of living and increasing inequality (Jacobsen, 2001). Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, and Kenya, countries that have witnessed increasing levels of xenophobia over the last few decades, as well the stoking of anti-migrant feeling by government officials, are frequently also listed among the most unequal societies in the world. The plethora of laws restricting migrants’ movement to cities and their right to work, hence, has an additional function to that of creating an exploitable population for the informal labor market. By maintaining a public rejection of migrants’ presence in cities, and restricting their right to work, governments and political elites can diminish the appearance of disregarding the concerns of native workers while fueling the redirection of popular anger towards these ‘alien’ populations. It is certainly not coincidental that some of the most extreme violence against refugees and migrants over the last decade has been seen in countries that have gone furthest in privatizing state industries and deregulating the economy. South Africa, the region’s most urbanized country and the one that has gone furthest in retooling its economy and labor market according to the demands of neo-liberal global economics, has also witnessed some of the severest anti-migrant violence on the continent.

Refugees, Development, and Aid

For the governing elites of many African states, control of development aid provides leverage over local populations, and resources for the disbursement of jobs and contracts, which has become a powerful form of patronage within the new neoliberalism order. Not only has the amount of aid provided by developed countries declined over the last few decades, but remaining aid is targeted at a limited number of states that have reformed their economic practices and show investment potential (Crisp, 2010). These changed priorities are most apparent in the international agreements known as the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda on Aid Effectiveness. These agreements were signed in 2005 and 2008 by governments of donor and developing countries and by participating international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Investment
The Declaration and Agenda outline principles of aid effectiveness that include greater leadership by the governments of developing nations in identifying development goals and distributing aid; greater efficiency and transparency in the management of aid; and a commitment to a set of business and management principles that would, in the language of the Paris Declaration, “mobilize domestic resources, strengthen fiscal sustainability, and create an enabling environment for public and private investments” (OECD, 2008, II.25).

Under circumstances of declining international aid, the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda offer the governments of developing countries access to substantial funds over which they have far greater control, albeit under conditions of greater transparency and accountability. For governments, there are clear political advantages to endorsing the language and business principles of neoliberal economic management that are contained in the Declaration and Agenda, and utilizing the rhetoric of neo-liberalism to gain access to these limited funds (Little, 2008). Tanzania has been especially active in this regard, taking the lead in promoting a framework for development according to the United Nations “Delivering as One” Program (DaO), a set of development principles that aim to “translate the Paris and Accra principles of aid effectiveness into practice” (UN Tanzania, 1). The achievements of the DaO, according to the UN, include greater transparency and increased reform of development practices by “deepening the harmonization of business practices and improving cost effectiveness.” (UN Tanzania, 2). Since 2007, donors have channelled over 90 million US dollars to Tanzania via the Delivering as One Program. The committee that oversees the disbursement of these funds is co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, who helps to determine funding priorities.

A number of sub-Saharan African countries have adapted their refugee policies to take advantage of the increased aid and the control of aid that comes from aligning development policies with the Paris and Accra Accords. Within the context of the DaO Program, Tanzania has committed to locally integrating approximately 170,000 Burundian refugees, who have been in the country for over three decades, although policies towards other groups of refugees remain quite hostile (Thomson, 2009). While the Tanzanian government’s magnanimity in integrating these refugees should not be doubted, the move also garners the goodwill of the international community and allows the government to solicit aid for this integration under the auspices of the DaO Program. Given that the program, as well as the Paris and Accra Accords all focus on reinforcing national government leadership in setting development goals, providing delivery infrastructure, and managing funds, the Tanzanian government has strong political and financial incentives to utilize this specific moment in international development and aid policy to resolve a prolonged refugee problem, and to do so in way that maximizes the governing elite’s control over infrastructure development and service provision for the duration of the project.

A few other African states have shown similar “magnanimity” towards the local integration or assisted resettlement of refugees when such programs coincided with extensive support from the international community. However, whereas countries like Tanzania have embraced government transparency and accountability as a means of gaining funds, other countries have used the refugee issue as a means of attracting foreign aid despite their failures in these areas of reform. Guinea, for instance, has arguably used refugee populations as “diplomatic currency” (Milner, 2009) to extract aid, despite the country’s failure to establish democratic and transparent government. As Milner argues, between 2003 and 2008, “Guinea tried to use the presence of refugees as leverage against the donor community.... [The country]
highlights its open asylum policy as a way of rebutting criticisms of its failures to combat corruption and promote good governance” (Milner, 2009). The country shifted from a policy of mass round-ups and forced expulsion of Liberian and Sierra-Leonean refugees, conducted in 2000, to support for a policy of integrating these refugees locally. Following the expulsions, Guinea received aid and debt-relief, including US$800 million from the Word Bank and IMF, in exchange for its continued support of refugees. Substantial aid has flowed to Guinea from the US State Department (US$5 million), USAID (US$7 million), and other organizations since its reversal of policy (Milner, 2009). Most recently, Guinea has benefited from the African Development Bank provision of about six million dollars to ECOWAS for the UNHCR- assisted repatriation or local integration of refugees (AllAfrica.com, 2012).

Conclusion

It is now clear that the emphasis by many theorists of globalization on the dehumanizing policies and exploitation of southern migrants by northern regimes risks obscuring the rise of similar attitudes and policies among developing nations. Where such changes have been noted in the countries of the global south, they have often been explained on the basis of local conditions. But just as the economic and political effects of neoliberal globalization transcend the situation of individual developed countries, leading to a uniformity in the new migration and refugee regimes that have emerged in the global north, so, too, can the pervasive effects of global neoliberalism be traced in an emerging pattern of laws and practices in many countries of the global south. These laws and practices diminish the legal status of refugees and migrants in the region and help to foster xenophobia among the populace. The result is a growing population perfectly suited to the needs of privatized global capital. At the same time, political and economic elites can continue to reap the rewards of an increasingly competitive and privatized economy by scapegoating migrants as the cause of the middle and working classes’ economic decline, or by exploiting the discourse of neoliberalism to gain control over the disbursement of aid for refugee integration or resettlement.

Insofar as neoliberal globalization continues to exacerbate inequality within the developing world, and as development aid becomes scarcer, the host of measures taken by governments of developing countries against their refugee and migrant populations are likely to increase. Given this possibility, and given the fact that the majority of the world’s refugees and migrants still live in the developing world, it is important that scholars of migration and human rights begin to reassess the popular image of the global north-south divide in the interests of exploring a more complex migration reality in which growing threats to the legal and social rights of refugees and migrants are arising in places far from the borders of the United States or Europe.

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1 I use the terms migrant and refugee more or less synonymously. Despite the important legal distinctions between the two, the difference has become less meaningful in both the European and African contexts, in part because popular rhetoric increasingly conflates the two, but also because in reality, many African
migrants are fleeing both political and economic insecurity and may well find themselves in the asylum process, whether or not they have a clear claim to be escaping political persecution under the terms of international refugee law.
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State Sponsored Famine: Conceptualizing Politically Induced Famine as a Crime against Humanity

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Abstract
This paper argues for the codification of politically induced famine as a crime against humanity. We use the term “state sponsored famine” to reflect the conceptualization of famine as not merely nature-induced but also as a willfully orchestrated state policy. The specification of faminogenic practices as criminal would subject perpetrators to international jurisdiction and provide deterrence to future offenders. We review traditional conceptualizations of famine as a geophysical event. We explore Amartya Sen’s concept of famine as caused by the collapse of individual entitlement and market exchange dynamics; we also discuss commentary on Sen’s approach. Further, we analyze the limits of these frameworks in accounting for systemic socio-political processes orchestrated by states and/or individuals with authority that cause famine or contribute to its evolvement from a natural disaster into a manmade catastrophe. This paper adds to existing literature that challenges conventional thinking about famine as primarily being the result of natural disaster. There is limited literature in direct opposition to the criminalization of famine. However, arguments are also presented which point to legal and practical difficulties in criminalizing faminogenic practices.
Introduction

Savage images of emaciated African children (and, to a less frequent extent, Asian children) on television screens and in news magazines evoke strong emotions. These images are meant to stimulate profound human emotions and encourage donor governments and global citizens to respond generously with humanitarian aid, personal donations, and the mobilization of social advocacy networks. Many interpret these images as the quintessence of lack of resiliency and maladaptation of groups of people against powerful geophysical forces. These presumed forces relate to climate change, drought, rising water tides, earthquakes, and insect invasions and topsoil erosion that effect crop production. The images of starving children around the world appeal to media consumers to provide aid for the less fortunate. Yet, the general perception of famine as a nature-induced event may not hold true for most of the famine experiences in certain pockets of the globe.

In this paper, we contend that famines are also caused by acts of state deviance and assert that the act of famine is a political act. We argue that politically induced or state sponsored famine should be considered a crime, and, specifically, a crime against humanity. This classification enables institutionalized faminogenic policies to be viewed as manmade rather than as nature-induced. Marcus (2003) defines faminogenic practices as the implementation of policies by governments that engender famine and the continuation of these policies despite awareness that they result in mass starvation. In addition, Marcus argues that faminogenic policies are intentionally used by governments as a tool of extermination of specific populations. We assert that by clearly defining what constitutes faminogenic practices and by codifying these practices as criminal in international law, perpetrators would then be subject to universal jurisdiction and prosecution. This codification has the potential to deter faminogenic practices and to save populations from the scourge of famine.

The paper is organized as follows. The first section provides conceptualizations of famine and limitations of traditional definitions. The second section reviews the effects of state deviance, including willfully induced famine, on populations. In this section, we apply Foucault’s concept of governmentality within the context of famine. The governmentality approach provides important insight into how famine is perceived, managed, and responded to. The third section discusses codifying famine as a crime against humanity and also discusses the legal complexities of this codification. The conclusion summarizes key arguments made in the paper.

Conceptualizing famine

Malthus (1798) provides an early theory of famine in his proposition that population size increases exponentially because of the passion between the sexes, which results in the production of children, with population growth far exceeding food production. Malthus argues that with time, the availability of food would decrease as population increased, resulting in food shortage and eventually in famine. As such, the power of population growth is infinitely greater than the agricultural capacity to produce food for man. According to Malthus, “Population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical ratio, and subsistence for man [increased] in an arithmetical ratio” (p. 6). For Malthus, famine represents a “natural check” that reduces population size to a level that can be sustained by the nation’s agricultural productivity. He
articates the traditional conceptualization of famine as a natural disaster that results from shortages in the availability of food.

In his seminal book on poverty and famine, Sen (1981) synthesizes definitions of famine presented in the existing literature. He argues that famine occurs during widespread and/or extreme food shortage, with extremity measured by the degree of mortality caused by starvation. Famine results in persistent hunger, evidenced by emaciation and an increasing mortality rate caused by starvation and/or disease. Sen describes famine through the perspective of entitlement. Sen’s four sets of entitlements which allow individuals to access food are (1) trade or exchange of commodities, (2) the production of crops and livestock, (3) ownership of labor in the form of wages, and (4) transfer and inheritance entitlements. Individuals gain access to food through exchanges of their entitlements. Based on the entitlement perspective, famine can be viewed as an event that occurs when the entitlements of a group of people are undermined, and they cannot gain access to an adequate amount of food (Dreze & Sen, 1989). The end result is increasing mortality from starvation and diseases related to starvation.

Green and Ward (2004) note the limitation of Sen’s emphasis on individual entitlements and economic exchange relationships as immediate causes of famine, which fail to address broader structural features that induce famine. Similarly, Rangasami (1985) questions Sen’s early formulation of famine as an event, a perspective which does not recognize social, political, and economic determinants that mark the inception of the famine process. She shows the limitations of the entitlement approach in theorizing famine. Rangasami argues instead that famine can be described as a process that is differentiated by three periods. The first period is dearth, which refers to the social and economic origins of famine. The second period is famishment, which refers to the process of being starved. The final period is morbidity, or the incidence of sickness within a region. Thus, Rangasami redefines famine as a set of systemic socio-economic and political processes that collude to maintain the vulnerabilities experienced by diverse population groups. Devereux (2001) similarly criticizes Sen’s entitlement perspective as decontextualized from the social and political processes that cause the famine. For example, one of the most devastating famines in recent history occurred in China during the Great Leap Forward in the early 1960s, which resulted in 30 million deaths (De Waal, 2008). Although these deaths directly resulted from disastrous agricultural policies, emphasis was shifted from the social and political underpinnings, and no one was held accountable.

Perspectives of famine have shifted from famine as an abruptly occurring event to famine as a process occurring over a period of time, characterized by both natural and manmade events including drought, inefficiency, mismanagement, and political attributes. Famine occurs when chronic starvation results in widespread death (Sen, 1981). Walker (1989) defines famine as a socio-economic process resulting in the rapid destitution of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in a community to a point where the group cannot sustain its livelihood. Walker refines the model of famine as process-based with the identification of four stages of the faminogenic process: (1) the adoption of coping strategies which overcome normal seasonal stress, (2) the adoption of strategies which trade short-term gain for longer-term problems, (3) the reliance on outside aid, (4) and the final stage of starvation and death. He argues that these stages begin with the adoption of non-reversible coping strategies. Howe (2010) applies systems theory to famine, and argues that “famines should be seen (more appropriately) as self-reinforcing dynamics or systems that arise from a combination of conditions that often result from longer-term processes” (p. 33).
Famine extends beyond the individual and the event to include societal dislocation and breakdown. Devereux (2001) argues that entitlements to assets that are communally owned are ambiguously defined, and ownership rights are not clear. Entitlement rights are also violated during war. He develops a complementary analysis of famine that conceptually improves on the entitlement approach by recognizing the role of non-market forces in determining entitlements and in violations that emerge during famines. Devereux also analyzes famine as a social process and as a public health crisis. In addition to economic entitlements, famine relates to state corruption, socio-economic deprivation, marginalization, health crises, and policy making (Howe, 2010; Green & Ward, 2004). In an analysis of strategic starvation in Kailik, a town in Darfur, De Waal (2008) notes that widespread famines arise from political malfeasance, which includes government error, exclusion, and inaction. Conceptions of famine extend beyond natural event occurrences such as drought or flooding. Famine encompasses social and economic processes, and political strategies employed during crises, conflict, war, and even peacetime to accomplish specified agendas.

Conflict-induced famine has been a common occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa; such instances of famine highlight the important role of political negotiations in preventing famine. Conflict strategies include earth scorching, food requisitions by military forces, disruptions in food production and supply, enforced food rationing, disrupted economies, undermined coping strategies, population displacements, and the creation of refugees (De Waal, 1997; Devereux, 2001). The 2011 food crisis in the Horn of Africa almost engulfed the entire region. Most of southern Somalia suffered from famine. Kenya and Ethiopia, despite weak democratic systems, were able to more effectively respond to the food crisis, as compared with Somalia, a nation which has not had a central government since 1991 and continues to be mired in armed conflict. Somalia has been governed by warlords and militias who occupy different regions of the country. Somalia was unprepared for the crisis and lacked adequate knowledge and mechanisms needed to respond to famine. Further, Al-Shabaab, the militant Islamic organization, had earlier banned humanitarian organizations from the region, closed humanitarian corridors, and engaged in activities which impeded the optimal functioning of aid agencies and other organizations. Authorities in Somalia at the time contributed to the deaths of thousands of vulnerable people and are culpable for the famine crisis that engulfed the nation.

De Waal and Whiteside (2003) conceptualize a form of famine which is differentiated from previous drought-induced or mismanagement frameworks. They theorize a new variant of famine, primarily found in southern African countries, which has emerged as a result of high HIV prevalence. New variant famine is precipitated by HIV in countries with a high prevalence of the virus as the immunity of people with HIV is compromised and as the deaths of young adults diminish agricultural productivity. According to De Waal and Whiteside (2003), the HIV pandemic has created a new category of vulnerability that includes a reduced household labor force, loss of skills and assets, and an increased burden of caring for the sick and orphans. This new variant famine is based on interactions between HIV and malnutrition that does not employ coping strategies, as there is no hope of full recovery for HIV victims. The traditional view of drought-induced famine with the hope of recovery differs from HIV-induced famine, which presents multiple challenges.
Reviewing the effects of state deviance on populations

Recent natural disasters and governments’ failure to adequately respond to these disasters can draw conclusions of state crime against its population. The devastation of life and property in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina occurred in the world’s most affluent and powerful nation. The Bush administration’s knowledge of the instability of the levee structures, and its failure to dedicate material resources in mobilizing government action in a timely manner after the storm arguably amounted to federal negligence. Critics maintain that the administration failed in its response because Katrina victims were predominantly poor and underprivileged. Giroux (2007) states:

What first appeared to be a natural catastrophe soon degenerated into a social debacle as further images revealed, days after Katrina had passed over the Gulf Coast, hundreds of thousands of poor people, mostly black, some Latinos, many elderly and a few white people, packed into the New Orleans Superdome and the city’s Convention Center, stranded on rooftops, or isolated on patches of dry highway without any food, water or places to wash, urinate, or find relief from the scorching sun. (p. 306)

Similarly, in a moment of intense rage, the musician Kanye West departed from a scripted National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) television performance and blurted out, “George Bush does not care about black people” (de Moraes, 2005). Despite two wars and a nearly collapsing economy during his presidency, President George Bush asserts that Kanye West’s rebuke that he was racist in his failure to respond to Katrina victims represented the lowest point of his presidency (Bush, 2010). This encounter between the former president and a musician gives insight into the magnitude of perceived state deviance and its ramifications. Bush’s assertion that West’s accusation represents his lowest point expresses the idea that important responsibilities of a democratic government include seeking and protecting the welfare of all citizens, especially the most vulnerable. The indictment that his administration failed to care for segments of American society is an indication of failed democratic principles, which suggests that democracies may lack the capacity to adequately care for their most vulnerable.

The 2008 earthquake in China and the 2002 earthquake in Turkey exemplify geophysical disasters whose impacts were magnified by rampant and systemic political malfeasance on the parts of both state and economic actors. On the surface, causality may seem elusive or attributable to extreme geophysical forces. However, human behavior was a major component of causality and resiliency in these disasters. Deficiencies in building structures and failure to enforce building codes, which precipitated the structures’ collapses, were attributes of gross negligence, clientelism, and corruption. Roniger (2004) defines clientelism as “a form of patrimonial corruption of public agencies, evident, for instance, when politicians and officials distribute public services and jobs personally in a restricted, arbitrary, secretive, and unchallengeable way” (p. 354). Clientelism closely relates to political corruption, which entails the use of political office for illegitimate personal gain.

Scandlyn et al. (2009) argue against the dominant hegemonic view of causes of disasters by natural forces and processes outside of human history and beyond human or governmental control as a deflection from criticism of inadequate enforcement of building codes and lack of investment in warning systems and disaster planning, which result in some communities suffering from higher casualties and costs than others when disasters do occur. They note that the access to resources and power that is embedded in social institutions and social structures
interact with the actions of individuals to create vulnerability to disasters. Attempts to emphasize the causes of disasters as primarily nature-induced while minimizing manmade influences tend to neutralize state deviance. If claims of malfeasance and negligence are validated, then these practices constitute violations of international human rights, which include the right to life.

In a similar vein, faminogenic trends have been evident in recent history and continue into the 21st century. Sinclair and Fryxell (1985) suggest that continuous famine in the Sahel region since 1968 is manmade and is caused by overgrazing of cattle rather than by drought. According to them, famine is worsened by developmental aid projects and by emergency food aid, as these efforts are not integrated with long-term care for human populations and for the regeneration of the vegetation. Devereux (2009) highlights that as of the turn of this century, famines have claimed not less than one hundred thousand and possibly one-quarter of a million lives in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Niger. He insists that the decline in food availability played only a minor role in these crises. Despite the great famine of 1984-1985, the early warning system put into place in 1976, and the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC), it appeared that the Ethiopian government deliberately refused to respond adequately to avert the 2000 famine. Khalif and Doornbos (2002) assert that the former Ethiopian Prime Minister’s home province, the Tigre Region, which was also effected with similar rain shortfall, did not suffer a plight similar to that suffered by the Somali Region. They note that the early warning system has been non-functional in the Somali Region due to governmental restriction of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other United Nations agencies. Similarly, during the Niger famine in 2005, the government and other business actors in Niger exported food commodities to neighboring countries where purchasing power was higher (Devereux, 2009; Keenan, 2005). Just as government practices can cause famine, a government can also prolong and worsen a famine by ignoring it once it has started. The famine of 1943 that occurred in Bengal, India occurred during a period of economic prosperity. Millions of agricultural workers starved because they could not afford rising food prices that resulted from the economic boom. These examples illustrate an alarming feature of famine: it occurs most often where there is more inequality and where resources are available to only the privileged. Not only did these state actors not seek the interests of their populations, they also sought to exploit the vulnerabilities of their people and maximize their own personal gains.

These events provide support for Sen’s (1981) analysis that famine usually occurs in places where there is sufficient stock of food products. Keenan (2005) notes that Niger’s president at the time, Mamadou Tanja, made it extremely difficult for the international community to intervene in a timely manner by denying the existence of famine in his country, which made it more difficult for the World Food Program to solicit funds from donors. Devereux (2009) contends that in all these cases, NGOs working in affected communities informed host governments about the impending food crises, but these warnings were ignored. He notes the lack of political will to protect the vulnerable on the part of governments, the late or non-response by donors, and the circulation of inaccurate information as among the factors that failed to prevent these famines. Devereux therefore argues that the most critical question regarding famine in contemporary Africa is not why famines have happened but rather why these famines were not prevented. He argues that food production or market access to food might fail but that famine only occurs when there is a failure of response. According to him, given the statistics regarding the causes of famine, which not only result in a lack of food for the poor but also an increased risk of illness amongst the entire society, famine can be used as an indicator to judge whether a crime has been committed by a country’s government.
De Waal (2008) notes the role of politics in the occurrence of famine. According to him, conflict-induced famine signifies the importance of political contracts between political leaders and their constituents in preventing famine. Government officials and private citizens must acknowledge the occurrence of famine and work together to mitigate its magnitude. Further, external responses to famine, including international aid and the delivery of emergency food supplies, may undermine the development of these contracts, as corrupt governments use much of this international aid towards maintaining their power. By acknowledging famine as an indicator of state crime, international legal institutions can declare governments guilty of human rights violations. The international community continues to sanction states and influence state actions through diverse mechanisms. Some of these strategies employed by international institutions in many ways have saved lives. As such, similar strategies can be applied to discourage faminogenic practices. Aid can be contingent on proof of wrongs being righted.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with vast natural resources, has experienced ongoing conflict since 1997, which has resulted in the deaths of more than five million people from violence, famine, and disease (United States Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). Mobutu Sese Seko, head of the former Zaire’s authoritarian regime for 32 years, misappropriated and deposited billions of dollars of the country’s resources into his personal Swiss and other bank accounts. After his death, the DRC plummeted into a civil war that was termed Africa’s World War. Despite fundamental flaws and malfeasance in governance, Sese Seko was never brought to justice for the ensuing carnage, rape, deprivation, and famine that marred the former Zaire. He set a precedent for unaccountability that many of his countrymen continue to follow. Justice unfulfilled does not negate Seko’s political malfeasance, which led directly to famine and constituted a crime against the people of the DRC.

Similarly, during his 32 years in power, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe could have gradually transferred land to indigenous Africans, as he purportedly agreed to do, as outlined by his redistribution of land policy, to remunerate blacks for past inequalities against them. However, to maintain his grip on power when threatened, he has instead implemented policies which foment violence against farmers, disregard for the rule of law, and economic mismanagement resulting in hyper-inflation and reckless price controls. These policies have resulted in famine and mass migration of Zimbabweans into neighboring countries, where they are subject to ongoing xenophobic attacks, as occurred in South Africa in the past few years (Howard-Hassmann, 2010).

North Korea represents a documented case in which political policies to maintain power have resulted in famine. Despite widespread scarcity of basic food supplies, the regime continues to implement policies that result in widespread starvation of its people. The North Korean government appropriates scarce resources for the development of weapons and militarization, at the expense of a starving and impoverished population. The regime continues implementation of faminogenic policies despite full awareness of the detrimental impact of such policies. The crime is not merely about North Korea’s continued development of military weaponry, although the effort to develop weaponry correlates to the outcome of famine. The crime is about a regime’s policies that restrict and stifle its people’s resiliency and about the willful faminogenic diversion of scarce resources from the vulnerable. In the early 1990s, North Korea was faced with severe famines, and its policies significantly hindered it from getting aid from donor countries. North Korea has never disclosed the number of people who died from the famine; however, the number of deaths is estimated to have been between 200,000 and 300,000 to 3.5 million people, with the lower range generally accepted as the most accurate (Woo-Cumings, 2002). Even when
requesting aid, North Korea asked that it be provided secretly. The political ideologies of donor countries also contributed to the deaths by placing conditions on the aid that were not palatable to North Korea, the requesting country.

According to Sen, famine does not routinely occur in democracies (Sen, 1981; Devereux, 2001). As Sen argues, no fully democratic government has ever experienced famine. Although Ethiopia can be considered a democracy, famine persists in the nation. Upon closer evaluation, it becomes clearer that the level of democratic representation and the strength of democratic institutions within the Ethiopian government arguably do not represent a developed democracy. While democratic governance does not completely solve the hunger problem, widespread loss of life due to famine is less likely to occur with democracy. Sen relates democracy to famine in that politicians in a democracy will initiate relief efforts when food shortages occur so as to win the vote and maintain their power. As elected officials, democratic politicians are more accountable to their electorates and are thus more likely to respond to population stresses. Arguably, in a developed democracy that is inclusive and does not disenfranchise any groups, the right to vote within its society decreases the risk of state deviance.

Countries that adopt neo-liberal democratic values also ensure mechanisms to prevent famine, as Sen suggests. These countries create a functional political economy that allows their people to prosper and to avert mass starvation and famine. In contrast, famine occurs in authoritarian and conflict prone states that lack democratic institutions and disregard basic human rights. Sen suggests that the lack of a democratic government in India at the time of the famine contributed to the disaster, as the government did not sufficiently care for its citizens to dispense relief. Howe and Devereux (2004) describe the definition of famine as an event within the Famine Codes in India, within which the colonial government recognized the financial and political costs of failing to prevent famines yet “felt no moral obligation to institute social welfare programmes for poor Indians in non-emergency contexts” (p. 357). Devereux (2009) observes that adverse local, national, or international politics have been primary causes of 21 out of 32 major 20th century famines. He characterizes famines as resulting more from corrupt governments than from natural events. Natural disasters, including drought, do not necessarily result in famine if governments anticipate and respond to these disasters adequately. A people-centric government provides care for the vulnerable and creates the necessary political and environmental conditions for its citizens to prosper.

Foucault (1991) contends that in the era of governmentality, the modern government aims to improve the welfare of its population. He notes that this trend has been developing since the 18th century in western societies, wherein government intervenes directly or indirectly through the mechanism of security to manage demographic factors such as fertility, life expectancy, economic productivity, reduction in mortality, and prevention of famine. According to Foucault, government becomes concerned with “making life” rather than with “taking life.” Foucault terms the focus of government on population affairs “biopolitics,” in which, he claims, the biological existence of a population is at stake. Foucault conceptualizes the biopolitical form of power as being focused on “man as a species” and aimed at the collective body (i.e. a population). Biopolitics aims to increase the population’s productivity through governmental management and interventions. In this respect, the government of life adopts strategies focusing on demographic characteristics at the population level.

Agamben (2005) theorizes that the modern government manages risks associated with the state for the protection of its population. O’Malley (2004) suggests that “not only subjects, bodies, and social relations may be recast by governing through risk, but even the environment
and elements may be transformed” (p. 9). He highlights the redefinition of drought in the Australian outback from being a natural disaster to being a manageable risk. O’Malley writes that “in this new governmental guise, drought is constituted as something farmers should anticipate and make provision for, rather than regard as an unforeseen cataclysm” (p. 9). If vulnerable groups in societies do not have the means or lack the ability to adapt to unforeseen events, their governments must respond as best as possible to protect them from harm. Foucault (2003) recognizes governmental power in the modern state as not just coercive, but as a force for population welfare within a broader political economy.

**Codifying famine as crime against humanity in international law**

Pre-deterministic theorists (Lombroso, 1911; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985; Goozen et al., 2007) have argued that social deviance is pre-determined due to intrinsic biological attributes. These theories have been challenged by other social theorists (Sutherland et al., 1992) who assert that deviance is learned behavior and more socially acquired. Even if pre-deterministic theories are valid, in human societies, individuals are expected to assume responsibility for their actions. Similarly, accountability for acts of state deviance, which include institutionalized famine, should be highly encouraged. Famine as a natural disaster precipitated by declining food availability is not inherently criminal. A crime occurs when a state has the capacity to predict and plan for a famine-related disaster in order to minimize its impact but fails in disaster preparation and in its ensuing response to mitigate the catastrophic effects, conceals relevant relief information from humanitarian agencies and/or donors, blocks humanitarian corridors, or engages in other faminogenic practices with an aim to exterminate or cause mass starvation of a group of people. Negligence or apathy on the part of the state that results in its failure to respond to the crisis can be considered criminal, based on its technological capacity for early identification and early response, its level of mobilization of resources, and its prioritization of the situation. Thus, culpability exists if (1) a government has the technological capacity to predict famine yet fails to do so, (2) if a government has the resources needed to mobilize a response to famine yet fails to respond in an adequate and timely manner, causing malnutrition, disease and death among vulnerable populations, (3) if a government delays responses based on considerations of race, ethnicity, class, religion and other factors, or (4) if famine directly results from deliberate state policies, with foreseeable results. In her study of genocide, Fein (2007) theorizes that human rights violations can be thought of as crimes of attrition that result in widespread death through displacement and other mechanisms, with the state’s tolerance of or complicity in implementing these mechanisms. Fein’s framework provides important insight into the conceptualization of famine as a violation of human rights. Famine can similarly be viewed as a crime of attrition in that perpetrators use mass starvation to indirectly exterminate a group of people. Perpetrators engage in slow, subtle methods that aim to deny a group the right to life (Fein, 2007). In many ways, famine serves as a strategic means of decimating particular social groups; it is not an unintended consequence but rather a deliberate and organized means of carrying out the state’s policies.

A crime occurs when governments or individuals who occupy high positions of command deliberately engage in faminogenic acts as a form of political weaponry against a particular social class, ethnic, racial, religious, or gender group. As government has the responsibility to protect its citizens from both natural and manmade disasters, failure to protect especially the most vulnerable populations and to maintain their human rights draws into question the state’s
compliance with societal norms. It is a government’s duty to protect its citizens without discrimination and to uphold the laws, but, as pointed out in previous examples, in many cases of famine and human rights violations, it is the government that is the perpetrator and law breaker. Countries most often affected seem to be those which lack democracies and have high rates of inequality within their societies (Sen, 1981). State negligence and the implementation of willfully orchestrated plans or policies that cause widespread death should be criminalized. Marcus (2003) contends that famine can be criminalized based on elements of existing international laws that prohibit starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Article 54 of the Geneva Conventions states:

It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive. (United Nations, 2000)

Consistent with these prohibitions, state sponsored famine and willful starvation or acts that cause starvation can constitute criminality.

The Convention does not prohibit political negligence or the failure of political responses that may result in mass starvation and famine. However, Article 54 recognizes derogations from these prohibitions by a party to the conflict when it is “in the defense of national territory against invasion” and when made “within such territory under its own control where required by imperative military necessity” (United Nations, 2000). Such prohibitions criminalize the deliberate starvation of civilians during conflict yet restrict responses from the international community to international (and not to internal) conflicts (Marcus, 2003). Marcus questions the moral and legal sensibilities in the criminalization of deliberately perpetrated mass starvation during war but not of the mass starvation of a people by its government during peacetime. Faminogenic policies, whether engendered during violent conflict or peace, should be considered criminal since starvation, a precursor to famine, has been prohibited. War crimes, genocide, and other gross violations of human rights are internationally recognized crimes. Historical precedents of convictions of perpetrators of crimes against humanity do exist (e.g. the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of post-WWII, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and others). However, Article 5 of the Rome Statute limits the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. These are the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Famine can also be a means for the accomplishment of these atrocities.

Article 6 of the statute defines and specifies genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. These acts include killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group, in whole or in part. Crimes against humanity are specified in Article 7 of the statute as acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, including murder, extermination, torture, persecution, and other inhumane acts. Extermination includes “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population”
State Sponsored Famine: Conceptualizing Politically Induced Famine

(United Nations, 2000). Based on existing definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute, state sponsored famine with similar objectives should be specified as a crime against humanity.

Messer and Cohen (2009) note the widespread acceptance by the international community of the individual human right not to starve. They observe that the right to food is an economic right, interconnected with the right to land, work, income, and a just economic order. Consistent with Sen’s analysis that links food security with democracy, Messer and Cohen assert that “country case studies across the developing world demonstrate that those denied civil liberties suffer disproportionately from social injustices and material deprivations, including food insecurity, hunger-related disease, malnutrition, and preventable child mortality” (2009). Messer and Cohen connect freedom of speech, a free press, and freedom of assembly (i.e. the pillars of democracy) with the protection of economic rights, including the right not to starve. According to them, food security is closely linked to democracy and good governance. The right to food has been adopted as a universal human right by the United Nations. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948) states:

> Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

Article 8 of the Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. War crimes entail grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. War crimes also encompass other serious violations of international laws, including “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival” (United Nations, 2000).

Similarities exist between war crimes and willful negligence or the intentional implementation of formal policies that can reasonably be ascertained to lead to famine, with the end result of mass starvation, disease, and death to a particular group. Thus, if atrocities committed during war and other human rights violations are criminal, then it stands to reason that politically induced famine as a means of annihilating a group should also be criminalized. A government or group intent on carrying out acts of genocide will more likely do so irrespective of war or peace and will use whatever mechanisms it has at its disposal if the international community chooses to ignore it. Famine has been employed as such a mechanism and will continue to be used as such until such acts are criminalized and efforts are made to bring perpetrators to justice. State actors in Darfur, Ethiopia, and the Ukraine have used famine with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, particular national, ethnic, racial, political, religious, and other groups. As genocide is a recognized crime in international law, it follows that famine as a means of perpetrating genocide should also be codified as criminal. Orchestrated state policies that engender famine with the aim of exterminating a particular sub-group is a crime against humanity and should be classified as such under international law. Edkins (2000) cautions that one cannot assume that the international community would fight against famine if it only knew how to. She conceives of famine as a crime and argues that governments and the international community should be held responsible and subject to sanction for allowing famine to occur.
There is a dearth of literature which directly opposes the codification of famine as criminal. It has been argued, in contrast, that famine should not be considered a crime, given the political and legal difficulties in defining and codifying what constitutes famine. Arguments of prosecutorial mechanisms have also been raised. The political and legal disagreement in defining what constitutes famine is important and should be given serious consideration, as it determines response to the crisis and accountability for perpetrators. Howe and Devereux (2004) note that the lack of an agreed upon definition makes it difficult to advocate for the criminalization of famine and to impose accountability for violations of the right to food. Lack of conceptual clarity is due in some part to technicalities of definitions, including, for example, questions such as: What is the level of mortality that has to occur before a food crisis is considered as famine? Lack of clarity also includes the construction of typologies of famine, the identification of perpetrators, and the determination of intentional state orchestration or authorization. De Waal (2008) notes that in the 1980s, people in the Darfur region made the distinction between famine that kills and famine that does not kill but that results in social breakdown and destitution. Howe and Devereux (2004) contend that ambiguous usages of the term famine have had tragic results for response and accountability in recent food crises. They argue that lack of consensus defining famine has contributed to delayed interventions and inequitable distribution of resources in areas of need. According to them, “Governments and agencies with national responsibility for famine prevention have often exploited the ambiguities in the term to contest whether a famine has occurred, thereby evading even limited accountability for their actions—or inactions” (p. 355). They thus propose an instrumental definition of famine using intensity and magnitude scales.

Limitations in codifying famine as crime also include the scope of actions considered to be faminogenic. There are no generally accepted criteria of what rates of malnutrition or mortality indicate the onset of a famine (Howe & Devereux, 2004). The Sphere Project is a voluntary consortium of humanitarian agencies that attempts to set internationally recognized common principles and minimum standards of humanitarian response to complex emergencies that can be applied universally. The Sphere Project (2004) shows similar lack of consensus in defining and establishing thresholds for moderate and severe malnutrition among population groups (children over five years old, adolescents, working age adults, and elderly people). Political differences exist, but the international community cannot afford to give up attempting to bridge these differences. These concerns are legitimate and deserve more detailed reflection.

An important argument against criminalizing faminogenic practices is that states may be unwilling to enter into such legally binding frameworks (Marcus, 2003). Similar arguments were advanced before the creation of other international frameworks. Marcus notes that codifying famine as crime may result in some potential donor states’ refusal to provide aid to starving populations with the justification that to do so would be equivalent to aiding criminal governments. It can also be noted that the international community continues to provide humanitarian aid through NGOs in places where there is no single central government and places with no semblance of governance. De Waal (2008) also cautions that the criminalization of famine would further hinder humanitarian operations, as perpetrating states often refuse to grant access to relief workers. Despite political and legal complexities, we argue that the criminalization of faminogenic practices has the potential to save lives and that it is the responsibility of the international community to protect those at the margins of society whose human rights may be trampled on.
Conclusions

This paper argues for the codification of willful famine as a crime against humanity. The subsequent prosecution of perpetrators who engage in faminogenic practices is more likely to deter future offenders and prevent famine. The attribution of famine to events in nature such as low levels of rainfall, drought, deforestation, desertification, and climate change minimizes state policies that push these events into the levels of complex emergencies. Famine should be viewed as state crime when ensuing human rights violations result from the state’s deviance from internationally recognized statures (Green & Ward, 2004). Acts of state deviance that exacerbate the impact of famine and other natural disasters on vulnerable populations include practices of political corruption, government negligence, and post-disaster cover-ups.

Willful famine has not been formally criminalized, although international laws exist that prohibit the starvation of civilian populations during conflict. Precedent has been established in which famine can be considered criminal and legal codes determined. As famine is “a particularly virulent manifestation” of starvation (Sen, 1981, p. 40), it should likewise be prohibited by international convention if intentionally inflicted as a weapon of war or as a deliberate policy of a government to exterminate a particular population. If famine is merely attributed to natural causes, with states unaccountable for willful negligence and malfeasance, then human misery caused by state criminality will remain unabated.

Humanity may not be evolving in its physical attributes in a way that is perceptible to the naked eye (the way that evolution is illustrated in textbooks showing images of pre-historic man to modern man). However, the evolving intellectual capacity of the human species, made evident by ingenuity and technical innovation, has dramatically revolutionized our environment, be it for the advancement of or the destruction of said environment, especially in the past 100 years. Humans have mastery of various acts in diverse fields and are no longer passive spectators of local or global events. The capacity to alleviate mass starvation is within our reach. Yet some would willfully choose to apply the weapon of famine for political purpose. Such violence committed against a population anywhere should never be tolerated and should be criminalized.
References


Abstract

Due to the fact that there is a new world culture, with increasing connections of varied local cultures, the characteristics of the 21st century seem to be globalization, seen as “a matter of increasing long-distance interconnectedness, at least across national boundaries, preferably between continents as well” (Hannerz, 1996, p. 17). However, despite this tendency towards globalization, there are still some communities who have no contacts even within the same country (different tribes from an African country, for example) or countries which are isolated due to political doctrine (North Korea, for example), where contact with the rest of the world is not possible. The link depends on the place and time: the strength of the communist era in Eastern Europe compared to the openness of nowadays, for example, or the lack of interconnectedness in the Third World in the 21st century due to the financial situation while in the same period of time, in developed countries, globalization is no longer theory, but everyday life (consumer goods coming from the other side of the world, tourists, exchange programmes, etc.). In recent times, people everywhere have cultivated links and relationships to people and places in other countries and on other continents, especially in a political context. “Globalization creates First Worlds in the Third Worlds and Third Worlds in the First World” (Parameswaran, 2008, p. 116). The diplomat is one of the strangers who is playing an important and increasing role in globalizing the world. The diplomats’ status and challenges are analysed through the theories of Hannerz, Simmel, Luckmann, and Stonequist.
The Diplomat as an Actor in the Globalized World

Globalization is a key word of our times and an issue for the day to day life. The question is not whether this leads to less or more culture, but how the contact between cultures is possible, for diplomats, in the era of globalization.

The main actor of the globalized world is the cosmopolitan. The term comes from the Greek and was coined by the stoics as kosmētēs (world citizen). If “the cosmopolitanism leads to a borderless society of strangers” (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 377), the diplomat’s mission is not so difficult. But, even nowadays, with some closed societies or societies which are unfriendly towards strangers and with clear nation-states, this is not yet possible, even if the state has sometimes lost its quality as a sharp entity and the interactions are becoming easier and easier. We are not yet living in a world of cosmopolitans, because there are still communities which have not been touched by globalization, but the trend towards ‘Unions’, such as the European Union and the African Union, is moving in this direction. The semi-globalization of the world is a challenge for a diplomat, moving from country to country and trying to adapt himself in each place, being expected not only to survive, but to flourish without “local, immediate, concrete and exclusive bounds” (p. 384).

In Hannerz view (1996) there are two types of cosmopolitans: the individual who takes from the other culture only those elements which suit himself, this being the way, in the long term, to construct his own unique personal perspective or the one who does not make distinctions between the particular elements of the alien culture in order to admit some of them into his repertoire and refuse others. He does not negotiate with the other culture but accepts it as a package deal. This is the place to introduce the diplomat. His attitude must lie somewhere between the two mentioned above. He is not entitled to negotiate the culture in which he is a guest, he must take it as it is, without comment and complaint. He is not in a post in the country to criticize it. On the other hand, in order to find his way in the culture, to acculturate himself in order not to be rejected, to socialize and find connections (important in diplomacy), he needs his own perspective. Immersion in the other culture, although necessary for a diplomat, is, at the same time, limited by the constraints of the job and by his own constraints. The diplomat is a spectator and participant at one and the same time, which give him the quality of being involved and being objective all at once.

One important point to be mentioned is that cosmopolitanism represents not only the mobility of persons but also the mobility of the person’s perspective. Cosmopolitanism supposes a state of mind, characterized by openness toward other cultural experiences. This openness is expressed through listening, observing, being intuitive, and reflecting. These qualities as an observer and participant should be the result of one’s own state of mind (willingness) and not the result of requests imposed by the country. The involvement of the diplomat in the new culture is not thanks to his own good will. He has to build up connections and networks because it is part of his job, even if he does not necessarily enjoy it.

Another characteristic of the cosmopolitan is the fact that he is more distant and reserved remaining objective, as Simmel (1992) says. He prefers to remain a stranger, not to be included by the locals (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 376), always ready to leave the organization. This is another factor that transforms the diplomat into a cosmopolitan – he does not seek inclusion, and even when involved, he remains outside the local community, flexible and aware of the fact that he could, at any moment, be asked to leave by his own country or by the host country, in the case of a diplomatic conflict. In this context, we can speak about “we” and “others”, the latter being the society where a stranger – the diplomat – is (or is not) accepted. Perfect identification with the culture of the others and total intrusion is dangerous for a diplomat. If the diplomat becomes too familiar with the system and the people (in their attempt to become integrated and accepted), feelings of being at home in the culture of the others as well as in their own culture will ensue. If things are considered as normal and
familiar, the interests of their own country are overshadowed and there is a danger of becoming useless for their country.

**Cosmopolitan-local Distinction**

The diplomat must be seen in the context of his new surroundings, not as space, but as society. As pointed out above, cosmopolitanism supposes more than just movement in the world from one space to another. Can an immigrant, a trader, or even a tourist be considered a cosmopolitan? Finally, the three of them are on the move, they get involved with the locals, interaction is present and the cultures could be contrasting cultures. However, a tourist is in contact only with a superficial side of a country and he cannot go in details, while someone living in a country can get in touch with the more profound side of the society. In addition, the reaction of the locals towards the tourists is different than the one towards the strangers who are living there for a longer period.

Someone can be given the attribute of cosmopolitan only in regards to the locals. The cosmopolitan-local distinction has been a part of sociological vocabulary since 1957, having been introduced by Merton in his book *Social Theory and Social Structures*. He made a study of two types of influential persons, the local and the cosmopolitan, pointing out the differences between these categories. In order to divide up people into these two categories, he used criteria such as geographical situation and patterns of communication behavior, but the main criterion for distinguishing the two was found in their orientation towards a certain place (in Merton’s case a small city called Rovere). Merton adopted these terms from Zimmerman, who, translated Toennies’ concept of *Gemeinschaft* as localistic and *Gesellschaft* as cosmopolitan (Merton, 1968). Although the terms are used in the literature to refer to types of social relationship or social organization, Merton uses them as types of influential persons, which includes, in our case, the diplomat as an influential person, due to his status. In Merton’s conception, for the local, the place where he lives essentially represents his world. He is preoccupied with local problems and he is “parochial” (Merton, 1968, p. 447). The cosmopolitan type (who has previously lived in other places and in other communities) maintains a minimum relation with the community where he exercises a certain influence but he is oriented towards the outside world, because even when he is resident in a certain place, he lives in the “great society”, feeling himself not to be rooted in that place. “If the local type is parochial, the cosmopolitan is ecumenical” (p. 447). In this regard, although I have shown that the diplomat fulfills the conditions for being a cosmopolitan, he does not fit in with Merton’s criteria. He is sent to a certain place to be oriented towards this place; he has to be informed about what is happening in the place where he has been posted and he has to keep in the contact with the locals (officials and others). Although it is important for him to know what is happening in the outside world and especially in his home country in order to carry out his functions well, priority has to be given to the “parochial situation”.

Of course, the diplomat does not feel rooted in the place where he is posted (this is not his home, after all), but he has to find his way about without putting down his roots, to keep to Merton’s concept. Merton considers that the differences between locals and cosmopolitans do not only arise from education and knowledge, but also from their basic orientation, which is preordained by the structure of the social relations they construct, the “roads they have travelled to their present position” (p. 448), the utilization of their present status and their communicational behavior. Being familiar with the place, the local knows the “ins and outs of politics, business and social life” (p. 454). The cosmopolitan, being a new comer, has to learn these ins and outs. It is precisely this which is one of the missions of the diplomat. On the other hand, he arrives already equipped with the prestige and skills, which are associated with his profession, while the local has to gain them. In contact with other locals, the local has the advantage of understanding the cultural patterns, habits, and customs. The cosmopolitan has
the advantage of knowledge, but, in the case of the diplomat, he has to acquire the understanding. Acceptance and understanding of the local culture will help him to carry out his tasks. A distinction between local and global (with global standing for cosmopolitan here) is also made by Hannerz: the former is a source of cultural continuity and the latter is a source of change. The cosmopolitan introduces some changes into the life of the local. He brings new ideas, new habits, and new values. Because he travels with his meanings and perspectives and his social standards, he gives the local the possibility of making a comparison between his local culture and the outside world. Without intending to do so, through his contacts with the locals, the diplomat somehow contributes to globalizing them. This is way, the diplomat as a cosmopolitan is not only very mobile, moving from a country to another one, but he has (or he is supposed to have) a very mobile mind and perspective, being an active participant in the globalization process around the world.

Of course, it should not be forgotten that locals remain locals even without cosmopolitans, but someone cannot be a cosmopolitan without locals, without being placed in relation to the local society. Just as Cowan and Arsenault use the term ubuntu (from Ghanan language, other authors are given as source Kenyan language), the meaning being “I am human only through others” (2008, p. 616), I can say that the diplomat is cosmopolitan only through contact with “the others”. In order to become involved, the first condition is the willingness of the diplomat and the second is the willingness of the other, “Of the various conditions said to be important to the interpersonal domain, reciprocity stands out as one of the most significant” (Sampson, 2003, p. 158).

A World Citizen

Constantinou considers that “The diplomat is a prominent citizens of the polis, ‘sent abroad to see the world’ with the purpose of finding out the laws and political ways of other peoples (non-Greeks) and bringing back this knowledge to inform and suggest reforms in the polis” (2005, p. 354).

Moving from his home country to a new country transforms the diplomat into a stranger, a concept that will be developed furthermore. Before being a stranger, a marginal man, or a member of an embassy, the diplomat is first and foremost a human being. Constantinou has proposed a very interesting term, homo-diplomacy.

The first aspect concerns the non-professional dimension of diplomacy, by which I mean the interpersonal dealings of the homo sapiens, the experiential diplomacy of everyday life. The second aspect concerns the transformative potential of diplomacy, that is, a form of diplomacy (a more spiritual form of diplomacy) that engages in heterology to revisit and rearticulate homology, whose mission is not only, not just, the knowledge and control of the Other but fundamentally the knowledge of the Self. (Constantinou, 2006, p. 352)

Even though he is abroad nearly all of the time, the diplomat does not lose contact with his “mother country” which he represents and where he goes back to every three or four years. As a world citizen, he does not deny his quality as a citizen of Germany, France, or the United States, for example, he simply adheres to a set of universal values. He is not in forced exile; he is in his chosen place in the world. In this context I can consider the diplomat as a new category of persons at home nowhere and everywhere in a worldwide chaos of cultural diversity, where the local remains local and the universal, universal.

Moving from one place to another, the diplomat is a stranger in all places (sometimes even at home, where he spends less time than away). Nussbaum stresses that the invitation to acquire world citizenship is an invitation to lose your friends, neighbors, and colleagues, an invitation to be in exile. It is a “lonely business” (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 15). In this situation, the diplomat has to remap his social order. “For the cosmopolitans, the breakdown of the group
boundaries opens up new possibilities for remapping the social order, in which they rule without local and national restraints” (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 373). He needs full-time adjustment. He is in continuous transition; things have a “short life” for him, relations as well. He is on the move in the world. Sofer used the word impermanence for the situation of the diplomat abroad, the diplomat being “a wanderer among diverse cultures, climates and customs” (1997, p. 182). Another word to characterize the diplomat’s life is temporary, an ephemeral situation for him and his family, because diplomats usually take their wife/husband, children, and sometimes even servants, baby sitters, etc., abroad with them. Previous friendships are interrupted and old friends may be lost. In this special case, the difficulty was in learning the mother language. If the diplomats and their families are not able to react rapidly to the new situation to find their way in their new life, they always remain with nostalgia for the old place. In this case, integration is difficult. Some of the diplomats who have written books, memoirs, or articles about their lives mentioned the Diplomatenenkinderschicksal1 “It is not easy for the children of the diplomats. Quite a few of them cannot cope with this life. The children, like their parents, are moving in a three-year rhythm… It can be painful.” (von Selchow, interview with U. Sante, 2006, p. 181). Short-lived relations with friends and surrounding are also the fate of the diplomat’s partner, whether wife or husband, as a collateral effect of his globalized life. Usually they are obliged to give up a profession or a job in order to follow their partners to the countries where they are sent. Those who do not do this of their own free will, or those who are doing it under constraints, might have difficulties adapting to their new lives and feel unhappy in the new country.

The Diplomat, A Marginal Man – As Effect of Globalization Process

We cannot ignore the fact that the diplomat, as a stranger, somehow lives in two universes, but not as a full member of either of them; he does not totally adapt to the new culture and, at the same time, he is no longer part of his home culture either. Although some diplomats feel more like being member of the society at home compared to the country where they work and others feel the opposite, as fully integrated in the society where they are posted and like the marginal men at home, clear is that a diplomat lives between two cultures. Sharp found a metaphor to describe the situation of the diplomat abroad, being one of the first authors who describe the diplomat as a professional stranger, “the boat is pushed out, they leave, but they do not fully arrive in the place where they are to be received” (2009, p. 101). With one foot he is at home, in the country that he represents and that means he needs to keep in touch and have good knowledge of the political, economic, and social situation at home. However, as he is not physically there, he possibly loses partial touch with the people at home. With the other foot he is in the country where he is posted, where he must be well informed because he is the author of reports about the situation in that country which he has to send home. But he does not belong to that place. He has to respect the laws of the country where he is posted and generally accepted rules (regarding human rights, for example), but at the same time he has to conform with his own country’s laws.

Stonequist (1961) speaks about three types of strangers, using three French terms: déraciné, dépaysé and déclassé. The diplomat is not déraciné because even when abroad, he still has somehow his roots in his home country; he has a clear origin and is supposed to go back to his original roots after his service is complete. He is also far from being déclassé, because he enjoys a high status. The best word from those three to describe his situation is maybe the term dépaysé, because it might happen, when the diplomat comes to live and work

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1 The destiny of the diplomats children (own translation from German).
2 Uprooted
3 Disoriented, not feeling at home
4 Inferior rank, grade, prestige
in a new country, that he is disoriented at the beginning until he finds his way in the new culture. If he does not find his way in the new place, disorientation will turn into a culture shock. Park considers that the marginal man is “a personality type that arises at the time and place where, out of the conflict of races and cultures, new societies, new peoples and cultures are coming into existence” (as cited in Stonequist, 1961, p. xvii). In the case of the diplomat, he is not only “a new man”, but he brings with him a new culture, which due to his profession, is not ignored in the new place. On the contrary, he and everything that makes up his function is at the full attention of the officials in the place where he is posted. Park believes that the marginal man plays the role of the cosmopolitan and the stranger at the same time. He becomes a person with a wide horizon (which is normal for a diplomat because he moves from one place to another and has knowledge about all the places where he has been posted). He is “detached and rational”, says Park (as cited in Stonequist 1961, p. xviii). From this point of view he comes to the same conclusions as Simmel, who speaks about the objectivity of the stranger. Park also considers that the marginal man is the effect of imperialism, in economic, political, and cultural terms. In the case of the diplomat, the marginalization is the effect of political contacts and agreements between countries in the globalization era. Stonequist gives another definition of the marginal man as “the individual who, through migration, education, marriage, or some other influence leaves one social group or culture without making a satisfactory adjustment to another finds himself to the margins of each but a member of neither” (Stonequist, 1961, pp. 2-3). I agree that the diplomat is at the margins of two cultures, but he does not have peripheral participation. Sofer, on the other hand, considers the diplomat abroad a “peripheral man”, who lives at the edges of society (1997, p. 181), being entrapped in a false social position. Through his position and his job, he is in the centre and not at the periphery. He has a special status and he must be treated with consideration; he cannot be ostracized or rejected because of his nationality or race. From this point of view, the diplomat is not a marginal man. Another question that is raised from Stonequist’s theory is whether the diplomat could be considered a hybrid, from a cultural point of view. The answer is no because, although the diplomat has a mixed culture, he is not the result of contact between different races and neither is he the result of cultural diffusion, as Stonequist defines the hybrid. It is not the case that a whole cultural system moves into another system, which can only happen when a large group of people is involved. The diplomat is one person who represents one culture in another culture. Thus, the diplomat is somehow at the margins of the culture of the host country, suffering from incomplete incorporation in his new surroundings. Regarding his home culture, he is also at the margins. Being abroad, although permanently in contact with officials and colleagues from his ministry, the diplomat loses touch with his “real life” at home, which might make re-entry shock possible especially if he takes on two consecutive posts abroad and is away for up to eight years. However, it is very important to mention that the diplomat leaves his social group for a professional reason, he is not forced to do so, it is his choice. One of the criteria used by Stonequist to identify the marginal man is his nationality (based on the fact that in modern countries, society is formed upon the principle of nationality) and another is race superiority because “cultural differences among national groups are explained in terms of biological causation” (p. 8). He also mentions possible hostile social attitudes in the host country, but in diplomacy, even when countries are very different ideologically, the diplomat is paid the necessary respect. So normally, none of these criteria can be applied to diplomacy. Generally speaking, the question of nationality, race, or social attitude could maybe erase problems in the case of the immigrant but not in the case of the diplomat.

As has already been pointed out, in few years that he spends in a country, the diplomat is not able to fully encompass all the cultural patterns of that place. Stonequist claims that he cannot acquire a new and stable self. Moreover, total adaptation is not advised because he is, after all, representing his home country (that means its values, its culture, and its habits) and if
he takes on the new culture totally he is no longer useful for the country who sent him. “Without social distance and this enchanting strangeness, the diplomat may lose his usefulness” (Sofer, 1997, p. 185). That is one of the reasons for the unwritten rule in diplomacy about not keeping a diplomat in a post for more than three to four years (some exceptions being possible).

A New Identity

The advantages and disadvantages of the globalized life for the diplomat abroad are obvious. The next question is if he needs, in this situation, a new identity. More than 30 years ago, personal identity was a sociological category of similar importance to the social institution, “In the course of the twentieth century the socio-political connotations of identity concepts faded whereas the psychological implications, linking identity to some ‘inner self’ gained in importance” (Luckmann, 2006). Some changes have occurred in the meantime. One of them was the increasing individualization of social relations, taking into account the perspective of “the others”. “The individuals experience their actions not only in their own ‘inner’ perspective but also in the perspective of others” ( Luckmann, 2006). As Luckmann says, personal identity is constituted through face-to-face interactions. Pekerti and Thomas have the same meaning, “it is possible that in interacting with a culturally different other, individuals felt obligated to reinforce, through their behavior, their own cultural identity” (2003, p. 139). In the case of the diplomat, he remodels his identity in face of the new reality of the country where he is posted, but he does not fake his own identity just to please others. Sofer speaks about the crisis of identity of the diplomat as stranger; the diplomat is called upon to refrain from being his true self, “Perhaps this is the cruelest price paid for the sake of diplomacy: to be a strange to oneself” (1997, p. 183). Each society is different to a certain degree and the cultural identity is different in each society. It might be the case that German and Austrian societies are similar to a certain degrees, but at the same time, German society is different to Eskimo society. The diplomat’s system of values is primarily connected with the place he comes from and with common sense. If the ‘guest society’ is similar with his ‘home society’ and globalized enough to offer him the necessary comfort, there no need for a new identity. However, the challenge for the diplomat, in this context, is to retain his own identity and to find a way of managing contact with people with different identities, not losing his affection for, and identification with, his place of birth. “The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up local identifications, which can be a source of great richness in life” (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 8). The diplomat does not suffer from a process of ‘Americanization’, ‘Germanization’, or ‘Romanization’, he remains who he was at birth. The process of learning influences membership, and the new skills and discourse become “part of developing one’s identity as a full legitimate participant” (Castells, 2008, p. 298). Only moving easily and with an open minded from one circle to another gives the diplomat full access to world citizenship and transforms him into a world citizen with full intercultural skills.

Conclusion

The diplomat, although having the characteristics of a world citizen, is not allowed to create a large gap between himself and his own culture in order to understand the new one. As a world citizen, the diplomat is one of many who hold world citizenship, just like managers who move from one country to another (especially in recent years), depending on the wishes of the company they work for. In a mobile world strangers attract a lot of attention in the societies in which they live. In this case, the diplomat can manage his situation better than the stranger without being rejected and without taking over, just by adapting and having an open
mind. On the other hand, moving from one place to another, with a biography that includes staying in different places, the diplomat takes the knowledge he has acquired with him, the final result being a flexible citizen with knowledge without boundaries. In this context, being all the time surrounded by cultural differences, the borders become, as Ossewaarde puts it, “superfluous” (2007). It is from this point of view that they must judge themselves and their actions for a diplomat. These persons are equipped (or at least they are supposed to be equipped, by the simple fact that they have been selected by their own country) with a special set of knowledge and “they could leave and take it with them without devaluing it” (Hannerz, 1996, p. 108).

Diplomacy remains, due to its characteristics, restraints, and advantages a special mixture of profession and vocation. The diplomat is in a continuous process of changing his relationship to match current patterns. Of course, in his case, moving from one country to another, and moving again after some years, the diplomat could be confronted with an identity crisis, new rules for the social constructions of identity. He does not know any longer where he belongs. He has become a world citizen, at home everywhere and nowhere.
References


Abstract

The emerging interest in diasporic studies has recently begun to permeate various academic disciplines, none more so than cultural studies. Today, there are numerous articles, books, and journals that have begun to engage in heated discussions on the importance of recognizing and understanding diaspora communities as collective transnational organizations and movements. However, sociology, the discipline out of which traditional migration theory emerged, has seemingly been more reluctant to embrace the concept of diaspora. In this article, I initiate a much needed conversation between traditional sociological migration theory and theories of diaspora emerging out of cultural studies. I look at the commonalities that exist between the two fields of study as well as points of divergence. Finally, I suggest ways in which the two fields can work together to help us gain a more nuanced understanding and appreciation of what happens when persons migrate.
Global Journeys: From Transnationalism to Diaspora

Advances in information technology, increased accessibility to communication via the internet, and more affordable modes of transportation have facilitated the rapid mobility of information, capital, people, and power to nontraditional spheres. In the twenty first century, such nontraditional spheres include diasporas—groups of migrants originating from the same homeland who have formed transnational movements. “Diaspora—as both concept and social practice—is in vogue” (Dufoix, 2003). This quote by Stephane Dufoix can be contrasted to popular sentiment in previous years when scholars like when William Saffran (1991) observed that scholarship on ethnicity and immigration paid “little if any attention….to diasporas” (as cited in Brubaker, 2005). The concept of “diaspora” has indeed become a “hot topic,” the relevance, and significance, and negotiation of which are actively debated not only in academia (beginning especially in 1991 with the publication of the academic journal Diaspora) but also in real life, where governments, politicians, and economists all reference the term “disapora.”

The political importance of diasporas across the globe is evident in the recent surge in discussions about their geo-political influence. The 2010-2011 Arab Spring (the revolutionary political demonstrations and protests in the Middle East) gained tremendous global coverage for the way in which residents were displaying levels of frustration and intolerance of injustice, but the uprising also was a platform from which diasporas connected to these countries were able to become directly involved in socio-political change. The important role of migrants in the Arab Spring resulted in political analysts, academics, and intellectuals developing renewed interest in the impact of diasporas. One online commentary, The National, published an article discussing the important role of diasporas not just in the revolutionary process of change but also in the future reconstruction of the countries affected by the Arab Spring. Specifically, the article highlighted the World Bank’s appeal that these nations call on their diasporas to help them rebuild; the article’s author quotes the organization’s economist, Dilip Ratha, as saying, “The diaspora can be a friend in foul weather. If things are not going well in your country, and foreign investors aren’t there, the diaspora will still be there” (Arnold, 2011). These kinds of discussions about diasporas are not unique to the Arab Spring or to countries experiencing political upheaval. For example, in 2012, the U.S. State Department hosted its second annual Global Diaspora Forum under the theme “Moving Forward by Giving Back.” This conference took place in the nation’s capital on July 25-26, 2012. According to the website for the forum,

The Global Diaspora Forum is an annual celebration of America’s diaspora communities. The gathering challenges diaspora communities to forge partnerships with the private sector, civil society, and public institutions in order to make their engagements with their countries of origin or ancestry effective, scalable, and sustainable.

Such examples of journalists, intellectuals, and political leaders hosting conferences and forums and making public attempts to facilitate the influence of diasporas on their home countries shows just how timely this research is.

This interest in diasporas is not limited to the developing world or to the host countries where migrants reside. Leaders in developing countries such as in Africa, the Caribbean, and South America are also are having conversations and reconsidering nontraditional resources that could help them become competitive. Noticeably, diasporas are frequently mentioned in these
conversations, often cited as invaluable assets to aid in the country’s development and, therefore, a major part of the solutions they seek.

In this paper, I review and discuss the rise of “diasporic studies” over the past two decades. These contemporary studies, utilizing renewed and recreated definitions of diaspora and the role of diaspora communities, reflect the theoretical shift and current trends in migration studies. In particular, I am interested in trying to determine when and how the term “diaspora” (in its current form) came to play such an important role in academia. The paper is also ambitious in the sense that while trying to assess the rise of diaspora studies, I start what I believe to be a much needed dialogue between the sociological literature on migration and the literature on diasporic studies. To date, the two have often been discussed in different camps (sociology and cultural studies, respectively), giving the impression that neither camp of scholars has anything in common. However, this paper seeks to show what connections, if any, exist between theories of migration in sociology, specifically theories of transnational migration and theories of diaspora studies.

I begin with a brief explanation of the title of this paper and an interpretation of how I believe ‘the migrant’ has evolved in academia. Because diaspora is the central aspect of this paper, I then provide a discussion of the understanding and definition of diaspora, as presented by some of the pioneering scholars. I choose to start with a discussion of diasporas because I believe that obtaining an understanding of diasporas will be helpful in understanding the connections and diversions between theories of transnational migration and diasporas, which are discussed in the subsequent sections. (A thorough discussion and review of transnational migration theory is beyond the scope of this paper, although an overview of the theory can be obtained throughout the paper.)

The Journey of the ‘Migrant’

At the risk of resorting to a fixed, linear progression of the conceptualization of the movement of people across borders, I assert that what we have seen in studies on migration is an “academic evolution” from the notion of ‘migrants’ to that of ‘diasporas’ and then, ultimately, to that of ‘transnational social movements.’ That said, the greatest overlap between studies on diasporas (originating out of the cultural studies discipline) and sociology of migration theories lies in the area of transnational migration. However, where I believe that diaspora studies move beyond theories of transnational migration can by summarized in two points: (1) diaspora studies’ focus on how members of diasporas *self-identify as belonging to the diaspora communities and eventually formulate a new movement based on this identity and (2) the ways in which members of diasporas connect not only with the host country and the home country but also the ways in which they *connect with each other*.

These distinguishing points seem to be problematic for scholars who intend to reserve the right to categorize people who move across borders and define them as “migrants” or “transmigrants.” Although academics have utilized the concept of diaspora widely, I argue that diaspora studies differentiates itself from studies of migration based on the premise that the members of diasporas are self-identified; they do not quite fit nicely into theoretical typologies or defining characteristics—they define themselves and operate accordingly. In short, diaspora is more than just another concept being introduced to group and categorize persons; it is also a social process. It is a process in which some migrants actively engage—a process that possibly shares qualities of a movement. Furthermore, I suggest that missing from theories of
transnational migration is the deep connection members of diaspora communities share with each other, another somewhat difficult reality for social scientists concerned with quantifiable phenomena to study. This is not to say, therefore, that migration scholars need not try to understand diasporas or the role diasporas play in the current global era. Regardless of whether or not they do, however, I believe that it is crucial to realize that whatever social scholars have to say about the reality of diasporas, diasporas are very real to those who participate in them.

Despite the fact that diaspora communities are often real for those who participate in them, some scholars assert that diaspora studies is just a passing fad in academia. As Butler (2001) put it, many scholars are keen to capitalize on the “sexiness of the discourse of diaspora studies in academia” without putting much effort into forming a methodological and theoretical conceptualization of the term. This may be partly true, as scholars are often seeking ways to make their work innovative and important by somehow incorporating the latest “hot topic.” However, I challenge the notion that such studies are a fad or that they are “passing” in any way. Instead, the challenge facing academia at this time is to shift the focus and unit of analysis from the scholars of migration to the actors in migration and diasporas. Once we do so, I think we become less concerned with conceptual, theoretical flaws and instead become able to get to the things that matter most: an understanding of how these individuals are defining themselves, changing their lives, and impacting the world.

What is Diaspora?

Before I engage in a more thorough discussion, it is important to remember that among scholars focusing on migrant networks, identity politics, cultural politics, and global movements the definition of “diaspora” remains highly contested because not only are scholars not in agreement on a single definition, but others reject diaspora itself as a new theoretical lens. As Brubaker (2005) remarks, we are in essence witnessing a “‘diaspora’ diaspora—a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space.” Furthermore, according to Brubaker, the large number of scholars who have attempted to define and redefine the concept has possibly left “diaspora” as a concept “stretched to the point of uselessness.” It is highly possible that like “transnationalism” before it, what “diaspora” suffers from is what Robert K. Merton (1968) referred to as the “fallacy of adumbration.” As Merton stated in Social Theory and Social Structure, “To come very near to a true theory and to grasp its precise applications are two very different things…Everything of importance has been said before by someone who did not discover it” (as cited in Portes, 2001). That is, “if something is new, it is not really true, and if something is true, it is not actually new” (Portes, 2001). And so, we inevitably get to the question that leads to this essay: Is diaspora new? Or even true?

Before we fall into the “age old” trap of romanticizing, we must remember that, like all spaces, diasporas are places of contestation and struggle. They are heterogeneous entities, replete with varying personalities, experiences of gender, race, class, sexuality, immigration status, age, and religion, among other differences. Like any other organization or community, these differences suggest that there are constant struggles for power, for leadership, for common goals, and for agenda setting within them. As Hua (2006) reminds us, no diaspora community is homogenous; “diasporic communities and networks are not exempted from sexism, racism, ethnicity, classism, homophobia, ageism, and other discrepancies and prejudices.” Because of this contestation, Werbner (2002) describes diasporas as “chaordic,” replete with multiple discourses, dissent, and competition—all within the same diaspora. This understanding may
weaken the claim that people actively “choose” to join a diaspora, which leads some scholars to believe that only some persons (i.e. those who are highly educated, wealthy, or elite, etc.) are included in the diaspora, while others (i.e. the poor, struggling and uneducated) are excluded.

Just as we have to be careful not to assume that all persons who relocate become knowledgeable of the existence of diasporas or actively participate in them, we also have to be careful not to resort to the equally problematic labeling and categorizing of the “masses of migrants” who are viewed as poor, uneducated, and struggling. Indeed, the claim that a diaspora necessarily consists primarily of migrants is as faulty as the claim that diasporas necessarily exclude them. These conceptual challenges to our understandings of how diasporas come about do not mean that we should abandon the consideration of agency or choice altogether. In fact, I maintain that agency and choice are essential to understanding diaspora formation. It is also important to remember that diaspora formation is not always a positive phenomenon and that there are instances in which diaspora communities support civil wars and political instability in their home countries. Despite all this, diaspora is a concept worth exploring, to which I will attempt to bring some clarity in the next paragraphs.

In the pioneering work on diaspora communities, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (1997), Robin Cohen presents a thorough assessment and analysis of the world’s dispersed communities. The word *diaspora* is derived from the Greek verb *speiro* (to sow) and the preposition *dia* (over), so its literal translation is “to sow over” (Cohen, 1997). Therefore, when we speak of diaspora, we are acknowledging some form of dispersion from a central location or place of origin that results in the scattering of something or someone over various locations (oftentimes two or more countries). When referring to people, the term “diaspora” implies that people have been relocated or removed from their original place of residence (homeland). In his book, Cohen describes the term as originally being used to describe the experience of the Jews—a group of people who were forced out of their place of residence, shunned into exile, and scattered around the world. Hence, in academia, the word “diaspora” was often used in relation to the Jewish population and has historically had the connotation of a negative experience (i.e. forced relocation). In his discussion, Cohen acknowledges that although the modern conceptualization of diaspora communities has evolved drastically from this view of victimized, exiled diasporans, an understanding of the Jewish diaspora is crucial in understanding today’s dispersed communities.

Historically, there are other “victim diasporas” that have significantly influenced the discourse on diaspora. These historical, often victimized and traumatized diaspora communities include the African Diaspora, the Armenian Diaspora, the Irish Diaspora and the Palestinian Diaspora (Cohen, 1997). But today, there is much more variety in the diaspora communities that are being analyzed, with a shift from a focus on historical, victimized diasporas to that of a living diaspora, conceptual lens that provides a framework for the observation, analysis, and discussion of active migrant movements. As one scholar put it, “Membership in diaspora now implies potential empowerment based on the ability to mobilize international support and influence both the homeland and the hostland” (Clifford, as cited in Butler, 2001). As this quote suggests, “diaspora” invokes a sense of agency and action within those who participate in it. That is, those who have migrated seem to experience a greater sense of involvement in a community when they view themselves as belonging to a “diaspora” as opposed to being just a migrant. This is not to say that the traditional push/pull model of understanding the process of migration is outdated or that it does not apply to specific type of migrants, (e.g. those who move from the Global South to the Global North). However, diaspora studies, compared to traditional migration studies, seem
less concerned with trying to describe reasons why people migrate and instead focus on the process that occurs after they migrate. In so doing, diaspora studies move beyond traditional push/pull models of migration (the primarily focus of which include exploring the factors that force or “push” migrants out of their home countries and attract or “pull” them to the host country). Diaspora studies are, in contrast, more concerned with understanding the process of community formation after persons migrate.

It is therefore not surprising that we are beginning to see an increase in the emergence of formal diaspora entities and organizations. Evidence of this increase is reflected in the plethora of studies on diaspora communities from various geographical regions around the world such as South Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Central Europe. Today’s diaspora communities are also much more diverse, with persons dispersed in multiple lands and with a wide variety of individuals partaking in initial dispersal, including refugees, temporary visitors, international students, permanent residents, and so forth. Here again, there is much controversy concerning who should “legitimately” be included in counts of diaspora communities and who should be excluded. Nevertheless, contemporary studies about diaspora communities are less concerned with who is traveling and are more concerned with when they travel, how they travel and under what circumstances, and their experiences when they arrive (Brah, 1996).

For Cohen, diaspora communities can exist in cyberspace, in a physical location, or as Benedict Anderson (1993 [1983]) would argue, through a shared imagination. In Global Diasporas, Cohen offers nine common elements that contemporary diaspora communities embody. In an effort to preserve brevity and conciseness, I will highlight what I consider to be some of the more important elements of the ones he presents in the hope that the reader will develop a more conclusive definition of the term diaspora. The third element on the list states that members of a diaspora community have a “collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history and achievements.” That is, they have a shared understanding of what and where the native country is and utilize their collective memory when reminiscing about the country. It also means that they often share similar nostalgic thoughts—often an idealized conception of what it would be like to return to the country of origin and all of the imagined benefits of returning. Another common feature of a diaspora community highlighted by Cohen is “a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate” (Cohen, 1997). In other words, members of a diaspora experience a strong bond with each other based on their shared belief of having a unique and distinct cultural and national identity as well as a belief that they have a common and connected future because of this identity. The salience of identity is often neglected in the transnational migration paradigm but cannot be ignored in diaspora studies. As Butler (2001) states, “[Diaspora] calls attention to the relationship between identity and active participation in the politics of hostland and homeland.” It is this identity that eventually facilitates the active involvement in the diaspora community and sustains the bonds and linkages that members of the diaspora form with each other.

Khacha Tololyan edited the only academic journal, to date, solely focused on studying diaspora communities. The title of this journal is Diaspora: A Journal of Transitional Studies. In the first publication of this journal in 1991, Toloyan stated that the journal would be “concerned with the way in which nations, real yet imagined communities are fabulated, brought into being, made and unmade, in culture and politics, both on the land people call their own and in exile” (as

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1 To “fabulate” is to engage in the composition of fables or stories.
Diaspora communities are therefore simultaneously “real” in a geographical sense (the actual dispersal of people) and “imagined,” in a conscious sense (the shared imagination of belonging to a community). Either way, they come into existence for very salient reasons. This understanding of diaspora is more in keeping with the postmodern definitions that scholars like Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy propose. The most important thing to remember is that while becoming a part of a diaspora community entails a form of consciousness raising and changing (a mental reality), the people themselves, through their collective action, make up the diaspora through the process of “rooting and branching” (Cohen, 1997). Diaspora communities are often not composed of any physical infrastructure, legal constitutions, or legislative policies (though this may very well be the case in the future). Instead, these communities are often formed as a result of everyday experiences, stories told, and communication and interaction with others from the common homeland. As such, the diaspora community is constantly evolving and changing.

Many authors have preferred to use the term *diaspora community* instead of immigrant or migrant community, because diaspora community not only suggests agency and action but also implies a strong engagement and connection with the homeland on a cultural, political, economic, and social level. Diaspora communities are composed of migrants who, according to James Clifford (1994), “feel (maintain, revive, invent) a connection with a prior home.” As such, this community is unique in its strong sense of connection to “home,” rooted in the community members’ resistance of cultural erasure in the new place of residence—they are often not concerned with conforming to the host society. Clifford argues that diaspora communities are different from traditional conceptions of immigrant communities because they are more permanent and are not as concerned with assimilation or permanent incorporation into the new culture. The notion of diaspora community also embodies post-colonialism, as the narrative of wanting to go home, to give back to one’s home culture, and to help one’s family members who remained in the homeland are all characteristics of the post-colonial subject (Brah, 1996). But as Brah explains, this “homing” desire or narrative is not necessarily the same as wanting to return to a physical homeland. Instead, it is more of an understanding that regardless of where the persons relocate, their conception of home is always with them and that it will remain a central part of their identities and that they will always themselves embody some obligation and responsibility to this home. Indeed, some persons in the diaspora feel a need to physically return to the homeland, but the “diasporic feeling” is that one never leaves the homeland, regardless of their place of residence.

One of the defining characteristics of diasporas is the creation of self identity. Those in the diaspora occupy what some argue is a “diasporic space” that incorporates the physical and metaphoric homeland, as well as some attributes of the new “host” society—a space replete with multiple identities. Because of this, those in diaspora communities have a very global outlook, living in the local but occupying global identities. That is, they often embody identities that transcend their physical locations. For this reason, cultural studies scholars like Stuart Hall (1990, 1992) and Paul Gilroy (1993) argue that contemporary, hybrid definitions of diaspora challenge any essentialized notion of race, identity, culture, or ethnicity and instead focus on differences and the reconstruction of new, multiple, fluid identities. Many scholars have begun to pay special attention to the formation of this new “diasporic identity” that is pronounced within these diaspora communities. These identities are often the quintessential features that determine how and why persons form diasporas. At the same time, we have to be careful not to essentialize this diasporic identity. As cultural studies expert Stuart Hall (1999) reminds us:
Identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation. Identity then is in a perpetual process of refreshing, renewing, and reforming itself; it is never static. This identity, though in constant fluctuation, eventually results in a sense of belonging to a common identity, and this helps to reaffirm the connection to the diaspora. In reality, multiple identities are created and reconstructed in these diaspora communities; oftentimes “simultaneous diasporan identities” exist (Butler, 2001).

**Transnational Migration and Diaspora: Where the Two Meet**

Now that we have established some understanding of the concept of diaspora, it is time to engage this understanding in dialogue with traditional sociology of migration theories, specifically transnational migration theories. In reality, despite the tendency to characterize diaspora studies as a novice phenomenon, the field shares similarities with transnational migration theories, primarily in the sense that both refer to the idea that nations are “unbound” (Anteby-Yemini & Berthomière, 2005; Vertotec, 1999). As Knowles argued, “The concepts of diasporas and transnationalism are ‘not distinct but bleed into each other in describing similar sets of people, circumstances and social processes’” (as cited in Ramji, 2006). Rogers Brubaker (2005) has also acknowledged a “fuse” between the literature on transnationalism and the literature on diasporas. Nagel (2001) even uses the two fields as two sides of the same coin, referring to the literature in her article as “diaspora/transnationalism literature.” The obvious similarity between them is that both concepts claim to present an alternative lens through which to view migrants and the migrant experience that departs from the older assimilation theories of migration. The often cited example of the old assimilation model of migration is Oscar Handlin’s 1951 publication of *The Uprooted*, which suggested that migrants experience a “clean break” from their countries of origin, where the place they left remained a distant past and the migrants assumed a new life and a new identity in the host country. This model promoted a linear and limited understanding of the process of migration, suggesting that it simply involved going from “immigrant” to “ethnic resident” to “native citizen” over the course of two or three generations (Smith, R., 2005). It is this assimilation model that, according to most transnational migration theorists, has dominated migration research and the way migrants were viewed up until two decades ago (Smith, R., 2005). But perhaps both transnational migration scholars and diaspora scholars could benefit greatly from a more nuanced exploration of the assimilation model from which they both argue they are attempting to depart. A good reference here is the work by Alba and Nee (2003), who attempt to trace and explain the ways the American mainstream has been affected by and has affected the process of immigration and, specifically, the assimilation of immigrants. In their work, they highlight the differences between the assimilation patterns of early European immigrants and the assimilation patterns of contemporary immigrants, who originate, for the most part, from the Global South. While advocating for the importance of understanding the process of assimilation, the authors nonetheless assert that assimilation is not inevitable and that, contrary to the assimilation model associated with Handlin, all immigrants face a choice when it comes to how much of their own culture they want to keep and how much of the new culture they are willing to accept. The authors also assert that this is not a one-time
process but is instead a continuous social process. Like transnationalist and diaspora scholars, Alba and Nee (2003) also challenge the traditional theories that tended to separate immigrants into the distinct categories of those who assimilated well and those who did not. Alba and Nee discussed an often ignored aspect of assimilation—the reciprocity of the assimilation process. Using America as the prime example, they contend that as much as immigrants are being encouraged to “become” American and are unconsciously versed in the American way of life, the so-called American way of life itself is being changed, altered, and affected by the immigrants (albeit without the acknowledgment of those who seek to preserve the “American way of life”). Because of this, the authors believe, the lines of segregation in America will become more blurred; they say they expect a “blurring of the main ethnic and racial boundaries of American life” (Alba & Nee, 2003). As such, neither transnational theorists nor diaspora scholars portray an accurate picture or understanding of the traditional assimilation theories. Still, these traditional assimilation theories remain significant in that the studies of both transnationalism and diaspora claim to “move beyond” the assumptions of these assimilation theories. By challenging the assumptions (whatever they may be) that exist in this old assimilation model, both transnationalism and diaspora studies camps acknowledge that there is something significant about the way that migrants are living their lives transnationally, a significance that is overlooked or downplayed in older migration scholarship. They both, in this sense, promote a new focus of analysis: the “lived experiences” of the migrants.

Some scholars even present diasporas as an example of transnational communities that must also navigate the ever present tension between “living here” and simultaneously “remembering there,” and fields both certainly move beyond a focus on assimilation and how migrants “fit in” to the host country (Nagel, 2001; Ramji, 2006). In both cases, too, there is often some often idealized conception of what “home” is, and the possibility of return is likewise a salient feature in both areas of study. Also, both camps utilize the concept of ‘imagined community,’ often borrowing from the work of Benedict Anderson (1983) in asserting that the migrants engage in long distance nationalism, as they remain involved and engaged in the politics of the home country in some form. Another connection is that whether in a transnational migrant community or diaspora, members form a community within which they often never engage in frequent face-to-face interactions with each other (Kivisto, 2003). Furthermore, in both cases, the community has benefited from technological advancements that have facilitated communication and connections across national borders (Smith, 2005). In fact, this benefit of technological advancement is very pronounced in transnational migration theory. According to Kivisto (2003), one of the things that makes the current era of transnational migration so different from previous eras is that “modern technology has intensified the rate and extent of circulation between homeland and migratory destination.”

Where theories of transnational migration and diaspora studies also bear similarity is in response to the critique that neither phenomenon survives past the first generation of migrants. The argument is that the desire to maintain ties and bonds with the home country and others in the diaspora or migrant community is more important for first generation migrants than second or third generation and beyond. However, both diaspora studies and transnational migration studies refute this. Indeed, I argue that we should not be so quick to make this particular assumption about the experiences of second and third generation migrants. Butler (2001) believes that one of the distinguishing features of diasporas is their existence over at least two generations. A good example can be found in the case of the Jamaican diaspora. In June 2008, I attended the Jamaican Diaspora conference held in Kingston, Jamaica. At this conference were
the “Future Leaders” of the Jamaican diaspora, where members were mostly individuals aged 30 years and under from England, Canada, and the USA. One of the things that surprised most of the conference participants is that of the nearly 200 youth present, from all three countries, the overwhelming majority had not only not been born in Jamaica, but they had also never been to Jamaica prior to the event. Despite this, their enthusiasm in sustaining the Jamaican Diaspora was evident based not only on their attendance at the event but also on their active engagement on the diaspora’s online webpage and on their own social webpages such as Facebook, as well as their planning of their own conferences of Jamaican diaspora future leaders, the latest of which was held in Jamaica in August 2009. In fact, they seem to be more organized than the larger Jamaican Diaspora organization and were determined to make their presence known by engaging in projects with youth in Jamaica, among other activities.

The concept of space is another point of convergence between transnational migration theory and diaspora studies. In both instances is the assertion that there is something unique and important about the space within which displaced or relocated persons operate. Transnational theories of migration have referred to this as “transnational social spaces” (Pries, 2001), bearing similarity to the “third space” (Bhabha, 1994) often used by diaspora scholars. It is important to note that both frameworks recognize the importance of space, though they may define it differently. Transnational migration scholars often discuss the ways in which geographical spaces give way to social spaces within which migrants operate (Pries, 2001). These spaces help to confirm the notion that immigration is a circular concept and not necessarily a linear phenomenon, something that possibly scholars in both camps can agree on. Although not necessarily admitting so, diaspora studies also borrows heavily from one often overlooked or ignored field in sociology: the sociology of space. Both frameworks place importance on the way in which migrants conceive of space and the new space they find themselves in once they leave the homeland. However, transnational migration scholars have attempted to define and redefine this space, while diaspora scholars are content with knowing that there is simply something unique about the notion of space.

One of the eminent scholars on transnational migration, Thomas Faist, has proposed three analytical types of immigrant transnationalism: kinship groups, circuits, and communities (Kivisto, 2003). Of these three types, diasporas have more in common with the third type—communities. Kinship ties are focused on notions of reciprocity and the role of remittances in maintaining family relationships. Circuits are concerned with the circulation of goods, information, and people. It is his conception of transnational immigrant communities that find commonalities with diasporas. As Kivisto points out, transnational immigrant communities are defined more by space than place. However, it seems that theories of transnational immigrant communities maintain that these communities are only transnational when the majority of migrants in the community frequently engage in some tangible transnational activity, such as hometown associations, school alumni associations, or religious associations. Scholars of transnational migration often go out in the field asking migrants to tell them how many times they send money home, make phone calls home, participate in specific projects on development in the home country, and so on, in an attempt to gather quantifiable data and make general assumptions. However, because diasporic scholars view diaspora as a process and type of consciousness, they seem to be less concerned with counting “evidence of transnational connection” and more concerned with understanding the experiences of the migrants, how they are negotiating their new identities and what factors motivate them to be involved, or not, in the home country.
Diaspora Moving Beyond Transnational Migration Theory

Despite the similarities described in the previous section, the distinctions between transnational migration theories and diaspora studies bear some rather significant distinctions. Indeed, not all scholars are comfortable using transnationalism and diaspora interchangeably. The first editor of Diaspora, Khachig Tololyan stated, “The idea of diaspora—as an unending sojourn across different lands—better captures the emerging reality of transnational networks and communities than the language of immigration and assimilation” (as cited in Lie, 1995). Scholars of diasporas suggest that “diaspora” more accurately describes persons coming from one central geographical location who are “scattered” across multiple locations. Typically, transnational migration theory can be applied even in the case where persons from one nation migrate only to one other nation. Diaspora, on the other hand, necessarily suggests a scattering and, therefore, often describes migrants or migrant communities with a common place of origin living in more than one nation.

One of the main problems with trying to contrast and compare transnational migration theory with the diaspora framework is that the two concepts come out of very different camps. That is, while transnational migration theory is more or less rooted in anthropology and sociology, diaspora studies “involves a dispersion in disciplinary space” (Brubaker, 2005). That is, as a studied phenomenon, it spans anthropology and sociology, and other disciplines (including cultural studies, geography, race and ethnicity studies, geography, political science, and theories of transnational social movements). In fact, diasporic studies maintains that it is not a theoretical conceptualization about persons but is instead a framework from which to understand the process which migrants go through. So while one (transnational migration theory) maintains its newness as a theoretical concept, the other (diaspora studies) presents itself as a lens through which we can see migrants, a lens that privileges the way migrants define themselves and not the way in which they are defined by others (this will be discussed in more depth later on). Diaspora studies is, as Paul Stoller (2002) commented, a multidisciplinary framework that defies being tied down by any one discipline trying to legitimize itself as a new theory. As such, it is a concept that gets defined and utilized across many disciplines and is hard to “fit” under the sole umbrella of sociology. John Lie (1995) has suggested that one reason that the sociology of migration has been slow in theorizing about diaspora is that the preoccupation of transnational migration studies with getting information through census data and surveys presents a “methodological incongruence” with diaspora studies, which is more about a lived experience than a reported one. Lie also discusses the way in which diasporic writers tend to utilize “poststructural vocabularies” that help with their personal narratives, while sociological studies are more focused on “generalizing and statistical orientation.” In other words, the study of diasporas is essentially and fundamentally different from the more scientific methodological approach often employed in sociology of migration.

Transnationalism has received criticism for its claim that it provides a radical concept describing something new. That is, many scholars have challenged the claim of transnationalist theorists who say that transnationalism is something new that differs significantly from the experiences of migrants in previous centuries (Foner, 1997; Smith, R., 2005; Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). As these critics argue, transnationalism has always existed (albeit in different ways) and perhaps simply without the label of “transnationalism.” Regardless of the available communication methods available, people have always remained connected to their homelands.
when they migrate. The concept of diaspora is different in the sense that it cannot and does not claim novelty (indeed, it was used decades ago to describe the experience of the Jews). However, what it can claim, and possibly indisputably so, is (1) that the term has been redefined (as detailed previously) and (2) that while the process of diaspora, like transnationalism, is not new, there is something very new about the way in which migrant communities have adopted this concept to describe themselves, something they have not done previously. Migrant communities have adopted this concept particularly in the case of newly emerging formal networks of diasporas, including the Indian Diaspora, the Filipino Diaspora, the Haitian Diaspora and the Jamaican Diaspora, to name a few. While these people have been migrating for years and engaging in transnationalism throughout that time, it is only recently that they have decided to identify themselves as members of formal organizations mobilizing under the banner of diaspora. This is significant. So while Brubaker (2005) is right in questioning whether or not we can truly speak about the unprecedented penetrability of borders and the movement of people, he fails to acknowledge the unprecedented way in which people have come to self-identify as belonging to a diaspora.

Transnational migration literature, although often claiming to assert that it moves beyond a nation state focus, tends to rely heavily on nation state discussion. According to Schiller, Basch, and Blanc (1995), “Transnational migration is the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.” Yet one of the distinct features of diasporas is that they entail and embody more than just simultaneous connection to the homeland and the host country: They entail connection to others in the diaspora. As Butler (2001) put it, “Contact between communities of the diaspora, independent of contacts with the homeland, is vital in forging diasporan consciousness, institutions, and networks. It is, therefore, an essential point of analysis.” As such, it is the contact between members of the diaspora that helps distinguish it from traditional conceptions of transnational migrants. This contact results in the building of a unique cultural identity within the diaspora and a group identity of what it means to be in the diaspora. In this way, diaspora can be viewed as a cultural identity project.

It should be clear by now that concepts such as culture and identity are central to the studies of diasporas—something that is perhaps missing from transnational migration literature. Because diaspora studies is willing to embrace the complexities, fluidity, and significance of culture and identity, it tends to focus on an individual level of lived experience and the everyday life of migrants. Diaspora scholars like James Clifford (1994) have argued that diaspora populations do not share the same theoretical point of origin as immigrants; they do not come from “elsewhere.” This is because, as he asserts, the theoretical underpinning of traditional migration theories is that the person comes from “elsewhere” and engages in some form of assimilation and integration, always with reference to some conception of a nation state. As he states in relation to diaspora studies, in contrast: “Positive articulations of diaspora identity reach outside the normative territory and temporality (myth/history) of the nation-state” (Clifford, 1994). For Clifford, the sense of shared collective history and loss are salient features of diasporas, features that often never get merged or integrated into some bounded territory. As he argues, diasporas operate in a somewhat alternative public space that cannot be reduced to national boundaries. Transnational migration theories often define transnational identities as those which “[cross] multiple national borders” (Ramji, 2006). For Ramji, the country of departure and the host country are the two reference points from which identities get constructed. Again, the point of reference is the nation state or territorial borders. So while transnational
migration theories still give preference to nation states and use them as key points of reference, diaspora communities move beyond this and, as Clifford discusses, do not easily fit the objects of diaspora studies into linear migration models of assimilation or transnational migration theories. Diaspora scholars are more likely to assert that the diasporic identity is a hybrid identity that is not necessarily restricted to an identity based on home or host. In contrast, the focus on the nation state is naturally the main point of reference for many sociological transnational migration scholars, since, by definition, sociology is concerned with the study of societies, and societies are often defined within territorial borders. As Peter Kivisto (2003) put it, “Sociology, from its inception until recently, tended—often implicitly—to view society as synonymous with the nation state” (10).

In reviewing and researching transnational migration theory, it becomes clear its real focus is on the role of nation states and whether we can conclude from transnationalism that the role of the nation state has declined. For this reason, it is not surprising to find studies on transnational migration are caught up in the discourse of the “eroding power of the state as boundary arbiter” and whether or not we have entered into a transnational or “postnational” world in which the nation state is in crisis (Kivisto, 2003). While this might be the latent agenda of transnational migration theories, diaspora studies seems much less concerned with taking any side in this debate and puts the migrants themselves and their conceptualization of their diasporic identities at the center of analysis. Diaspora studies has no stake in the efforts to further determine, demonstrate, or prove that nation states are declining in power.

One of the unique characteristics of diaspora communities, according to Steve Vertovec (1999), is that diaspora suggests that it is also a form of consciousness. This consciousness is predicated upon participants’ “awareness of decentered attachments,” as the diaspora is held together by a recreation through the mind that reflects a shared imagination (Vertovec, 1999). This consciousness enables members to form a connection with others who share the same “roots” and “routes.” Transnational migration scholars are perhaps more apprehensive to enter the world of the “mind” and the realms of “consciousness,” “collective memory,” or “longing and belonging” and the like, preferring to leave the field of cognition and the mental construction of world view to psychology. These scholars may suggest that the weakness of diaspora as a concept is that it appeals to too many existential concepts and is not based enough in practical and observable structures and institutions. Nevertheless, diaspora studies seems more willing to embrace the multidimensional conception of diaspora, willing to borrow from multiple disciplines (cognitive psychology, cultural studies, identity studies, etc.) to explain a complex reality. Again, we can see the ability of diasporia studies to transcend disciplines, not being bound to any particular one.

Another important difference in my estimation is that transnational migration theorists are deeply concerned with their ability to group migrants into some fixed category. This becomes clear in the work of scholars such as Kivisto, who, in one of his articles, “Theorizing Transnational Immigration,” finds himself asking the following questions:

Should all immigrants today and yesterday be viewed as transnational? What about the immigrants from either era that sever family ties, care little if at all about the homeland issues, and never return home? Would not it be more appropriate to consider which immigrants from both periods qualify as transmigrants and which ones do not? (Kivisto, 2001)

Though these questions present very real problems for transnational migration theory, they do not enter consideration as such within the realm of diaspora studies. In response to the first two
questions, diaspora studies asserts that members of the diaspora are self-defined and make a conscious effort to become part of the diaspora. As Brubaker (2005) has noted, one of the more unique characteristics of the concept of diaspora is the way in which it has transcended the “ivory towers” of academia and has entered the “everyday life” of individuals who have adopted the concept and utilized it to define themselves. As he said,

Dispersion [of the concept of diaspora] has been even more striking outside the academy: in the media, on the web, in the self-representations of a wide range of groups and initiatives. In this respect, the trajectory of ‘diaspora’ resembles that of ‘identity’, which moved from being a technical term of philosophy and psychoanalysis to a key term throughout the humanities and social sciences, and which came to be widely used in the media and popular culture. (Brubaker, 2005)

In my estimation, transnationalism has not yet become an accessible or “trendy” term that has been able to move beyond academia; it remains, for the most part, a concept unfamiliar to most migrants. On the other hand, possibly because of its chicness or “sex appeal,” diaspora has successfully become a part of everyday discourse in both home countries and host societies. Indeed, many of the pioneers of diaspora studies (at least in the cultural studies discipline), including Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy claim to be part of the diaspora communities they describe. These persons took the initiative to write about an experience that was unique to them and because of this, many ironically criticize diaspora formation as being elitist or only for intellectuals. This is mentioned in the work of Anteby-Yemini and Berthomière (2005), who, in describing the Caribbean diaspora, state, “Most of the actors of this group, most of the leaders were (and still tend to be) intellectuals, writers, very active in the public sphere” (Anteby-Yemini & Berthomière, 2005). John Lie (1995) refers to such scholars as “Third World Intellectuals” whose fiction, memoirs, essays, and even scholarly prose shape the representation of the new immigration. I see no contradiction here. The fact that many scholars of diaspora are writing about or referencing their personal experience only further legitimizes my argument that the significance of diaspora rests within its organic formation. These migrants, who have the opportunity, are simply doing what should have been done before—they are connecting their personal experience with a structural phenomenon and writing about it. These voices (often not visible in sociology of migration literature) “account for the gulf between international migration studies and transnational diasporic studies” (Lie, 1995). Whether or not these persons have been able to present some set, bounded, and fixed definition of the term “diaspora” is probably less important than the fact that they are trying to make some sense of their experiences and gain some understanding of their lives.

Diaspora formation is not an inevitable result of migration, and it is not merely a new category in which to group migrants. It is therefore no surprise that not all migrants belong to diasporas. Unlike transnational migration theory, diaspora is considered a process, a practice, and not a category of people. One can choose to join a diaspora and become active within that entity, but no one is forced to do so; becoming a member of a diaspora community is a process of self-identification and consciousness. It is a social process and a practice that some persons engage in while others do not. Diaspora scholars would remind us that diasporas consist of self-identified persons who feel connected by their sharing of the same process or practice of lived experience. Diaspora communities are organically formed from within and not from without. That is, it is not necessarily the work of a scholar to determine who is included in and excluded from the diaspora, but the migrants themselves determine this by a self-guided processes. As Brubaker states, “We should think of diaspora in the first instance as a category of practice, and only then
ask whether, and how, it can fruitfully be used as a category of analysis” (Brubaker, 2005). That is, diaspora is primarily a lens through which we can attempt to understand a process in which migrants engage and is only secondarily a category of migrants.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have summarized contemporary studies on diaspora communities by attempting to link diaspora studies to its predecessor and close relative (transnationalism) with its seemingly next of kin and “newly found” relative (transnational social movements). In doing so, I briefly discussed the concept of diaspora and then went into two detailed sections, one showing the way in which diasporas and transnational studies are related and the other showing how they diverge. Once we are able to move beyond the need to perfectly define diaspora and show how “new” or not new it is as a concept, then we can possibly begin to actually find ways of understanding how these diasporas have formed, mobilized, and created change. Because whether we agree that it is new or not, the existence of diasporas is undisputed for many who participate in these communities.

The importance of an article like this is that it encourages a conversation (between sociology of migration and diaspora studies) where silence has typically prevailed. Although both camps may have varying foundational philosophies, they could certainly borrow and benefit from each other. Traditional sociology of migration journals (such as *International Migration Review*) and contemporary diaspora journals (such as *Diaspora* and *Public Culture*) need not be archenemies or polarized as extreme opposites. As John Lie (1995) so succinctly and aptly put it:

> It would be a pity indeed if sociologists neglect the new journals. Surely there are reasons to be wary of them—their ignorance of the sociologist scholarship, their disregard for numbers and generalizations, and their abstruse theoretical terminology and endless neologisms. Nonetheless, hardheartened empiricism must confront our inescapably transnational world. It is simply bad sociology to ignore the reality that the new ideas and terms seek, however unsuccessfully at times, to comprehend. Impressionistic though they may be, they valiantly attempt to capture the ineffable range of colors and shapes of the ripples through our time and space that the old school has neglected in favor of reproducing standard academic style. The new diasporic voices will not be silenced or marginalized; their sheer numbers and their centrality in academic and nonacademic discourses ensure their continuing significance. This is no cause for lament, however. Sociologists after all, have the splendid example of *The Polish Peasant*. It is time to reconsider the splendor of human waves by once again valorizing the personal and the general; the sociological imagination demands nothing less.

Finally, I believe that the next stage that diaspora studies will enter is to a focus on individual diaspora communities and the way in which each community embodies elements of transnational movements. To date, the majority of the scholarship on diasporas has tended to focus on finding generalized characteristics and attributes of diasporas. At this time, however, it seems that most scholars are willing to go beyond this and have recognized the importance of paying attention to each diaspora community individually and the ways in which each one has
formed and how its members mobilize. For example, while there is a plethora of available literature on the Caribbean Diaspora community, few authors have narrowed their studies to specific case studies of Caribbean Diasporas residing in various parts of the globe. Although there are some similarities among all Caribbean Diasporas, I believe, for example, that the Caribbean Diaspora communities residing in different countries (i.e. the U.S., the UK, and Canada) each warrant their own analysis in order to highlight their unique characteristics and to be able to accurately analyze the evolution of the diaspora community in a particular host location. As diaspora scholar Avtar Brah (1996) reminds us, “It is axiomatic that each empirical diaspora must be analyzed in its historical specificity.” By doing so, we will better be able to understand the ways in which these unique transnational socio-cultural movements arise, why they arise, and the specific implications of these communities on societies.

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References


Globalization and Shanghai Model: A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis

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Abstract

Intended to shed light on the debate on the results of globalization and provide better understanding of the influences of globalization upon China as well as the world, this article traces the history of Shanghai’s economic globalization over the past 170 years since 1843 and demonstrates the benefits and problems Shanghai received from (or connected to) its economic globalization. Divided into three sections (Globalization, de-globalization and re-globalization of Shanghai’s economy; Manufacturing-Oriented vs. Tertiary-oriented—Shanghai’s Double Priority Strategy of Economic Growth; Free market, state enterprises, and Shanghai’s mixed economy) the article summarizes and analyzes several characteristics that made Shanghai a unique model in the history of globalization: In adapting and adopting inevitable economic globalization, Shanghai created its unique model of economic development—widely embracing economic globalization; placing Shanghai’s economy on a solid foundation of both strong modern manufacturing and strong tertiary industry (consisting of finance and insurance, real estate, transportations, post and telecommunication, wholesale and retailing); and creating a mixed economic structure with hybrid of private and state owned enterprises. The Shanghai model proves that globalization has been an unavoidable trend as science and technology have made the world “smaller” and “smaller.” Actively engaging into economic globalization is the only way for Shanghai, as well as many developing countries, to accelerate its economic growth.
Introduction

Economic globalization has been a hot topic among scholars since the 1980s. Debates have never stopped over the advantages and disadvantages of economic globalization for the world, particularly for the developing countries. Some scholars look at globalization with skepticism and criticize economic globalization for causing serious problems such as the north-south conflict, the gap between rich and poor, and environmental deterioration, thus triggering the global economic crises. In the meantime, other scholars look upon globalization favorably and see a more diverse and better life for all resulting from economic globalization. They believed that economic globalization has accelerated free market flows and enabled the optimal distribution of productive elements in the world and thus promoted the growth of world productivity and provided more opportunities for the developing countries, which have greatly benefited from foreign capital and international market. As China’s most globalized city, Shanghai has demonstrated all the benefits and problems resulted from (or connected to) its economic globalization. The history of Shanghai’s economic change over the past 170 years may shed light on the debate regarding whether economic globalization has been more harmful or more beneficial to the world and will be certainly helpful for our understanding the influences of globalization upon China as well as upon the world.

Globalization, de-globalization and re-globalization of Shanghai’s economy

While some scholars believe globalization is a phenomenon with a long history, most scholars put the nineteenth century as the advent of globalization, when national economies across the world became increasingly interdependent through a rapid increase in cross-border movement of goods, services, technology and capital (Joshi, 2009). Shanghai’s economic globalization also started in the middle of 19th century, when the Western countries forcefully drew Shanghai into the world market after the First Opium War. Unlike many of China’s well-known cities, Shanghai’s history as a metropolitan city is short, and, until 1843, it was still not an independent city. The surging demand for tea, silk, and other Chinese products in the western countries in the 19th century provided a great historical opportunity for Shanghai’s globalization. With the rich and vast hinterlands of the Yangtze River Valley, Shanghai quickly emerged as a booming international trading port. Engagement into the global economy triggered Shanghai’s geographical advantages as a port city, which greatly strengthened its import and export function. Very soon, Shanghai replaced Guangzhou as China’s largest treaty port for foreign trade. By the 1870s, over 60 percent of China’s foreign trade was handled through Shanghai (Luo, 1932, p. 90). By the 1920s, Shanghai had become one of the 14 largest trade ports in the world. The imports and exports of Shanghai made up more than 50% of China’s total foreign trade before 1949 (Zhang, 1991, pp. 87-88; Cheng, 1956, p. 23).

Stimulated by the expansion of international trade, Shanghai’s modern industry prospered. Thanks to the globalization of Shanghai’s economy, a large number of modern factories appeared in Shanghai. With the advanced technology and equipment and systematic management, these new enterprises transformed Shanghai into China’s modern industry center. By the early 1930s, about half of China’s modern manufacturing companies (1,200 out 2,435) were located in Shanghai. These factories employed 43% of China’s industrial workers and manufactured 51% of China’s total industrial products. Shanghai’s modern factories produced about 60% of China’s
cigarettes from 1925 to 1935 and generated 58% of China’s electric power in 1936 at the lowest price in the world (Liu, 1940, pp. 26; Murphey, 1953, pp. 196, 197, 200).

The economic boom and population growth yielded new demands. Modern banks, insurance agencies, financial trusts, a stock market, a commodity market, and other modern business service institutions boomed in Shanghai, popping up one after another. By 1935, 35% of China’s modern banks, including 81% of China’s largest banks, set their headquarters in Shanghai. In 1936, almost half (47.8%) of all Chinese banks had their paid-up capital, banknotes, and deposit and bank reserves in Shanghai (Jiaguan, 1990, pp. 328-9). Shanghai’s gold trading market was “the sole gold market in whole Far East,” and the gold trading volume in Shanghai was behind only that of London and New York and much higher than that of Japan, France, and India (Jiaguan, 1989, pp. 21-22). The booming of international trade, expansion of modern industry, and increase of various business service institutions attracted more people into Shanghai. Shanghai’s population jumped from about 200,000 in the early 1840s to one million by early 20th century and to over 5 million by the 1949 (Zhang, 1991, pp. 53-55).

By the early 1930s, Shanghai had undoubtedly consolidated its position as China’s financial center, modern industrial center, international and domestic trade center, transportation center as well as cultural center. Though many problems existed and many people were still suffering economically at the time, nobody could deny the fact that economic globalization greatly benefited Shanghai and made Shanghai the most energetic and the richest city in China.

Shanghai hit a wall, however, when it was forcefully de-globalized after 1949. Confronting the economic embargo imposed upon Chinese exports by western countries after the Communists took over Shanghai in 1949 Chinese leaders deliberately chose to pull China as well as Shanghai off the course of globalization. Most foreign companies had moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong by 1949. The ones that had not left before 1949 departed shortly thereafter, as no remaining foreign companies could survive due to unreasonably high taxes and numerous restrictions set up by the new Chinese government and were forced to escape from Shanghai (Jiaju, 1983).

The newly-established Chinese government tightened their control over China’s foreign trades. Other than trade with Soviet Union blocs and very limited trade with Hong Kong, Shanghai’s economy was almost entirely secluded from rest of the world. In the meantime, Shanghai lost its position as China’s financial center. The gold market, stock market, bond market, and commodity market were all banned. China’s People’s Bank in Beijing controlled Shanghai’s finance so tightly that Shanghai’s banks became little more than an accounting house for the government. Compared to other East Asian centers of commerce, such as Tokyo, Singapore, Seoul, Taipei, and Hong Kong, all of which experienced spectacular growth after the Second World War, Shanghai was left far, far behind in the next three decades.

The people of Shanghai made great efforts to save Shanghai’s economy under such unfavorable business conditions and kept Shanghai’s position as China’s most advanced city before China’s economic reform started in 1978. For several decades, Shanghai won “ten number one” positions in China, as measured by major economic matrixes, including industrial output value, foreign export value, labor productivity, industry profit and assets turnout rate per capita gross national product, energy efficiency rate, revenue submission, etc. Despite falling from the international trade scene, Shanghai still made one eighth of China’s industrial product value, handled one fourth of China’s exports, and contributed to one third of the Chinese central government’s revenue before the middle of 1970s.
These “ten number ones,” however, were sharply contrasted by Shanghai’s “five tailenders,” as measured by the matrixes of social, human, and environmental development. Shanghai’s high revenue contribution came at the cost of severely crippling Shanghai’s infrastructure and the deterioration of the standard of living for the people of Shanghai. The rapid population explosion made Shanghai the most crowded city in China. Additionally, since the government invested almost nothing in building houses, roads and other basic public facilities, the crowding was compounded by poor and unsanitary living conditions. By the late 1970s, Shanghai’s per capita road length was 1.57 square meters, and the crowded roads led to high incidences of car accidents. With auto casualties as high as 42.5 persons/per 10,000 cars, Shanghai’s car accident rate was the highest among China’s large cities. Even more notorious were Shanghai’s terrible living conditions. In 1979, Shanghai’s population density was 41,000 per square kilometer, the highest in China. Since very few housing complexes or apartments were added after 1949, the average size of a person’s living space was smaller in Shanghai’s than in any other of China’s large cities. Each Shanghai resident had only 4.3 square meters of living space on average and 50% of households, or 918,000 households, had less than 4 square meters of living space per person.

Shanghai’s per capita green space was only 0.47 square meters, just as big as a piece of newspaper. The unrestricted industrial expansion and the ignorance of public facilities also brought serious environmental problems to the city. Crowded public space and congested residential space and the pollution took a heavy toll on people’s health. Shanghai’s per capita cancer rate ranked the highest among China’s large cities.

Shanghai’s economic superiority in China was ruined by years of overproduction and underinvestment. Particularly when China’s other provinces were developing by leaps and bounds after China’s economic reform started, Shanghai was rapidly left behind. During the 1960s and 1970s, Shanghai kept its GNP growth rate at about 40% higher than China’s national average. By 1980s, however, it was 12.6% lower than China’s national average (Zhou, 2004).

Re-globalization saved Shanghai from its economic downturn and possible bankruptcy. Immediately after China began to open itself to the world (after 1978), the people and government of Shanghai repeatedly requested that the Chinese central government release its tight control over Shanghai’s economy and give Shanghai more space to connect to the world directly. The opportunity finally came in early 1990, when China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was considering taking a significant step to show the world that China would continue to open itself to the world, something he especially wanted after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Zhu Rongji, the then Shanghai mayor, formally submitted the proposal of “opening and exploiting Pudong.” For historical reasons, Shanghai had previously developed in a strange model until the 1980s: Shanghai’s main river, the Huangpu River, divided Shanghai into two distinctive economic regions. Almost all modern factories and other industrial facilities were concentrated on the west side of Shanghai (Puxi), leaving the area east of Shanghai (Pudong) almost entirely an agricultural zone. In the 1980s, the government of Shanghai planned to set up a special economic zone in Pudong and make Pudong Shanghai’s second modern economic center.

The Chinese central government accepted this proposal and decided to make Shanghai’s Pudong the focal point of China’s economic reform for the subsequent decade by allowing Shanghai to widely open its port back up to the world. From that time on, the keystone of China’s reform shifted decisively from the Zhujiang Delta region centering in Guangdong province back to the Yangzi Delta region, centering in Shanghai. If the decade of 1980s was the “Guangdong era,” represented by Shenzhen, the first year of 1990s started a whole new
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“Shanghai era.” If Shanghai was forcefully drawn into economic globalization by western powers in the 1840s, Shanghai’s leaders and Shanghai people consciously and wholeheartedly embraced globalization, hundred-fifty years later in the 1990s,

Shanghai made very bold moves to re-initiate or simply invent crucial institutions for China’s market economy. The Shanghai Stock Exchange opened for business in 1992, and more and more state or private owned enterprises went public, thus providing huge potential for corporate financing. Soon, the Shanghai Stock Exchange became one of the largest stock markets in the world. Gold, metal, and other commodity exchanges and option market were reestablished one after another in Shanghai. The Shanghai Property Exchange was invented in Shanghai to facilitate property transition and to merge and purchase companies or company stock shares. The establishment of these institutions and market systems provided great opportunities for Shanghai to get necessary capital, various materials, and crucial manpower for improving and upgrading its economic capacity, thus competing and winning in the world market.

Starting from 1990, Shanghai spared no efforts in engaging its economy in globalization efforts by turning all of Shanghai into a sort of paradise for international as well as domestic investors. Shanghai’s public investment in the city’s own infrastructure held double digit increases year by year. In 2007 alone, the Shanghai government invested about RMB 147 billion (30% more than 2006) in Shanghai’s public infrastructure, including RMB 16 billion on electricity and RMB 84 billion on transportation.

Having a first class infrastructure is obviously important, but more important for attracting investors is to provide the best services. Having had a long-standing command economy made for notoriously burdensome levels of bureaucracy a common phenomenon in China, which severely hindered economic progress. To open a new company, for example, one had to pass through numerous government offices and apply for a long list of licenses or certificates. It was not uncommon for a new company to spend months, if not years, just getting the government’s permission to do business. To accelerate Shanghai’s economic development, the government of Shanghai was determined to make swift, red-tape reducing changes so that government officials would provide investors excellent, real help in acquiring the necessary approvals (rather than lip service) in order to set up a new business establishment. For example, it set up the so-called “one-stop shopping” service for foreign investors. Staffs from various departments of the Shanghai government were clustered in one office (or office building) so that investors could, in one location, get all necessary certificates to set up companies and to start to operation.

This hard work yielded excellent results. Since 2004, for example, Fortune magazine has published its annual investigation about China’s best city for business. The magazine sent its questionnaires to 25,000 senior managers and entrepreneurs asking for their opinion on the business environments in China’s large cities. For five consecutive years, Shanghai has always ranked as “the best city for business” because Shanghai has “the best labors,” “the highest life quality,” “the highest business efficiency” and is China’s “best city for starting [a] business,” the “best city for business entertainment” and has most potential for business.

Re-globalization saved Shanghai from a downward spiral, and Shanghai’s economy once again grew by leaps and bounds. Shanghai’s foreign trade expanded even faster. For more than 15 years, until to 2007, Shanghai’s international trade value jumped more than 20% annually. By 2008, Shanghai’s import and export value reached 322 billion USD. By 2010, Shanghai became
the world’s busiest cargo port. In 2011, Shanghai’s ports handled 730 million tons of cargos with 31.74 million containers, far more than any other ports in the world (Xinhua News Agent, 2012).

Shanghai’s financial industry has also made a significant progress. More and more financial and insurance institutions began to gather in Shanghai. By the end of 2008, 395 foreign financial institutions had set up their China headquarters or branches in Shanghai, (53.1% of China’s total foreign banks and 84.8% of capital assets of total foreign banks in China) were located in Shanghai (Shanghaigang, 2009).

Though the Chinese economy as a whole has made great progress over the past 30 years, Shanghai obviously achieved the most economic success among China’s 31 provinces, metropolitans, and autonomous districts. In 1990, Shanghai’s per capita GDP broke US$1,000 for the first time. Five years later, in 1995, the per capita GDP doubled to US$2,000. The figure doubled again and again and reached more than US$11,809 in 2010. After sixteen years of double digit growth, Shanghai’s GDP reached more than RMB 1.69 trillion (about US$268 billion) in 2010, or 62 times what it was in 1978 when Shanghai’s GDP was RMB 27.2 billion (about 17 times in terms of US dollar because US$ 1 = RMB 1.7 in 1978) (Shanghai Overview, n.d.).

In building an international metropolis, Shanghai has played and continues to play a significant role in national economic development and shoulders the great responsibility of providing services to the whole country. Despite constituting only 1% of China's population and 0.06% of China’s land space, Shanghai contributed 1/8 of the national fiscal revenue. In 2008, Shanghai’s import and export goods made up one-fourth of the nation and its cargo handling capacity occupied 1/10 the nation's total. Additionally, the health of the people of Shanghai now matches that of those in developed countries. As of 2011, the average life-expectancy of an individual living in Shanghai increased to 82.1 years, and all major health indices in Shanghai have reached the same average levels as developed countries.

Anybody who has visited Shanghai recently, particularly those who had previously witnessed or known of Shanghai’s situation in the later 1970s would be impressed by Shanghai’s great changes. Shanghai’s remarkable record of rapid economic growth and return to prosperity since early 1990s has resulted a new, pretty Shanghai with numerous glittery skyscrapers, an F-1 racing ring, and the world’s fastest maglev trains. All of this has been achieved in addition to the major improvements in the average health and standard of living of the people of Shanghai (Olds, pp. 109-123; Gu and Tang, 2002, pp. 273-303). Whatever opinion a person may have regarding globalization, he or she would be hard pressed to challenge the fact that Shanghai has benefitted greatly from globalization and remains one of the biggest winners in China’s process toward globalization since the 1840s. The history of Shanghai’s globalization, de-globalization, and re-globalization demonstrates from both positive and negative angles the fact that Shanghai benefited greatly from its embracing economic globalization.

Manufacturing-Oriented vs. Tertiary-oriented: Shanghai’s Double Priority Strategy of Economic Growth

The world financial crisis, initiated in the United States, dealt a heavy blow to both China’s and Shanghai’s economy. Shanghai’s GDP growth rate dropped to 9.7% in 2008 (down from 11.6% in 2007). Though a 9.7% growth rate could still be considered comparatively high, worldwide, it was the first time in 17 years (since 1990) that Shanghai’s economy had experienced a less than double digit rate of growth. In discussing Shanghai’s economic situation,
Shanghai’s mayor, Han Zheng, acknowledged the negative impact the world financial crisis imposed upon Shanghai, but he was very confident on Shanghai’s economic future. As he said, “All difficulties are temporary because Shanghai’s economic structure remains healthy …. Shanghai’s competent enterprises would certainly walk out the predicament in advance.” (Jiang Yu, 2009).

All economic evidence demonstrates that Han Zheng’s confidence was realistic because it was based on solid economic reality. Shanghai’s economic structure is more resilient against economic crisis than the structures of other cities and/or nations due to another characteristic of the Shanghai model: a strategy of “double priority” (i.e. on both goods—in the form of manufacturing—and services) for economic growth. In another words, Shanghai’s rapid economic growth has been the result of a combination of the city’s strong manufacturing output and a parallel tertiary industry of providing services (i.e. in the areas of finance and insurance, real estate, transportations, post and telecommunication, wholesale and retailing). In studying Shanghai’s role in China, various scholars have pointed out Shanghai’s position as China’s financial center, trade center, transportation center, and various other centers, but it is Shanghai’s position as both China’s manufacturing and tertiary industry centers that have made Shanghai a winner in economic globalization since it emerged as an international city in early 20th century.

It is a common trend in the world that the more advanced a country is, the higher the proportion of its economic structure comprises tertiary industry. This is particularly true in large cities, where the cost of manufacturing escalates as the costs of labor and land keep rising over time. In addition to such cost escalation, the manufacturing industry has more recently been neglected or given up in many cities, as the concepts of green economy is becoming more popular. People and governments are requesting stricter regulations to restrict, or better, to eliminate the air, water, and other kinds of pollution that manufacturing companies might bring to the city. Understandably, cities with the means to do so are thus inclined to expand the service economy, particularly since services can usually generate more added value while requiring fewer material resources. Stock exchanges and other financial institutions working in virtual capital markets (options, insurance, mortgage, and derivative agents) generate even more profits. Compared to the manufacturing industry, the per capita profitability an investment bank could bring to its investors and the tax revenue it could bring to local government is certainly much higher, maybe tens or even hundreds of times higher, at least in the short term. It is hardly a wonder that modern cities seek to attract businesses based on virtual economy. In fact, widespread use of the Internet and easy capital flow has made some cities nearly reliant upon virtual industry as economic bases. In recent years, the tertiary industry accounts for 60% of global GDP. In most developed countries, tertiary industry makes up more than 70% of GDP. These proportions are even more pronounced among the world’s top cities. It was 80.5% in Soul, 82.8% in Tokyo, and 84.1% in New York in 2004 (Liu, 2007). In Hong Kong manufacturing industry dropped from 25% in 1980 to about 8% in 2002 (Fishman, 2005, p. 75). In today’s age of digital information, science and technology became major players in international competition. It seems that the high proportion of tertiary industry signals the advancement of a city or a country and manufacturing industry seems no longer as important as it was before.

Shanghai is no exception. Once China started its economic reform, one of priorities for Chinese policy makers was to accelerate the growth of China’s tertiary industry. Because of China’s manufacturing-orientated economic structure, established in the 30 years since the People’s Republic of China was born, accelerating the growth of the service industry posed one of the most serious problems for the Chinese economy. Before Shanghai had shut its doors
toward the world in 1949, both the manufacturing and tertiary industries had developed side by side, making Shanghai both the financial and manufacturing center of China before 1949. Indeed, until 1952, the tertiary industry still made up 41.7% of Shanghai’s economic structure, and manufacturing accounted for 52.4% of the economy (Zhou and Yan, 2004). After that, however, Shanghai’s tertiary industry was largely ignored and the Shanghai government carried out a manufacturing-only strategy of economic growth. By the early 1980s, Shanghai’s tertiary industry had dropped dramatically, making up only 18.6% of Shanghai’s GDP (Shanghai Chronography office). This was one of the major reasons why Shanghai lost its competence and was left behind other large cities in the world from the period of time between 1950s and 1980s. Therefore, when Shanghai began its return to the world economy in the late 1980s, Shanghai’s officials, as well as many scholars and experts, called for the accelerated transition of Shanghai’s economic structure and advocated strongly for the promotion of tertiary industry in Shanghai. As such, starting in the late 1980s, a major strategic transition of Shanghai’s economic structure was carried out. The Shanghai government was determined to withdraw from the secondary industry and engage into the tertiary industry. Thousands of small factories were closed or were forced to leave Shanghai. Upon the departure of so many factories, there was a strong focus by city planners to develop more “green areas” and public parks among the apartment complexes in order to improve the quality of life for Shanghai’s residents, in accordance with the “Better City Better Life” theme of Shanghai’s 2010 Expo. In the meantime, the Shanghai government paid special attention to attracting foreign, financial, and other service companies to Shanghai.

This strategic transformation achieved great success. Thousands manufacturing factories disappeared from downtown Shanghai and were replaced by numerous fancy shopping malls, high-rise apartment complexes, and modern office buildings with various heights, colors and designs. The tertiary industry of Shanghai has expanded rapidly, with an annual growth rate at 12% since 1989. As of 2010, the tertiary industry constituted more than half of Shanghai’s industry structure for 12 consecutive years and made up 57% of Shanghai’s GDP that year.13 Hundreds of foreign and domestic financial institutions clustered around the Lujiazui and Bund areas. Law firms, insurance firms, consulting firms, and various other service companies mushroomed in Shanghai, serving the booming economic activities. The four primary sectors of the tertiary industry (finance and insurance, real estate, transportations, post and telecommunication, wholesale and retailing) accounted for 62% of total output. It is partly for this reason that Shanghai has benefitted so clearly from its re-emergence as a global player. Currently, more than 80% of world’s 50 largest banks have set up branches in Shanghai. The assets, deposits, and loans of these banks accounted more than 50% of all foreign banks in China in 2011 (Shanghai investment development board).

Despite this massive success, it is impossible, at least in near future, for the economy of Shanghai to depend only on tertiary industries or on a virtual economy without a strong manufacturing industry as its solid base. Attempting to maintain only tertiary industries would be akin to having a tree without roots or a building without a foundation. In New York, London, or Tokyo, tertiary industries are big enough to fully sustain their respective economies because each of these cities has had more than hundred years of continuing growth and has developed into one of the world’s financial centers, trading centers, or fashion centers. Many companies in these cities are providing various services to their clients throughout the world. Though Shanghai’s firms are rapidly catching up to cities such as New York, London, and Tokyo, there is still a long way to go before Shanghai’s service companies dominate Shanghai’s own service industry, let
alone provide their services around the world. For example, so many fancy high-rising buildings have been built in Shanghai recently. Few of them, however, were designed by Chinese architects. Many of them, including the famous Xintiandi compound and the world financial center building, are designed by foreign architecture firms. I have served as a senior advisor for an American business consulting firm for few years and personally watched as this firm and other famous American consulting firms or law firms followed their clients to China and provided various services in Shanghai. When working in China, few American companies switched to Shanghai’s domestic consulting firms or law firms (and instead retained the services of American consulting or law firms), despite the fact that Shanghai consulting firms would have charged far less money to provide similar services.

Furthermore, Shanghai has been selected by the Chinese government to develop as China’s financial center. For now, however, Shanghai is not truly functioning as all of China’s financial center (let alone the financial center of the whole world). At this time, there is more than one financial center in China. Hong Kong has already developed as one of the biggest financial centers in the world. Beijing seems to have a more favorable position than Shanghai in terms of becoming the country’s financial center because China’s macroeconomic policies, overall financial policies, and major currency policies are all made in Beijing. Besides, Shanghai also lacks the expertise to become China’s financial center. For example, less than 200,000 people, or no more than 1% of Shanghai’s population, were working in a financial field in 2007. In comparison, there were more than 770,000 people, or more than 3% of Beijing’s population, worked in financial field in Beijing, and 350,000 people worked in a financial field in Hong Kong in the same year (Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily)).

If Shanghai put all its eggs in one basket and only promotes its tertiary industry and ignores its manufacturing industry, the worst scenario for Shanghai’s economy might occur in the near future. First, Shanghai’s tertiary industry might not become big enough to support Shanghai’s economic growth. And second, if Shanghai’s manufacturing industry was weakened or ignored, other neighboring countries and Shanghai’s neighboring provinces would quickly catch up and replace Shanghai as a manufacturing center. In the end, Shanghai would lose its positions as both China’s manufacturing center as well as its financial center. Fortunately, Shanghai’s policy makers have always been aware of the significance of the “real” (secondary) economy, even while promoting the rapid growth of the tertiary industry. Once left far behind the developed countries, the leaders of Shanghai firmly believe that the manufacturing industry, transportation, infrastructure, and other real economy entities ultimately determine the strength and weakness of a city or a country, and they see no reason to abandon Shanghai’s efforts to maintain its real economic entities for this reason. It is their conviction that Shanghai must continue to strengthen (and not ignore) its advanced manufacture-based economic structure in order to compete effectively in the global economy. Particularly after the 1997 Asian financial storm, the Shanghai government further confirmed its economic development strategy and decided to promote “double priorities” and clearly announced it would give priority to promoting both modern services and advanced manufacturing industry. “The Contents of Shanghai’s Highly Supported Priority Industry (2008),” issued by the Shanghai government on October 17, 2008 further demonstrated this “double priorities” development strategy.

To compete with others, of course, Shanghai has to keep upgrading its industry by downsizing or even eliminating labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and pollution-producing industries and introduce new and advanced industries. The process of this transition was understandably not easy. The most painful case occurred in Shanghai’s textile industry. After the
early 1980s, with rising prices of Shanghai’s land, labor, transportation, and other costs, the textile industry lost competency in Shanghai, and the Shanghai government decided in the early 1990s to withdraw from the textile industry. However, at the time, the textile industry was one of Shanghai’s main industries, providing most jobs for Shanghai’s blue collar workers. The transition meant that most of them would lose their jobs. To upgrade Shanghai’s economic structure, almost all textile factories inside downtown Shanghai were, nonetheless, closed. A few of them were moved to suburbs of Shanghai. The worker force in Shanghai textile industry shrank from 550,000 in 1993 to 280,000 from 1998. Overall, more than 600,000 workers lost their jobs in Shanghai in the same period, and Shanghai’s unemployment rate remained in double digits for many years during the transition period, between 1992 and 1999 (Zhu, 2008, p2).

In the meantime, Shanghai focused on developing capital-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries with great potential in the future. As early as the early 1990s, Shanghai government designated six “pillar industries” for Shanghai’s industrial focus, including automobiles, electronic, and communication equipment, petrochemicals, steel products, equipment assembly, and biomedicine. From 2002 to 20007, Shanghai’s investment in industry reached RMB 450 billion, 80% of which went to these six pillar industries, including RMB150 billion in electronic & information industry and RMB 90 billion in petrochemical and fine chemical industry (Cheng). Today, these six industries realize about two thirds of Shanghai’s total industrial output. Shanghai also spared no efforts in luring foreign direct capital investment in its advanced manufacturing industry by offering special policies such as generous tax holidays to investors. Those new production-oriented enterprises with foreign investment would get income tax exemption for two years following the first year the company began to make profit and then a 50% of tax reduction in the years three through five. The benefits for those export-oriented companies (for whom the output value of all export products amounted to 70% or more of the output value of the enterprise) were even better. They were permitted to enjoy their tax reduction at a reduced rate of 10% after their income tax exemption or reductions period had expired in accordance with the state stipulations. These tax holidays were even more attractive for those newly-built enterprises engaged in energy resource and transport construction projects such as airports, ports, railways, highways and power stations. These companies did not need to pay income tax for the five years after their first profit-making year and from years six to ten, their income tax was reduced by 50% (Shanghai Metropolitan government).15

Fortunately for Shanghai, technological innovation initiated a great industrial transition in the world since the late 1980s. To adjust to ever growing costs of labor, land, and other necessities in manufacturing and the stricter regulations on manufacturing industries, the developed countries underwent a major industrial shift after the 1980s. Large numbers of heavy industry companies transferred their manufacturing facilities to developing countries. Over the past 20 years, Shanghai’s manufacturing has attracted more foreign investment capital than any other industry in most years. Though the tertiary industry grew 78.3% from 2002 to 2007 with an average growth rate of 12.2%, Shanghai’s manufacturing industry expanded even a faster (growing 86.2% with average growth rate of 13.3% in the same period).16 Comparing to other major cities in the world, Shanghai’s manufacturing industry made up a much large portion of its economy. As late as 2007, the manufacturing industry still makes up 47.3% of Shanghai’s economy.

Currently, Shanghai’s government still maintains its “double priority” strategy as Shanghai’s long-term development strategy. As the financial crisis is running deeper in the world, China has had to switch its export-oriented development strategy to focus more on promoting
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China’s domestic consumption of goods. Shanghai is planning to lead the country in further promoting Shanghai as a “consumer paradise.” Recently, in addition, the Disney Corporation has started building a new Disney Park in Shanghai. The Shanghai government is actively fighting to win a second license to build a horse racing course in Shanghai. Some scholars have proposed the development of a “Chongming-Shanghai’s last oasis”—as China’s Geneva—which would make Chongming an environmentally friendly city and attract major international institutions, just as Geneva did (J. Yang & C. Jiahai, personal communication, July 5, 2010). With these major projects, Shanghai’s service industry will certainly continue to expand.

In addition to these efforts toward the increasing of consumerism, Shanghai’s government paid equal if not more attention to promoting the city’s manufacturing industry. To that end, more capital was spent on upgrading the six pillar industries of manufacturing: automotive, electronic, and communication equipment, petrochemical, steel, equipment assembly, and biomedicine. Simultaneous to these upgrades, Shanghai was designated by the Chinese government as the headquarter location for the building of China’s large commercial aircrafts. Specifically, this implies that the Chinese central government has confirmed and supports Shanghai’s own double priority strategy. When China’s State Council recently announced China would build Shanghai into an international financial center and an international transportation center by 2020, it specially emphasized that the target should be accomplished by further pushing Shanghai’s “modern service industry and advanced manufacturing industry.”

Undoubtedly, the manufacturing industry will continue occupy an important position in Shanghai’s economy in the future.

Free market, state enterprises, and a mixed economy

Another characteristic of the Shanghai model is its strong emphasis on upholding a mixed economic structure, with a hybrid of state-owned and non-state owned companies. Since China’s economic reform started in 1978, non-state owned companies maintained rapid rates of expansion and became the most important engines in promoting China’s economic growth. By the end of 2006, two-thirds of China’s GDP were created by non-state owned company. Non-state owned companies employed more than 80% of workers, and 70-80% of added value in China’s economic growth came from non-state owned companies (Zhou, 2008).

However, the situation is a little different in Shanghai. Unlike Shanghai’s neighboring provinces (such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang), the government’s strong hands have been always visible in Shanghai’s economic changes, and state-owned enterprises in Shanghai have always played an important role in promoting Shanghai’s local economic growth. The Shanghai government has also never hesitated in supporting state-owned companies (though it had not publicly said so). Though non-state owned companies have grown steadily in Shanghai since early 1980s, state-owned companies grew even faster and still made up the majority of Shanghai’s economy. In 2007, the state-owned companies accomplished GDP of RMB 659 billion and accounted for 54.9% of Shanghai’s GDP, while non-state owned companies accounted for 45.1%. (It is important to note that most non-state owned companies in Shanghai belong to foreigners or overseas Chinese. Few large Chinese private companies ever existed in Shanghai, and those that do exist in Shanghai migrated from other provinces).

For a long time, particularly after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, most scholars and international financial institutions blamed the crisis on Asian governments’ involvement in their nations’ economies and held up the free market system as a model for all
countries to follow. It was a common conclusion among western economists that the government intervention of economy and state-owned enterprises were hopelessly non-efficient and that the market system was a more natural, risk-free system. However, numerous studies on the remarkable economic growth of Asian countries showed that market liberalization alone could not have brought about Asia’s remarkable economic growth. Though many Asian countries underwent a transition from a dirigisme (an economy in which the government exerts strong directive influence) to liberalized economic regime, the transition “was made possible by the combination of appropriate economic policy pursued by the respective national governments and the competitiveness of Asian entrepreneurs, business models, and disciplined workforces that had been nurtured in the context of Asia’s cultural, commercial, and business traditions” (Taniguchi, 2009). Shanghai’s experiences over the past thirty years further underlined the truth of this comment. Indeed, the financial crisis that started in America in 2008 shows just how risky a totally liberalized economic model can be, especially without proper supervision. In the meantime, Shanghai’s experiences over the past thirty years further underlined the truth of this comment.

The dominance of state-owned companies in Shanghai had its historical origins. As a crucial contributor to China’s state revenue, Shanghai’s economy was always tightly controlled by the Chinese central government after 1949. Even after China started its economic reform in 1978, Shanghai still assumed a heavy fiscal burden. Worried about the uncertainty of its bold economic reform, the Chinese central government made Shanghai a sort of safety valve for China’s fiscal income and took about 80% of Shanghai’s newly increased product value every year from 1949 to 1990. During that period, Shanghai’s accumulative fiscal income was 391 billion RMB. From that 391 billion, 328 billion or 83.94% was submitted to the central government. Therefore, Shanghai’s strictly command economy survived with little change until the late 1980s. As a result, there was little room left in Shanghai for private enterprises, just as it had been before China’s economic reform started.

Another, more important reason for Shanghai’s high percentage of state-owned business, however, results from a simple pragmatic concern. Four decades of “de-globalization” dragged Shanghai’s economic growth down and left Shanghai far behind the rest of the world. To catch up, Shanghai has had to jump start its economic transition. As I mentioned above, when Shanghai began to re-globalize its economy, Shanghai’s infrastructure had already deteriorated severely due to long time neglect during the period of Shanghai’s de-globalization. In the 30 years from 1950 to 1980, Shanghai’s investment in infrastructure accounted for only 7.38% of the revenue that Shanghai submitted to the central government (Shen, 1980). As a result, Shanghai had no money to expand roads, build apartments, or improve electricity, water, telephone and other public services. A person who once visited Shanghai in the 1930s would be no stranger to the Shanghai of the 1980s due to the city’s narrow roads and crowded residence areas. To catch up to foreign countries as well as to other Chinese provinces, Shanghai had to improve and upgrade its public infrastructure as fast as possible. However, doing so costs significant sums of money, and it may be quite a long time before seeing a positive return on such investment. If the work of upgrading Shanghai’s infrastructure was left to a free market system and private enterprises, then little or no headway would be quickly made. Much time would be wasted in “wait and see” games. Both foreign and domestic investors would be unwilling to put their money on either consumer industry or producer’s industry without the development of social overhead investments in transportation facilities, power supply, and public utilities, whereas the latter investments would not be increased unless there is a definite demand.
Consumers’ industries cannot easily expand without an adequate supply of capital goods at reasonable prices, but a capital goods industry would not make its move without seeing a clear outlook of consumers’ markets. In addition, private companies in China must worry about any possible change in government policy. Given all of this, it would have been difficult (if not impossible) for private entrepreneurs to take the lead in investing in public facilities in Shanghai. Since each sector of the economy was waiting for the other to roll the ball first, other countries and other provinces continued to develop further while leaving Shanghai much fewer opportunities to develop. The situation was not unusual to many developing countries. Therefore, the Shanghai government had no choice but to assume the responsibility of taking the lead in the strategic development projects with state-owned companies. The development of Shanghai’s Pudong area is a good example.

As I mentioned before, the Pudong area was basically an agricultural zone until the late 1980s. To attract investment, the first thing to do was to build more advanced infrastructure in the Pudong area. However, where would the money come from? It was estimated in 1990 that the total cost for Pudong’s enhancement would reach RMB 800 billion (more than US$100 billion),20 an enormous figure for Shanghai at the time. The Chinese central government had made it clear to Shanghai that though the central government supported the expansion of Pudong, it would only give Shanghai the economic autonomy to raise construction capital; the government would not provide money for the project. The mission to get seed money to trigger Pudong’s infrastructure build-up could only be taken up by the Shanghai government.

Immediately after the project of developing Pudong was approved, the Shanghai government designated 570 square kilometers of land in Pudong to set up the “Pudong New District.” Several state-owned companies, created by the government of Shanghai, initiated a special land leasing program, or the so-called “Kong madai beimi” (translated as “Grasp rice with empty bag,” meaning to get money with zero capital investment), as Professor Yang Jianwen vividly described (J. Yang, personal communication, March 2009).21 Several pieces of land within this area were auctioned to foreign investors, particularly to Chinese individuals living overseas (known as “overseas Chinese”) and to those from Hong Kong, Taiwan, among other places. The foreigners who won the bid were granted the rights to use of the land for seventy years. This move ignited a thundering rage in China. Many people compared this program with the foreign concessions existing in Shanghai before 1943. They claimed that the proposed land lease program betrayed China’s national interest (since Shanghai’s foreign concessions were long seen as a symbol of China’s suffering under imperialist oppression). The project would never have survived such a public attack without the support of the government of Shanghai.

With the money on hand, the Shanghai government started to build the necessary infrastructure in Pudong. Though it was not large amount of money in the beginning, it did trigger a cycle. Once the infrastructure project started, the value of land in Pudong New District began to rise. The government then put more land for lease at a higher price. The enhanced land value attracted more investors around the world because they saw potential for further increase of land value there. More capital came in and thus increased land value even further, which lead more capital to flood in. The value of immovable property in Pudong New District skyrocketed in the next decades. This cycle went on and on and provided funding for most infrastructure projects in the Pudong area.22 The Pudong International Airport, the Meglev train, and other substantial projects were built one after another with astonishing speed. Four bridges, six underground tunnels, and subways connecting Pudong to Puxi were accomplished, making
Shanghai’s economy more integrated with other nearby regions. From 1990 to 2004, the total investment in Pudong’s infrastructure reached more than RMB 90 billion (US$12 billion).\(^{23}\)

Ever improving infrastructure and other favorable policies attracted huge capital inflow. From 1990 to 2004, the total investment in Pudong’s fixed assets exceeded RMB530 billion (about US 70 billion). Many of these assets came from direct foreign investment. By the end of August 2005, overseas investors had invested in more than 12,000 projects in Pudong New District with a total contractual investment of 28 billion US dollars. From the beginning, Pudong aimed to introduce advanced industry, represented by multinational companies and make itself on the high end of product value chain and the magnet to high quality talents and entrepreneurs. By the end of August 2005, 57 regional headquarters of multinational corporations had located here. More than 80 foreign-invested enterprises have built R & D Centers in Pudong. About 194 corporations of the world’s top 500 companies listed in Fortune magazine have invested in over 400 projects in Pudong.\(^{24}\)

After more than 15 years of development, the Pudong New Area underwent great change and emerged as a complete new Shanghai. The GDP of the Pudong New Area has maintained an annual growth rate of over 20% for more than 18 years. The industrial output value in Pudong reached RMB352 billion in 2004, taking 25% of the total in Shanghai. Supported by the Chinese central government, the Pudong New District quickly emerged as a foreign-oriented, multi-functional, modern urban area.

In pushing for the development of Pudong, re-globalization also significantly changed the old Shanghai in the Puxi area (west of the Huangpu River). Since almost everything in Pudong was started from scratch, and it would take time before Pudong would begin to play a productive role in Shanghai’s economic development, Shanghai actually paid even more attention to the reforming and upgrading of existing infrastructure in Puxi. As some scholars joked, Shanghai adopted a policy of “shen dong ji xi” (making a feint attack to the east and an actual attack in the west) in the first several years of the 1990s (J. Yang, personal communication, March 2009).

Taking full advantage of the special policies the central government granted Shanghai to develop the Pudong New District, the Shanghai government also applied the same land lease program in the Puxi area, just as they had done in Pudong. Again, no private company would have been qualified for this mission. Since no systematic industrial distribution plan was ever carried out in Shanghai before the 1990s, thousands of small and middle sized textile, machinery, chemical, iron, and steel factories were scattered around Shanghai’s downtown area, mixed in among commercial and residential areas. Not only did such industries bring a huge burden onto the deteriorating infrastructure, but they also caused pollution and severely downgraded real estate value in downtown Shanghai. To recreate Shanghai as an ideal place for international investors, thousands of small and middle sized factories were closed or moved to suburban areas. The spared lands were then leased to real estate developers and other investors by auction. The government took the money from leasing those lands to improve infrastructure. Shanghai’s reputation and improved infrastructure in its downtown area triggered of high expectation on the land and property value in Puxi area. The same income-generating cycle occurred in Puxi as it had in Pudong and attracted more investors. By 2000, Shanghai had already collected more than US$13 billion through land lease program for Shanghai’s infrastructure construction. Without this funding, according to a former mayor of Shanghai, Shanghai’s completion of its infrastructure projects between 1990 and 2000 would not have been finished in 100 years (Chen and Zhou, 2009, pp. 262-3). Significant investment in infrastructure brought Shanghai a very sound city infrastructure. In turn, Shanghai once again became an attracting city for living and investment.
The log-jams of Chinese socio-economic problems, however, could not have been broken nor the level of economy lifted without an efficient, honest, and competent government. Bolstering domestic capital formation and inducing foreign investment would not have been possible if the government itself had been corrupt. Official corruption is one of the most serious troubles China faces. Well aware of the significance of this problem, the Shanghai government devoted itself to creating a service oriented, responsible government that is committed to the rule of law and that will conscientiously regulate the economy, monitor the markets, manage social programs, serve the public, and protect the environment. Many special policies were carried out to prevent official corruption and unnecessary bureaucracy. In Shanghai, all large government projects must be transparent and go for public auction. In addition to supervising the behavior of officials in various levels according to Chinese laws, the Shanghai government also designed stricter rules and regulations to discipline Shanghai’s officials when necessary. It is commonly accepted that, relatively speaking, Shanghai’s officials behave more appropriately than those in most of other Chinese cities.25

While Shanghai’s government attended to providing oversight of state officials after Shanghai reopened to the world, Shanghai’s state-owned companies made great efforts to transform themselves into modern corporations in order to survive in the market. As happened everywhere in the world, state-owned companies often encounter many troubles such as low productivity, inefficiency, and slow adjustment to the market changes. To enhance their compatibility in the world market, Shanghai’s state-owned companies had to insert themselves directly in the world market through fierce competition with non-state owned companies, both foreign and domestic. Learning from the world’s best multinational companies, Shanghai’s state-owned companies also introduced various advanced management systems. Many companies arranged to build strategic partnerships with foreign companies or reorganized themselves to be public, stockholding companies, not only to gather the necessary capital but also to use outside investors in order to make strategic changes in the company. In recent years, most Shanghai’s state-owned companies have enhanced their productivity and profitability, even though there is still a long way to go for many.

The Shanghai government also knew that state-owned companies alone, however, would not be enough to fully fuel Shanghai’s economic rejuvenation. A better model for Shanghai’s special situation, they thought, would be a mixed economy, with a hybrid of both state-owned and non-state owned companies competing with and compensating each other. Therefore, the government also spared no effort in promoting non-state owned companies, particularly foreign owned companies. As many people know, China has attracted most of its foreign direct capital in recent years. During these recent years, Shanghai has profited more from foreign investment than China has as a whole. During the past 16 years, Shanghai’s foreign direct investments (FDI) rapidly increased, with annual growth rate up to 36%, 10% higher than that of China as a whole. In 2006 alone, Shanghai attracted US$14.6 billion FDI, 23% of China’s total FDI. In 2007, 4,206 foreign investment projects were approved in Shanghai. The contractual volume increased by 2% to 14.87 billion USD. The paid-in capital increased by 11.4% to 7.92 billion USD, of which about 5.32 billion USD or 67.1% was attracted to the tertiary industry.26 By the end of 2007, 48,753 foreign investment projects had been approved in total, with an investment volume of US$129.41 billion. By the end of November 2008, the Shanghai government had approved 671 multinational corporate headquarters projects, including 223 multinational corporate regional headquarters, 178 holding companies, and 270 R&D centers.27 By end of 2007, there were more than 33,000 companies invested in Shanghai by foreign companies. Among Fortune 500
companies, 227 companies invested in 1,221 projects in Shanghai, with total capital of 18.397 billion dollars.\(^{28}\)

In addition to foreign owned companies, the Shanghai government also adopted policies to encourage the development of Chinese private companies. Shanghai’s previous reputation as China’s economic center and its newly established financial and information facilities attracted many private entrepreneurs to invest in Shanghai. Since it is convenient in Shanghai to get financial, legal, consultant, and various other services and collect information on markets, products, fashion trends, etc., many of China’s major private companies moved their headquarters to Shanghai or set up branch offices and R&D centers in Shanghai in order to take advantage of Shanghai’s convenience and Shanghai’s markets. The Shanghai government also deliberately invited private companies to participate in public projects, including those typically monopolized by state industry, such as the project to build China’s commercial aircraft. Since the Shanghai government set in motion the building of social infrastructure, transportation, and financial institutions, it not only started the economic ball rolling but also set the tempo of Shanghai’s industrial development. Shanghai’s entire consumption expenditures, savings, and investments were also guided to ensure speedy economic development. Non-state owned companies, both foreign and domestic, saw the potential of Shanghai’s development and flooded into Shanghai market. In 2010, non-state owned companies contributed RMB 833 billion (about US$ 132 billion) or 49.4% of Shanghai’s GDP.\(^{29}\)

Both visible and invisible hands played unique roles in accelerating Shanghai’s economic expansion over the past 20 years. As a result, a relatively balanced, mixed economic structure emerged and has worked quite well in Shanghai so far. With this kind of mixed economic system, Shanghai’s government has managed to rationally allocate Shanghai’s economic resources by implementing various economic policies, including controlling contract placement of public projects, release of capital goods, and other means. The non-state backed economy was also geared to making progress by adjusting rapidly to changing market conditions and making itself complementary to the government economy. Shanghai’s experience shows that a mixed economy with hybrid of private and state-owned enterprises might be better for the economic development of a developing country during an era of globalization.

In summary, Shanghai built its own model for developing its economy based on its positive and negative experiences and lessons over the past 170 years. In adapting to and embracing the seemingly inevitable economic globalization, Shanghai created its own unique model of economic development—widely embracing economic globalization; placing Shanghai’s economy on a solid foundation of both advanced modern manufacturing and a strong tertiary industry; and depending on a mixed economic structure with a hybrid of private and state owned enterprises. The Shanghai model proves that globalization has been an inevitable trend, as science and technology make the distances between nations of world smaller and smaller. Actively engaging into economic globalization is the only way for Shanghai, as well as many developing countries, to accelerate economic growth.

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Also known as the Anglo-Chinese war (1839 to 1842). Before the war, the Western merchants could only do business with China in one Chinese port, Canton. The war broke out when Chinese government tried to ban British merchants from smuggling opium into China. After China was defeated, a treaty was signed between Britain and China, which stipulated that China has to open Shanghai and other four ports to foreign trades.

For example, Shanghai’s industrial profit rate was four times of national average and its industrial labor productivity was 1.5 times higher than national average. Shanghai’s economy kept its growth at 11.3% annually from 1950 to 1980. Shanghai was the largest contributor of fiscal revenue of the Chinese central government among Chinese provinces. See Shen Junpo, *Shige diyi he wuge daoshu diyi shuoming le shenme* (What does the ten number ones and five tailenders mean?) On *Jiefang ribao*, Oct. 3, 1980.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Shanghai has ranked as the best city for business for 5 successive years, on *Fortune* (Chinese version), Jan. 1, 2009.


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Interview with Professor Yang Jianwen (March 2009), the director of Institute of Economy at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Prof. Yang is one of the twelve policy experts Shanghai Municipal government appointed. He actively engaged in designing the strategy of Pudong exploitation at the time.

Ibid.

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Ibid.
I have interviewed many American and Chinese business people who have involved in Chinese business for long time. Almost all of them confirmed this recognition. The downfall of Chen Liangyu, Shanghai’s party secretary, was more a result of political struggle among Chinese Communist Party rather than seriousness of Chen’s corruption.


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China Global Governance and Crisis Management

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Academic discourse on China and the role it plays in the international system is a field fertile with new ideas and theoretical extrapolations. The capacities and capabilities of this rising power, and the variables through which the extent of its power and reach can be realized are contested issues that constantly require elucidation. In a detailed study, Gerald Chan, Pak K. Lee, and Lai Ha-Chan provide a thought provoking and comprehensive analysis of China’s place and need to be part of the processes driving global governance.

Global governance *per se* is a term that does not encourage a single acceptable definition. It does stimulate a diverse range of thoughts and opinions. To Amitav Acharya, there exists a contradiction with Asia’s leading states wanting to be recognized as “global powers” and their hesitancy in contributing to making global governance possible (2011, p. 852). China could arguably be labeled an exemplar of this dichotomy. An element of “caution” guides policy makers in China seeing as it has been only slightly more than four decades since it became a member of the United Nations and three decades since it opened itself to forces of the market in determining its economic trajectory (Zhang, 1998). If caution is to be taken as a virtue, the multiplicity of China’s interests (economic, strategic, and political) predicates an approach that does not derail overall policy prescriptions in the pursuit of relative gains elsewhere (Shi, 2011). It ought to be stated that for China global governance as a concept is not something abhorrent, rather a legitimate tool that “conceptually and in practice” will enhance its stature amongst the comity of nations (Karns & Mingst, 2010). For China, the aspiration to be intrinsic to global governance mechanisms and institutions introduces notions of great power status and recognition of its responsibilities towards agenda setting and policy-making “for the stability of the global order” (Chan, Lee, & Ha-Chan, 2012, p. 2). Apropos global governance, the authors provide a working definition of their own:

…a dynamic process, global governance is about the making and implementation of global norms and rules by the joint effort of various actors in an anarchical world to provide global public goods…to tackle a host of trans-sovereign problems and create a stable and responsive political order. (p. 21)

Divided into ten chapters, a constant feature running through this book are three clusters of questions. The first cluster revolves around global governance and its expressions, composition, and salience. The second cluster of questions examines how China approaches global governance and the challenges encountered in making efforts to emerge as a responsible stakeholder. The third cluster of questions draws out fascinating linkages subsumed within China’s rise and global responsibilities and its desire, coupled with caution, in involving itself in the management of global affairs. The existential question that arises is whether China’s attempts will succeed or backfire?
The authors press the case for China to be conceptualized as a “social and relational phenomenon” (p. 2) and innovatively advocate its further involvement in the vast template of global governance. The hypothesis of China being “accorded great power status because it is involved more than many other emerging economies in various areas of global concern, its normative influence varying across issues” (p. 3) is debatable since China could alternately be seen as an “obstacle” to global governance as also an “enabler.” The obstacle part gets traction when it stonewalls issues touching upon human rights and nuclear proliferation at the UN and other institutional mechanisms it is a member of. It does however earn the tag of being an enabler when it takes quick measures, for instance, to insulate itself from the global financial crisis of 2008-09.

The chapters have been carefully laid out to encompass most aspects touching upon global governance concepts and initiatives. The first two chapters initiate a theoretical discussion on what comprises the building blocks of global governance and what are the Chinese perspectives on global governance. As a recent entrant into the lexicon of Chinese IR Thought, global governance invites rather conservative opinions with perspectives being motivated by China’s preference to adopt a “prudent and low-profile position in international affairs” (p. 27). Also, the Chinese interpretation of global governance gives primacy to the existing international order and emphasizes the centrality of the UN. The third chapter on “Peace and Security” tracks China’s behavioral patterns regarding its membership and participation in the UN. Elements of ambiguity do appear in China’s behavior; it constantly reiterates its normative opposition to any attempt to erode the legitimacy of state sovereignty giving way to a degree of flexibility, according to the authors. This ambiguity assumes another identity (duplicity?) as China loudly proclaims the supremacy of the UN and yet, is shockingly parsimonious in contributing financially to UN Peace Keeping Operations budget claiming its developing country status thereby inviting questions about its “free riding” tendencies.

The fourth chapter on “Finance and Trade” brings out the characteristic features of China’s embracing global governance in economic matters. Commensurate with its status as the world’s second largest economy, China has been proactive in increasing its heft in institutions like the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Of these, the WTO is the most “egalitarian” while the WB and the IMF are largely domains of developed countries. In the WB, China has sought to increase its influence by increasing its paid-up capital, thereby accruing voting power. Although China is willing to contribute more to the IMF’s programs, its relationship with the IMF is more complicated owing to the debate over fixing a more realistic value for the renminbi (RMB). At a time when the global economy has been roiled by low growth, financial scandals, and near defaults by a few European nations, China approaches global governance from the perspective of strengthening the G-20 and working with the U.S., rather than challenging it. On the question of “Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention” discussed in the fifth chapter, the authors paint a picture where China appears to be contending with an approach that will minimize the denunciations it regularly faces. The reasons are not difficult to list out - were the Communist Party to promote civil and political rights it could only be at the expense of erosion of the Party’s legitimacy. To turn around demands to improve its shoddy and blotted human rights record, China put out the spin that the very agenda of human rights is externally driven and what is more important is the right to development over human rights. Que sera sera!

“Environmental Protection” and “Public Health” are salient issues explained in the sixth and seventh chapters of the book. The authors argue that China does want to be part of global
governance mechanisms regarding the environment as it realizes the importance of environmental protection being intrinsic to overall sustainable development (pp. 92-93). That said, the bottom line remains China’s attempts to use global environmental governance platforms to articulate its position that developing countries should be given “common but differentiated treatment” (p. 107), and that its per capita emissions are low in comparison to the global average and being a developing country requires financial and technological resources to shift to environmentally friendly technology. The seventh chapter on “Public Health” makes a sobering assessment of China’s health sector. In China’s case, public health has become a victim of its relative economic success. The state appears to have withdrawn from its commitment to provide health security to all and what remains is a system that is unaffordable to common people. Added to this sorry state of affairs is the complete lack of preparedness in handling the SARS pandemic of 2003 that, if anything, exposed the state of China’s health governance to the rest of the world. No less flattering is China’s “Food Safety” as explained in the eighth chapter. With an economy growing fast and geared to satisfy consumers not only domestically but all over the world, China’s food safety governance has not given a good account of itself. There have been periodic recalls of Chinese food products world over as well as scandals involving food adulteration. The authors point out the complicity and collusion that takes place regarding food safety with the melamine scandal being reported much after the Beijing Olympics of 2008, although reportedly, the authorities were informed of the adulteration. In sum, it is a clear case of laws on food safety not being enforced and civil society being throttled from pointing out such grave lapses.

In the ninth chapter on “Energy Security” the authors clearly explain China’s reservations regarding global governance mechanisms (such as the International Energy Agency – IEA) and its policy of “going it alone.” The Chinese adopted a “neo-mercantilist, realist approach making state to state energy deals with producer countries not in alliance with the US” (p. 156). China’s energy security requirements are represented by state owned entities stitching up deals all over the world and also establishing a pipeline and transportation network that carries a strategic slant. The tenth chapter on “Transnational Organized Crime” focuses on two issues – money laundering and piracy. China’s record on being compliant with global governance norms regarding money laundering have been a mixed bag since its banking system (with the world’s largest banks) is not entirely compliant with global standards of financial transparency. China’s banking system is going through a learning curve with regards to international operational benchmarks and expectations. On the issue of piracy, China has preferred (yet again!) a going it alone approach as it does not want to be part of any multilateral initiative to combat piracy. Its presence in the Indian Ocean does discomfit the U.S. and other countries like India.

In its totality, the book does justice to the issues it has flagged, yet provokes many questions and observations. Chan, Lee, and Chan begin their book with the two questions of the emergent power in China and what kind of world order is likely to emerge in the wake of a rising China. While the first question explains itself in the narrative, the second question requires a considered answer. Global governance is a topic that requires “consensus” and less “dissonance” and this is where China falls short. As a concept and a vision, global governance can only be realized if the “effectiveness of the ‘institutional form’ as also the ‘composition of its decision making structures’” induce countries like China “to actively participate in global governance initiatives” (Nye & Donahue, 2000). As a normative actor, China tries hard to impress, as can be adduced from the 348 international treaties or conventions it has signed and ratified of which 313 (90%) are since 1978 and the initiation of the Open Door policy.
In the words of Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg the “treatise that China is indeed rule and norm adhering” (1999) could not be truer. The larger question however remains that while abiding by existing norms and values (largely…) and in being selective as regards global governance, China does less favor to the international community. Also, to enrich the concept and vision of global governance, what has China’s contribution been towards the projecting of values, norms, and rules? On issues of non-proliferation, is China entirely above board in its dealings with Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea? In regards to “Food Safety” the transgressions made by manufacturers of food products and the laws passed to check adulteration are just one side of the story. The intimidation and jailing of people who brought to light gross misdeeds and the clamping down on information is the other side. To conclude this review one wishes to argue that the conceptual tools to articulate global governance norms and values are inadequate (Weiss & Thakur, 2010) and that perhaps global governance is a “site” – one of many – “where struggles over wealth, power and knowledge are taking place” (Wilkinson & Hughes, 2002) with nations being the variables and not the determinants.

Jae Ho Chung’s edited book flows from the papers presented at an international conference on “China’s Crisis Management – Evolving Norms and Learning” held in Seoul in May 2010. The premises on which the book rests are the following, China faces a wide array of new and complex threats even as it is transforming itself to new realities and a comparative sectorial analysis will reveal the methodology by which it manages crises.

The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter by Wei Zhang explains crisis management of China’s economy at this very crucial period in its process of rapid development. Wei Zhang feels that the global economic crisis was an opportunity to China to increase its economic and political influence in the world (Zhang, 1998, p. 3). Being the second largest economy, the world’s largest exporter since 2009, and largest holder of U.S. Treasury bonds gives China a leverage and heft like never before. While the impact of the global economic crisis has been in the form of sudden and large drop in demand for Chinese exports, shrinkage in inward FDI, and declining confidence levels amongst domestic private investors, the policy responses in the form of proactive fiscal policies, expansionary monetary policy, and strengthened state administrative roles in macro-economic management have been successful in containing the cascading effect of negative sentiments of the market. Control of the financial sector by the state is also advanced by Wei Zhang as a positive feature that insulated China from banking volatility during the crisis.

The second chapter by Jae Ho Chung titled Managing Political Crisis in China, “The Case of Collective Protests”, advances the argument that parallel to the intensification of economic reforms and collective protests have increased in China. The number of people in such protests as also the occupational base of the protestors has widened to encompass all segments of society. Chung also delineates an increasing tendency of the protests to erupt into violence and the involvement of all regions irrespective of its regional economic status (backward provinces/advanced rural economy province/state enterprise dominated province/rich province etc.). The Chinese state has responded by adopting counter-measures that have witnessed an expansion in the plethora of security bureaus and agencies at the central level and the party level. The authorities also have a range of options to choose from in clamping down on protests or “collective incidents” by categorizing the level of protests and the response required. To the authorities, collective incidents do not pose a systemic threat and despite resentment over the manner in which land expropriation takes place, ordinary people view the central government as
a potential mediator and supporter of genuine grievances the people have against rapacious local agencies and authorities (Chung, 2011, p. 36).

“China’s Military Crisis Behavior” by Tuosheng Zhang is the third chapter in the book. In the post-Cold War phase China has been involved in several crises with the U.S. (the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996; the Belgrade embassy bombing of 1999, and the EP3 incident of 2001) and for China, each of these have revolved around three principles: to firmly safeguard its national sovereignty, to make efforts to maintain the overall interests of China-U.S. relations, and to avoid confrontation. To Zhang, it appears that Beijing is determined not to permit any potential crisis to become an actual crisis. Beijing’s varied decision-making groups (the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, the Central National Security Leading Small Group, Central Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, and the Central Military Commission) all formulate relevant policies. As an overarching framework, China adheres to international law and norms and advocates the primacy of the UN, seeks peaceful dialogue, and focuses on crisis prevention and crisis control. It also defines use of force against another country to be mandated by the UNSC. In its totality, the author argues that crisis management is a process in which parties to a crisis both engage in a game and cooperate with each other.

The fourth and fifth chapters emphasize the domestic components of crisis management. Colin Mackerras’ chapter on “Managing Ethnic Minority Crises – The Tibetan Areas and Xinjiang” reveals the close coordination inherent between various levels of the government and the party apparatus in handling crises at the regional level. The party secretaries of the provinces (especially Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai) closely coordinate with the Stability Preservation Leading Group and the Ministry of Public Security. By shifting money into minority-dominated regions, Beijing adopts a strategy of trying to improve livelihoods. However, what passes for “crisis management” on the part of Beijing does not air brush the reality that minority ethnicities (Uyghurs and Tibetans) in China do not enjoy the relative latitude afforded to the majority Han and face the real prospect of becoming minorities in their own regions – it has already happened to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang! In the fifth chapter on “Managing Pandemic/Epidemic Crises: Institutional Set Up and Overhaul” Lai Hongyi charts out the follow-up since the SARS epidemic of 2003 and the preparedness of the authorities as the creation of an institutional framework to handle health crises. This chapter could be termed as a logical extension of Chan, Lee, and Chan’s chapter on Public Health and brings out the anomalies of a system that in putting a premium on economic modernization neglected social welfare.

In the sixth chapter on “China’s Management of Environmental Crisis: Risks, Recreancy, and Response” Richard P. Suttmeier analyses the shift in crisis management on environmental issues from emergency response to one of comprehensive risk management that speaks the language of disaster prevention as stated in the 2009 State Council White Paper on “China’s Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction” that lays out a five year plan to fix strategic goals, legal framework, and institutional changes to effectively tackle incidents like the toxic spill on the Songhua river. In the final chapter on “China’s Management of Natural Disasters: Organizations and Norms” Chen Gang brings out the complicated nature of China’s labyrinthine bureaucracy and agencies that deal with natural calamities. The author argues for more attention to be paid to develop local disaster reduction infrastructure and for the toning down of various ad-hoc mechanisms.

In conclusion, what emerges from both the books is a mixed picture of a China wanting to be part of global governance initiatives, yet adopting a cautious methodology of exploring aspects where its requirements are fulfilled. The economic aspects of global governance appeal
most to a China thirsty for technology and skills that it can benefit from. It consciously adopts a
clow profile and pays platitudes to established conventions of global governance while at the
same time stonewalling itself from greater scrutiny. The duality that emerges is of a China
abiding largely by global governance norms and promoting its own concepts simultaneously (Li,
2012). China also carefully scrutinizes patterns of global governance and subscribes to concepts
where it finds opportunities for extending its influence (Kupchan, 2001). The final question
however remains, is China prepared for global governance while holding on to a political system
bereft of ideology and one that reflects an anachronistic temperament stifling a great people and
culture?
References


Li, S. X. (2012). China’s international education initiatives and view of its role in global governance. *Frontiers of Education in China, 7*(1), 103-123.


This volume, edited by two French scholars associated with the École Français d’Etrême Orient (EFEO) in Indonesia, adds some much needed detail to the grand narrative of religion in this largest Muslim nation-state of the world. Most of the relevant accounts so far have been dominated by speculations over the history of the Islamization process, the role of Islam in resisting colonialism and in post-independence state-building, and present-day challenges of the country’s religious pluralism. The present work provides a number of case studies from Java and Bali arguing, that even in this age of the globalized practice of religion, the local performance of ritual and localized manifestations of religious practice still matter deeply.

Subscribing to the thesis that religion is always “mediatized by the state and its religious politics” (p. xi), the editors detail the complexity of Indonesia’s religious situation; in the introduction, editor Michel Picard problematizes the use of the Sanskrit-derived term agama as the equivalent of “religion.” Criticizing the Eurocentric normative character of the term, he also contends that it lacks descriptive and analytical accuracy, as the term is typically reserved exclusively for scriptural religions with universalist pretences (i.e. Christianity and Islam) and excludes Indonesia’s many indigenous belief systems (kepercayaan). Specifically, Picard claims that the use of the term agama disregards the significance and resilience of indigenous systems of belief and the ways in which such systems have influenced the practices of Christianity and Islam in Indonesia, namely by creating unique, local forms of these “world religions.” For example, says Picard, the enduring indigenous beliefs of Javanism (kejawen), when incorporated into the practice of Islam, create a religious performance referred to as kebatinan, a local form of Islam that the term agama fails to capture. Other forms of co-mingled religious practices similarly influenced by indigenous beliefs emerged in the 1970s under the names kejiwaan and kerohanian. From the 1980s onward, however, these local manifestations of religion have been challenged as less than “authentic” Islam by traditionalist, modernist—and increasingly Islamist—Muslims. Even these recent developments continue to reflect the – in the eyes of the editors – felicity of the term ‘mystical synthesis,’ introduced by the leading expert on Javanese history, Merle Ricklefs. Whereas Javanism felt the squeeze of both state authority and (self-proclaimed) Islamic orthodoxy in both colonial and post-colonial times, the Balinese fared only slightly better as they managed to receive recognition for their religious practices as agama.

The first part of the volume is dedicated to Java and opens with co-editor Rémy Madinier’s discussion of the spread of Christianity in the early twentieth century. The narrative revolves around the Jesuit missionary Franciscus van Lith, a staunch advocate of the adaptation of Catholicism to the cultural settings of Java. Van Lith favored an emphasis on Christianity’s “animist-Hindu-Buddhist (that is, non-Islamic) dimension” (p. 32). Stressing continuities between religious practices rather than differences, this strategy enabled van Lith to bridge the Kristen Londo and Kristen Jowo varieties of Javanese Christianity. Opposed to swift baptism of the indigenous population, he focused instead on education and, in particular, the training of a new Catholic elite. In spite of the Church’s suspicions of van Lith’s “flexible spiritual identity” (p. 43), his approach proved to be highly successful, contributing in no small measure to the saint-like standing he still enjoys among Indonesia’s Catholic minority, which attributes its disproportionately large political influence largely to van Lith.

The merging of Islam with local religious practice has not been quite as seamless. Andrée Feillard’s “The constrained place of local tradition” examines the discourse of the
largest Traditionalist Muslim organization, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), and its effects on Java’s Islamization. Feillard depicts the NU as generally attempting to “[underline] continuity” among practitioners of Islam rather than “rupture and confrontation” among them (p. 48). She also tracks the origins of the migration of many traditionalist Muslims back to their indigenous cultures and belief systems (*prribumisasi*) in the 1980s and a similar migration among the Reformists in the 1990s. Her inquiry leads her to issues of the bi-monthly periodical *Berita Nahdlatul Ulama* (“News of the Nahdlatul Ulama” or BNO), published between 1936 and 1939. There, Feillard finds the first evidence of a traditionalist attempt to define Islam, using “a very exclusive definition of religion” (p. 51); the publications also included discussions of the relationship between custom, local tradition (*adat*), and Islamic law, emphasizing a separation between the two (pp. 60-64). Feillard’s investigation refines Ricklef’s “mystic synthesis” and shows that as early as the 1930s, “the NU was crossed by divergent identity currents,” foreshadowing the later tensions between conservative proponents of increased Islamization of law and “post-traditionalist” defenders of the republic’s Pancasila doctrine in the early twenty-first century (p. 68).

The contribution by Robert Hefner on Java’s syncretic *abangan* sketches the eventual demise of what once was one of the most successful manifestations of “non-standard Islam” to survive into modern times. Hefner attributes the collapse of this religious practice to a phenomenon he refers to as “religionization”: a process of transforming local beliefs and practices—in this case Islamic in origin—into a “standardized, textual, and deterritorialized form” of religion (p. 72). He identifies nineteenth- and twentieth-century Islamic reformist movements as well as Indonesia’s Ministry of Religion as key players in domesticking the “differentiation of local custom from universal religion, premised on the idea that the former may not supersede the latter” (p. 73). Hefner’s analysis draws attention to factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to Islam, including epistemological contrasts between the local and the global, and the impact of centrifugal political processes that superseded local religious organizational structures. This nationalization of *abangan* did not completely snuff out the existence of localized religious practices, however, because on the fringes, breakaway new faiths “known as mystical cults of ‘interiority’ or *kebatinan*” emerged (p. 83). Aside from repressing centripetal socio-cultural forces, says Hefner, the religionization of Islam was also used as a bulwark against communism and to resist the wave of conversions to Christianity in the 1950s and 1960s. Recently, a counterforce stressing pluralism has been forming among new generations of Muslim intellectuals associated with the higher Islamic education system and centripetal trends in the party politics of post-1998 Indonesia.

The “return of Pancasila” is further explored in François Raillon’s investigation of the rivalry between secular and Islamic norms. Due to the “noisy posturing of Muslim radicals” and the “de-Javanization” of Indonesian politics, the present-day “pro-Pancasila” secular camp has so far not received the attention it merits (pp. 92-93). Sketching the history of constitutional challenges to Pancasila since its introduction in 1945, Raillon highlights new threats to the doctrine as a direct result of the efforts of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as *Laskar Jihad* and *Front Pembela Islam* and the pan-Islamic *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, which has been particularly effective in penetrating student circles, as well as the electoral success of the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS), which calls for a central role for Islam in public life. Although in the 1980s, the New Order Regime had re-affirmed Pancasila as the indisputable state doctrine, it was only in 2006 that a broad coalition of intellectuals and activists asserted citizen support for Pancasila by signing the *Maklumat Keindonesiaan* or “Declaration of Indonesianess.” Coming on the back of the condemnation of pluralism, secularism, and liberalism by Indonesia’s conservative Ulama council, this was a civic act of defiance, protesting against the erosion of the core principles underlying the national doctrine. In Raillon’s interpretation “a growing group of mainstream Indonesians is fighting back against puritanical interpretations of Islam’s role in society” (p. 99), resisting what he
even calls the “creeping Talibanization” of Indonesia (p. 97). President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono jumped on the bandwagon by declaring, “Pancasila is final!” (p. 101). According to Raillon, the once domineering doctrine cast in a distinctly Javanese mold is now being refined and reconstructed into a more relativist discourse decentering Javanese culture. The current government system has been also re-engineered and reinvented as a softer version of its predecessor, with an integrative flair that is more accommodative of pluralism. However, at the same time, Raillon says, the pressures of pragmatic politics will continue to require compromise on such lofty principles.

The second part of the volume is dedicated to the exploration of Bali. Whereas contemporary Javanese struggle to respond to deterritorialized Islam, the Balinese faced their own challenge in balancing between the centripetal and centrifugal forces affecting their Hindu beliefs and practices. Returning to the topic detailed in his introduction, Picard discusses the shift from the use of the phrase Agama Bali Hindu to Agama Hindu Bali among Balinese Hindus during the colonial period. Indeed, the existence of two such close terms, so carefully considered and selected, indicates the extent to which the local Balinese tradition (adat) was linked to the practice of religion (agama)—in this case Hinduism. Picard concludes that “the inability of the Balinese to dissociate agama from adat does not stem solely from the polysemy of these terms, but also from the fact that up until then, the Balinese did not regard religion as a bounded field that could be demarcated from other aspects of life” (p. 121). In spite of an emerging consensus among the Balinese, it was not until 1958 that Hindu Bali was recognized as agama by the Ministry of Religion. However, this was not the end of it. In the course of the 1960s, there was a shift towards the more inclusivist designation Agama Hindu, accompanied by an increasing alignment with India, which reached its culmination in the 1990s as a reaction to the Islamic resurgence radiating from Java. This in turn invited a counter current reaffirming Balinese identity and a return to Agama Bali Hindu.

The stress on continuity within the Islamic discourses discussed in the first part of the volume is taken up once again in the second part by Andrea Acri, who makes a case for a textual-historical approach to link pre-modern religious discourses to “Balinese Hinduism” (p. 142). This discussion reminds one of the challenges posed to Clifford Geertz’s taxonomy of religion in Java by a younger generation of anthropologists such as John Bowen, Robert Hefner, and Mark Woodward, who advocated an integration of textual studies into ethnography. Acri makes a similar case for the appreciation of texts to dispel the misconception that Balinese Hinduism is all about ritual, by pointing at the rich literary legacy and suggesting an “alternative approach to scripturalization” (p. 149).

Before veteran ethnographer Brigitte Hauser-Schäublin brings the book full circle to Picard’s introduction with a discussion of how political actors on Bali use the terms adat and agama in the post-Suharto era, Annette Hornbacher’s “The withdrawal of the Gods” offers a fascinating insight into spirit possession. In spite of the decline of the phenomenon, the chapter shows that performance and ritual remain important to our understanding of localized manifestations of contemporary religiosity. The contributions of these German anthropologists also draw attention to the commodification of religion and its manipulation by the Balinese to assert local identity, for example through the Ajeg Bali (Bali Stand Up) initiative in the face of regional (Javanese) political hegemony and the global challenges such as radical Islamism.

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As the second part of David C. Kang’s successive research project (begun with his 2009 China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia), this text, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute explores how East Asia developed and examines the nature and history of the region’s international decision making. East Asia Before the West discusses the unique diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations at play among the four main states in historical East Asia: China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. The author also tries to contrast the experience of these “sinicized” countries to their relations with the nomadic tribes of the northern and northwestern borders, suggesting that there are not only military or commercial explanations for historical events but also that certain cultural interactions contributed to development of the East Asian international order.

Kang begins his book with a brief examination of the Imjin War (1592-1598), a major conflict between China, Korea, and Japan. The author seeks to understand why and how these three major powers in East Asia enjoyed a peaceful coexistence for the three hundred years both before and after the Imjin war despite “having the military and technological capability to wage war on a massive scale” (p. 1). His attempts to answer this question then serve as a brief historical background to introduce the book’s main themes, including the cultural roots of Chinese hegemony and a study of the “tribute system,” which, as Kang emphasizes, bears practical significance for the whole of East Asia.

Chapter two, “Ideas: Hierarchy, Status, and Hegemony,” explores the importance of these key concepts and uses them as a way of clarifying the ideas that inform the rest of the book. By studying various definitions offered by different philosophers and historians, Kang concludes that the distinctions between these terms are significant in helping “categorize and explain different patterns of international relations found in early modern East Asia” (p. 24). Kang provides in the subsequent chapter, “States: The Confucian Society,” a historical overview of East Asia, focusing on China’s role in the making of international order in the region. Here, the author makes two central arguments: first that there is no eternal, unchanging China and second that other secondary states in East Asia chose Confucianism and Chinese models more for their own needs than from Chinese pressure. Specifically, he claims that the Chinese practices provided other states with a wide range of “institutional and discursive hierarchic tools,” (p. 52) the use of which permitted such states to consolidate their own rule and to present themselves to China as states worthy of treatment as such. Says Kang, based on formal recognition and regulated by a set of accepted norms, national states of varying sizes and power coexisted in a multinational system in East Asia.

The next chapter, “Diplomacy: The Tribute System,” is a particularly well-argued one that explains how the tribute system of China, with the cooperation of Korea, Vietnam, and Japan, was created and maintained for almost six centuries. This system emphasized formal hierarchy among countries, yet it also allowed “considerable informal equality” (p. 54). In contrast to the modern Westphalian ideal of equality among nation-states, the Chinese tribute system, in which China was understood to be the superior state, was based predominantly on two key moves: the “recognition [of the subordinate state] by the superior state” and the “sending of embassy envoys to the superior” state (p. 56). Instead of a form of political or military hegemony, China exercised little authority over other states, and this sino-centric tribute system was based overwhelmingly on subordinate states formally recognizing China’s cultural superiority. Here, Kang underscores a crucial aspect about the Chinese style tribute system: in return for acknowledging its dominant role in East Asia, China respected the political sovereignty and relative independence of its subordinate states.

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1 In the Westphalian system, the national interests and goals of states and nation-states were widely assumed to go beyond those of any citizen or any ruler. States became the primary institutional agents in an interstate system of relations.
on fundamental issues such as government institutions, legal systems, and economic policies. Furthermore, within this system, there was a set of rules and institutions which developed over time to build “an overarching framework” (p. 81) for organizing external relations among political actors in the region.

In his chapter on war (pp. 82-106), Kang analyzes major military confrontations in the history of East Asia and reviews them in chronological order. Through these wars, it is evident that there is a major difference between Asia and contemporary Europe and that patterns in the pre-modern East Asian system are difficult to reconcile with the Western balance-of-power theory2 (p. 84). Kang emphasizes through his choice of the subtitle for the chapter that attention should be paid to the long periods of peace between the wars, though he also admits that plenty of violence existed between the realms and tribes along China’s long northern and western frontiers. Although there had been a vibrant and integrated system of trading and foreign relations in East Asia from the Song era of the tenth century to the end of the Qing dynasty in the nineteenth century, which are discussed in chapter six (p. 107-138), no such system existed among the neighboring pastoral nomads of China, whose role in the history of the region Kang also explores. Based on his examination of a variety of nomadic peoples beyond China’s borders, Kang concludes that for such peoples, the Chinese tribute system was unhelpful in that nomadic peoples comprised no “state” to speak of and did not, therefore, always fit into this system. In addition to which, the Chinese government typically considered such peoples a threat to the territorial and cultural security of China and therefore spent significant effort attempting to deal with these people through offense, defense, trade, and diplomacy (p. 145). Certainly, the author tries hard to avoid oversimplification of the complex problem, suggesting that China always had “different security concerns,” among them was “protecting” itself from the perceived threat of the “uncivilized barbarians” (p. 142). Clear evidence of this perpetual concern of China includes, for instance, China’s building of the Great Wall and the ongoing Chinese military actions against various nomadic tribes and states on its borders.

The concluding chapter is entitled “Lessons: History Forward and Backward,” which may well reflect Kang’s primary purpose of this book. In this sense, his history of East Asian foreign relations before Western colonialism should not be simply understood as a historical narrative but as a focused attempt to inform readers about a regional system predicated on different cultural assumptions than those of the West. Although in contemporary East Asia, the Western model of “balance of power” is now operative, East Asians seem not to be particularly anxious about China’s ascendancy, perhaps because many of them understand the history of the region and China’s place in that narrative.

East Asia Before the West is valuable scholarship which attempts to put the historical relations of different countries in the region under scrutiny and probe for a proper approach with which to provide the reader a coherent view of the region. This book will be a valuable contribution to any library and is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in the history of political relations in East Asia; it is also certain to provide the reader with a more comprehensive understanding of modern day East Asia and current situations in the region.

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2 Balance of power theory asserts that national security is enhanced when military capabilities are distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others. If one state gains inordinate power, the theory predicts that it will take advantage of its strength and attack weaker neighbors, thereby providing an incentive for those threatened to unite in a defensive coalition.
The research by Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2011) applies Mill’s inductive method of difference to isolate causal factors of successful regime change in nonviolent revolutions. Nepstad measures success only if the regime in power is overthrown, not if there is a democratic transition or a democratic procedure in its overthrow (Nepstad, 2011, p. xiv). She argues that by focusing on techniques and strategies used by civilian resistance groups and regime elites, one is better able isolate the specific factors influencing nonviolent political transformations. Nepstad’s research seeks to determine which nonviolent actions exert the greatest influence in authoritarian regimes. She also examines the various strategies of actors from both sides, the role of international sanctions, and the factors that can derail a well-planned nonviolent revolt. She uses six historical cases of civil unrest to answer these questions, arguing that defection of armed security forces is the most important strategic factor to a successful nonviolent revolution. This review provides a brief summary and critique of the findings in Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century.

The author applies the comparative method to six cases of domestic civil unrest during the Cold War Era. She orders the cases by regime type, placing them in three separate categories for analysis. Nepstad includes socialist regimes, military dictatorships, and personal dictatorships in her study. Each category contains one case of successful regime overthrow and one failure. The cases include the 1989 Chinese Tiananmen Square uprising and the 1989 East German revolt for the socialist regime category, the regimes of General Manual Noriega in Panama (1987-1989) and General Augusto Pinochet (1983-1988) of Chile in the military dictatorships category, and the dictatorships of President Daniel arap’ Moi in Kenya in the late 1970s and President Fernando Marcos (1968-1986) in the Philippines in the personal dictatorships category (Nepstad, 2011, p. 17). Nepstad examines each of these cases using only secondary sources, and while she acknowledges this as a research shortcoming, it does not weaken the author’s conclusion. She succeeds in her goal of providing an analysis of the strategies and tactics in nonviolent revolutions. She also creates noteworthy historical narratives of each case despite the lack of primary sources.

Nepstad identifies five criteria that must be present for a revolutionary movement to occur. There must be (1) widespread grievances against the state; (2) an allegiance shift in national elites away from the state; (3) the mobilization of the public against regime injustices; (4) public unification around an ideology of rebellion; and finally, (5) the mobilizing of organizations (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 5-6). She examines both structural and strategic factors which contribute to the success of nonviolent civil resistance. Structural factors are specific macro-level indicators that contribute to the strength of a revolution. Four are present in each case: (1) economic decline, (2) moral shock or new political opportunity, (3) divided elites, and (4) the existence of a free space. Despite the presence of such structural factors in all of the cases she examined, she argues that structural conditions are not all too relevant (a claim that is later questioned in this review). She asserts instead that the strategic tactics used by individuals are more important at influencing the outcome in a nonviolent revolution.

Applying Gene Sharp’s model of nonviolent resistance, she focuses on the six strategic tactics often present in civilian resistance: (1) the refusal to acknowledge rulers as legitimate; (2) the contestation of mentalities or ideologies of obedience; (3) the refusal to obey laws or
cooperate with the state; (4) the withholding of skills to sustain state activities; (5) the withdrawal of material resources; and (6) the undermining of a state’s sanctioning power. Nepstad observes that the first three techniques were present in each case, while the success of withholding of skills (4) and withdrawal of material resources (5) were mixed. The last technique, undermining the state’s sanctioning power (6), was only present in the cases of successful regime defeat. This strategic factor of undermining the state’s sanctioning power (6) was present in the successes of Germany, Chile, and the Philippines and was absent in failures of China, Panama, and Kenya. Importantly, the source of a regime’s ability to sanction comes from the armed security forces of the state. Once these forces defect, the government and its rulers lose the ability to coerce and punish the populace (Nepstad, 2011).

Of critical significance, then, is why armed security forces defect. Nepstad argues that soldiers defect if they are convinced that the goals of the military more closely align with its citizenry than the state. Defection can occur from the top-down or the bottom-up. In the case of Chile, defection occurred from the top military offices in the junta, while in East Germany, defection occurred from the lower ranks. The case of the Philippines saw a mix of high ranking officials and subordinates defecting (Nepstad, 2011, p. 128). Importantly, once the process occurs, says Nepstad, it begins a cascading effect through the ranks. Defection is even more likely to occur when civil resisters remain nonviolent, the armed forces identify with the protesters, soldiers question the morality of the orders, and soldiers see other soldiers defecting. (Nepstad notes that in the unsuccessful cases of China and Kenya military troops were unable to identify with resisters, and the soldiers were from different ethnicities and regions. As such, not only were troops unlikely to defect, they were more likely to crack down on resisters.) Nepstad’s analysis indicates that in all cases except China, religious institutions played a significant role in the defection rates. For soldiers who respected a religious institution, carrying out the state’s orders created a moral dilemma, increasing the likelihood of defection. Finally, says Nepstad, once other troops were aware defection was occurring within their ranks, the other armed security forces also defected (Nepstad, 2011).

Nepstad concludes by identifying factors that can undermine a nonviolent movement’s ability to successfully overthrow a regime. She argues that a divided resistance, the inability to remain nonviolent, and the backfiring of external sanctions all contribute to the failure of nonviolent movements. In each unsuccessful case, at least two of these factors were present, and all of these factors were absent in the successful cases (Nepstad, 2011, p. 131).

Despite the inclusion of six case studies, Nepstad’s research remains very focused, providing a detailed analysis of the strategic factors involved in each case. This analysis, however, comes at the expense of a detailed analysis of structural conditions. One of the null hypotheses (or default assumptions) of this research is that structural conditions contribute to regime overthrow. She isolates and discusses the four important structural conditions in each case, but does not elaborate on their relevance in drawing her conclusions. The problem is that all four structural conditions were present in each case, indicating that structural conditions might be significant precursors to regime overthrow. Certainly, if some of the successful cases were missing any of the structural conditions, it would strengthen the research’s conclusion regarding the importance of security force defection. However, since all four structural conditions are present the study suffers from selection bias. Nepstad’s rejection of this null in her conclusion might have led to a type I error, when the default is rejected when it is, in fact, true. It is highly possible that structural conditions are essential precursors to successful regime overthrow, and the absence of any structural condition would lead only to failure.
One of the four structural factors in particular appears to be of specific relevance. Free space, the fourth of the structural conditions Nepstad noted but did not consider critical to regime change, may be one of the most important structural conditions in the cases analyzed. Religious institutions, specifically the Christian Church, acted as a free space in every case study but China. While Nepstad acknowledges this in her conclusion and discusses heavily the role of the church, she does not provide much analysis on the operation of free space in nonviolent revolutions. Free space plays vital role in the cases by giving resisters the opportunity to organize, communicate, and facilitate their activities in a safe environment. Without free space, these nonviolent revolutions might not have been able to mobilize the public or establish an ideology of rebellion.

Nepstad’s research highlights important strategic elements to nonviolent revolutions. The book is relevant, given the recent events of the Arab Spring, and it would be interesting if the author applied the same methodology to these recent Middle Eastern cases. One conclusion that Nepstad discusses briefly in her last chapter is the ineffectiveness of international sanctions in overthrowing any regime. When powerful states like the US impose sanctions, doing so can have the undesired effect of generating allies to the regime in power. Sanctions can also harm the well-being of the general populace. Nepstad’s word of caution on the utilization of sanctions as an international tactic should be heeded by the international community (Nepstad, 2011).

Nepstad’s research thoroughly analyzes the role of strategic techniques for successful overthrow of a regime. However, while providing a detailed historical account and analysis of the strategic factors, Nepstad fails to produce an equivalent analysis for structural conditions, reducing some of the strength in her overall argument. Some political scientists and social scientists will be disappointed by the lack of analysis of structural conditions; nonetheless, the research offers some insight in predicting successful uprisings and the overthrow of regimes. Insight that proves particularly timely given the recent trend of global uprisings.

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This edited volume brings together six authors who evaluate the state of non-western oriented International Relations Theory in case study/country formats, incorporating studies of China, Japan, Korea, India, and Indonesia. Accompanying micro-level case study evaluation are meso- and macro-level inquiries from a Southeast Asian, Islamic, and World Historical view. The various authors come together in providing key insights into the fundamental question posed by this volume, namely: Why is there no non-western international relations theory—or, perhaps more pointedly—why is there a lack of appreciation for, exposure to, and dissemination of non-western oriented international relations theoretical scholarship? The nature of this volume is to offer readers a systematized purview of the nature of international relations theorizing, which stands in western academic circles as being the crux of scholastic achievement and stands apart from practitioner/policy analysis (which has as its core motive the solving of everyday issues and problems). The question posed by Acharya and Buzan’s text has perhaps escaped academicians and laymen in general for the preceding half century of international relations scholarship. Nonetheless, the research trajectory set by the editors is both intriguing and prescient to the contemporary period, not least because the focus of power relations and international influence in the 21st century is shifting and will continue to shift towards Asia, with its dynamic economies and rapidly modernizing social and political spaces.

International relations (IR) is an interdisciplinary field of study, sometimes considered a branch of political science, with the primary goals of (1) understanding relationships between countries and (2) seeking to both analyze and formulate the foreign policy of states. Students of IR are keenly aware of the demand for rigorous study of the IR “classics” as well as the expectation that publishable work adhere to a theoretically sound and testable base, both of which are the essence of scholarship in the field of IR (and, indeed, in academia in general). However, in U.S. academic circles, the limited scope of theoretical inquiry into the field of IR itself (which has centered on few debates such as neorealist v. neoliberal, realist v. ideational, positivist v. reflexive) has led students and instructors of IR in U.S. universities down a dangerous path. This path is characterized by ever-increasing inflexibility and the need to “reheat” studies and approaches, using familiar paradigmatic expressions (inherently stemming from post-colonial studies) rather than looking towards the nature of international society or exploring the effects that globalization is bringing to the fore, including fracturedness, diversity, reimagination, and reconnection with lost traditions (i.e. the recapturing of local, regional, and subsystem coherence). The threat of reifying western IR Theory and the problem of its uneven fit to emerging regions of the world highlight the need for a fresh look and a diversified understanding of IR. The volume itself is readily accessible to students of international relations. This accessibility is a result of the authors’ narrative styles, clearly structured work, and the absence of academic jargon. This text would appeal to a wide range of persons, including students of international relations, Asia experts, and those who simply find international relations interesting.

The first chapter, written by Yaqing Qin, addresses the state of international relations theorization and the components which have led to a lack of IR theorization in contemporary Chinese scholarship. Qin begins by making distinctions regarding the different periods of Chinese international relations academic inquiry. The author finds that the state of Chinese IR is
subject to political exigencies associated with China’s political economy during the post-civil war era. The lack of IR-specific theorizing is seen as the result of the political need to make policy prescriptions for state management. This political need coupled with the lack of expertise regarding the western world led Chinese IR to focus on policy-based, real-world (i.e. non-theoretical), immediate problem solving. Combined with a commiserate lack of funding, Chinese expertise in high-level IR theorizing is currently found lacking.

The author’s central argument for the reasons behind the lack of an academic discipline in IR in China is twofold. First, he surmises that there is a historical component that comes from the revolutionary nature of Chinese politics and society from 1898 onwards and the immediate need to “catch up” and establish China’s place in the world. Second, he says, is a philosophical aspect stemming from the conflict between the intellectual traditions of Confucian-based Chinese theorization and the western liberal tradition. Qin’s most revealing assertion, however, is that not only does Chinese scholarship have the potential to develop its own IR theory but also that Chinese reasoning and tradition themselves are in fact keenly suited to the creation of such theory. Confucian China places an emphasis on collective awareness with respect to understanding both China’s political place in the world and the place of the individual within the greater political collective. This Chinese worldview, which places the individual inside of a greater socio-political collective, stands out as having the potential to be a focal point of a paradigmatic shift towards original IR scholarship. The aforementioned, coupled with rapid modernization and the opening up of academic space in China, in general, bode well for the development of Chinese IR. These conditions create fertile ground for an emerging Chinese academia and have the potential to give birth to a truly non-western IR theoretical sphere with Chinese origins.

In the second chapter, Takashi Inoguchi considers the question of whether or not there is a Japanese IR Theory. Inoguchi suggests that if an American positivist standard is considered the IR theory benchmark, then the answer would have to be no. If, however, one considers IR theory to encompass a richer structural field including constructivism, regional integration, international law, and economics then the answer would indeed be yes, though with its own particular nature and limitations. The author considers the nature of IR scholarship in Japan and presents a few reasons why there may very well be a lack of academic rigor in Japanese IR studies. First, the author points to socio-political constraints due to the lack of a strong political science culture in Japanese academia, which can be traced, he says, to the formative period of Japanese modernization and nation building, during which students of political science and IR were selectively trained according to the specific needs of the burgeoning Japanese state. (The author also jests that a lack of a strong political science culture might well be the result of a fear of having too many unemployed political scientist running amuck.) The author asserts that the nature of both state structure and state needs in Japan are such that IR and political science in general are influenced by a strong bias towards policy and state needs rather than towards theoretical considerations. As such, major strains of Japanese intellectual thought are generally disposed towards policy, historicism, Marxism, and post-1970 positivism. Additionally, IR and political science, as an autonomous university department, is nonexistent in Japan; hence, IR/political science departments are dependent upon and in many cases appendages of other faculties such as humanities, law, letters or economics. (p. 52-53) Social constraints in the Japanese employment market and the rigid nature of employment crossover are also pointed out as cogent.
To provide support for his thesis that a Japanese IR theory does indeed exist despite its limitations, the author considers three divergent Japanese scholars from the pre- and post-war periods. The author chooses Nishida (Philosophy), Tabata Shigejiro (International Law), and Hirano (Economy) to show how Japanese scholarship indeed has its own shape and voice rivaling western scholarship in considerations of identity formation, communitarian international law, and human rights discourses, and functional regional integration. In fact, says Inoguchi, such considerations were of academic interest in Japan prior to their becoming fully mainstream western intellectual pursuits. The author’s premise is that Japanese IR theorists and theories were at one time quite prevalent and even informed Japanese scholarship for many decades prior to the recent upswing in American-influenced positivist methodologies. The American-influenced trajectory in IR theorizing is inclined to be descriptive, culturally laden, and critical in nature. However, if one takes a broader view and considers constructivism, diplomatic history, and integration studies to be a part of IR, then there is ample space for locally produced IR theories unique from western influenced IR theory.

Chaesung Chun’s chapter explores the lack of original IR theory in Korea. The author focuses on the relevance and applicability of western IR theories to the field of Korean IR and situates historical circumstances within the contemporary framework of tutelage, quasi-sovereignty, and the nonexistence of Korean-born IR traditions. The author clearly places the lack of Korean IR within the historical framework of Korea operating under Sino-dominated, Neo-Confucian understandings of dynastic hierarchy, which held enormous sway on the Korean peninsula with regard to regional politics, security, economy, and inter-social relations. The nature of peninsular relations, specifically between 1876 and 1953, which saw the collapse of the traditional order, the transformation to state-based equality, followed by colonial imperialism, then cold war rivalry, undermined the ability of the Koreans to develop a peninsular-specific form of IR theorizing and state policy consideration. As such, Korean IR tends essentially to rely directly on imported western IR theories, whether or not such theories are appropriate or applicable. In fact, the author considers western IR theories, particularly grand theories and traditions to be found wanting and wholly inapplicable to Northeast Asia, in general, and Korea, specifically (though he finds considerable applicability for micro-theories). He claims, American IR theories (e.g. realist) and methodologies, though recognized as imparting much needed expertise with respect to subsystem inquiry (such as security studies) are wholly inadequate when addressing macro issues, which, due to the nature and course of Korean history, simply do not fit the imported American philosophies. The reason for this uneasy existence between American IR theory and Korean reality is in fact the nature of political sovereignty (or rather lack thereof) in Korea. According to western IR theory, notions of sovereignty are the keystones to interstate and, by default, international relations of states. Problematically, Korean sovereignty falls outside of the west’s narrow, simple understanding of what it means to be sovereign. Korea (both North and South), during its many political epochs that constitute the nation’s history, (from the Period of Three Nations through the Ming Dynasty and into the Chosun Period towards Japanese Imperialism) has a very difficult time conceptualizing sovereignty in its western form. Sovereignty as constituted by modern international law and organized state behavior stands in direct opposition to Confucian worldviews and Korean Empire understanding of sovereign relations of personal and regional responsibility. Thus coming to grips with sovereignty and its highly deceptive form during the Japanese Imperialist period was not only instructive but helped cement realist leanings.
In considering the state of IR in India, Navnita Chadha Behera takes the question of whether or not there is an Indian IR and turns it on its head by instead firmly stating that there is an Indian IR and redirecting the frame of inquiry by asking why it has not been recognized. Behera’s argument is centered on postmodern conceptions of knowledge formation, dissemination, legitimacy and reproduction based on discursive underpinnings. Behera asserts that Western IR theory, born of Western-originated notions of international systems of states, leaves no room for local Indian IR theories. According to Behera:

…Western IR and its fundamental understandings of the Westphalian state\(^1\) and its attendant parts are part and parcel representative of a larger structure of exclusion. The exclusionary nature of this paradigm finds its powerbase in setting the intellectual agenda, gatekeeping and essential monopolizing discourse and the production of knowledge within the frameworks of western delineated structures. (Behera, 2009, p. 109)

By setting the course of academia, methodologies, legitimacy of inquiry, publishing, and wide dissemination of knowledge, says Behera, western sources of IR have “colonized the mind of local academics” in India by “precluding the inviolability of alternate sources of knowledge production” (Behera, 2009, pp. 105-106).

Despite these claims, Behera does not use the term “west” derogatorily and finds serious shortcomings, too, within the Indian system, particularly, for example, a lack of funding for IR in university departments, overworked academics, whose focus must necessarily be on teaching rather than on rigorous research, and a narrow field of inquiry, a shortcoming that began as early as independence, as a result of Nehru’s decision to undertake foreign affairs, diplomacy, and international relations of the Indian state personally. Of particular importance, says Behera, was Nehru’s non-alignment movement and attempts at pan-regionalism, which were dismissed by western intellectuals out of hand rather than considered as reasonable foundations of a new branch of IR theory. Bahera suggests that reconnecting history and allowing for a wider research sphere of IR would temper the western positivist science and rationalist perspective by adding more culturally oriented and appropriate models. In such a case, the field of IR would inherently benefit by the creation of a new IR that would be multi-polar and representative of those that IR seeks to generalize and study.

Alan Chong addresses the lack of originality in the existing IR scholarship of many non-western regions by pointing to an inherent bias that ultimately leads even non-western intellectuals to rely on imported western models, which are ill-suited to the region. Chong finds that discourse surrounding Southeast Asian states, in particular, in the international sphere largely coalesce around post-colonial studies, which stress a role of modernity that is superimposed by western lenses geared to highlight the salience of stability, nationalism, realist narratives, and dependence-based interpretations of nation building. In effect, the author asserts that western narratives concerning the Southeast Asian region reveal an understanding of Southeast Asia that began after the Cold War and one in which it is assumed that the agency of nascent Southeast Asian states and leaders was, in the best case, a second order priority. This

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\(^1\) Scholars of international relations have identified the modern, Western originated, international system of states, multinational corporations, and organizations, as having begun at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In the Westphalian system, the national interests and goals of states (and later nation-states) were widely assumed to go beyond those of any citizen or any ruler. States became the primary institutional agents in an interstate system of relations. The “Westphalian” doctrine of states as independent agents was bolstered by the rise in 19th century thought of nationalism, under which legitimate states were assumed to correspond to nations—groups of people united by language and culture.
abundance of scholarly work which favors western realist narratives is supported by samples of high ranking scholarly journals that provide some evidence of an embedded cultural bias towards the region. However, the author points towards recent academic endeavors in non-western spheres that attempt to study and develop at least a generative conceptualization that is region-sensitive (i.e. non-western) and that incorporates constructivist studies and works dealing with agent-specific narratives of regional phenomena.

Leonard Sebastian and Irman Lanti consider the existence of generalized IR theorizing in Indonesia and find room for meaningful surveys into Indonesian/Southeast Asian variants that may lead researchers towards a new track of IR inquiry. The authors cite the centrality of organizational leadership and personality as a point of inflection for methodological excursions into politics and IR of Indonesia and Southeast Asia. The authors claim that Indonesian mythology resulting from kingship and character traits are reflected in the larger political sphere and have large-scale social ramifications. and political culture the Javanese tradition of “musyawarah” where leaders use informality and as the basis for decision-making, “mufakat” as the process or practice of decision-making “pamrih” as the directional change of leadership towards a The crux of their argument lies in the Indonesian conceptualization deterrence and security, which is not simply based on material forces but rather is informed by ideational and non-materialist understandings of charisma and personality traits. This understanding points towards a need for greater recognition of the role of individual agency in the study of IR in Southeast Asia. Power structure, as has been studied by western theorists of Southeast Asian regionalism, is insufficient to fully unpack the nature of power in countries like Indonesia that demonstrate complex and nuanced cultural understandings regarding power, influence, and authority.

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh considers the role that Islam, or rather Islamic traditions and worldviews, can contribute to an emerging body of knowledge that is distinct from western traditions while sharing some traits of western schools of IR theory. Tadjbakhsh proposes that the fundamental discord between Islamic and western interpretations of international phenomena is rooted in both Islamic and western essentialist conceptions of “the state,” its people, and the role that religion plays in the formation of states. The author posits that the formations of Islamic states are based on a specific binary logic that eludes western political and positivist understandings, namely that justice is not predicated upon order or stability but that stability is predicated upon justice. The author believes that the Islamic state cannot be solely understood or studied in terms of western realist modernity; the Islamic state is a subjectified entity, bound in the identity-formations of its people. Finally, the author asserts that the Islamic state does not exist simply for itself. Rather, it exists for its people: to provide for them both physically and metaphysically by spiritual means. The last point is of particular interest, as it illustrates the critical point of disjuncture between Islamic and western IR theories and philosophies. This conceptualized understanding of the state requires the study of Islamic IR to include issues of morality and ethics, just as western-oriented IR examines conceptions of power, authority, and legitimacy. The author claims that there is an inability of the western scientific/rationalistic-based theories to capture the “essentiality” and “normative/ideational centrality” of Islam in not only everyday life but also in the role that Islam itself plays within the larger, collectivized understandings of the nation-state. The author believes that western rejection of all things that are not empirically-testable leads to the erroneous understanding that Islam’s relation to international relations is irrational or ephemeral, and, thus, not inclinable to rigorous and
verifiable study. It is precisely this point that the author believes should be the basis for a new IR understanding and theory for Islamic states.

Buzan and Little place the frame of non-western IR theorizing within the disciplinary sphere of studying world history. They begin by surveying the historical and prevalent thematic literature of world history written by scholars and find strong similarities with regard to the study of world history as it presented. Particularly, they find that within the study of history, a “modernity bias” is nearly ubiquitous, leaning invariably towards historical narratives that prejudice the centrality of the nation-state as being a priori and, thus, narrowing the availability of broader theorizing or inquiries (though this was not necessarily the intent of scholars themselves). The nation-state being taken as a “given” further provides prejudice to the study of Eurocentric conceptualizations of state activity, power, formation, and external relations, which find their intellectual home in Europe. Furthermore, the authors point towards historians who have come to the realization of the existence of such structural biases and who have attempted to reconcile these with more balanced appeals to scholars (yet have found trouble due to the fact that the study of history and its narrative understandings are generally sourced from same pool of Eurocentricity). Revisionist historians and legal historians are cited as being the primary force behind the drive to identify such Eurocentricity. The authors find that by inquiring with a view towards studying alternative system prevalence (prior to European hegemony), historians can begin to properly construct the world as it was before European colonialism.

This volume in no way proposes simple solutions to the complex problem of a highly biased system of inquiry with regard to the field of international relations, but it does add a critically needed voice that specifies areas of deficiency and methods which may allow for alternative and reasonable disciplinary guidance that can finally address the historical inequity within the study of IR. The authors provide key insights to a problematic theme regarding how to overcome “colonization of the mind” by the limiting and framing scopes of inquiry so as to essentially set an agenda with regard to an entire disciplinary field of academia and its requisite effects. International relations and its theorizing stands to benefit and become a much richer field of academic inquiry that allows for alternative and specifically-suited methodologies and theory which can be applied without prejudice in order to provide better insight into the majority of the world’s history, particularly those of cultures that are not European, American, or Australian.

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Cosmopolitans and heretics makes another dent in the view of the “Islamic world” as comprised of a center and a periphery. But the challenge this time is not grounded on literary manuscripts, archival documents, or scholarly or khutba networks of the seventeenth-nineteenth century; instead, Carool Kersten pursues a theorized analysis of the intellectual genealogies—and the writings—of three “new advocates of Islam’s wider civilizational heritage” (p. xv), from Algeria to Indonesia. Indonesia is here brought to the forefront not only as a producer of new ideas but also as an important pool from which to draw potential audiences interested in progressive interpretations of Islam.

Cosmopolitans and heretics is his first monograph, and it has already received much praise from the academic community, with nominations for the AAR Prize as Best First Book in the History of Religions and for the Asia Society's Bernard Schwartz Book Award. In this book, Kersten brings together three “new Muslim intellectuals” who challenge established scholarship in the field of Islamic studies in the West, as well as in Muslim countries, by embracing both traditions. They display varying levels of engagement with politics, establishing a conversation between academe and socio-historical developments. Such dynamics warranted labeling these intellectuals both “cosmopolitans” and “cultural hybrids” on the one hand and “heretics” on the other.

Born under European colonial rule, raised in Muslim countries and religious environments, and receiving both Western and Islamic educations, the Indonesian Nurcolish Madjid, Egyptian Hasan Hanafi, and Algerian Mohammed Arkoun have much in common. Socio-political change markedly affected their intellectual development, yet “these events functioned as catalysts rather than immediate causes” (p. 5) of their political engagement in the 1950s as well as in the 1990s. Kersten does a very good job at giving the unacquainted reader the information necessary to understand the juncture between intellectual engagement, socio-political milieu, and historical circumstances in Indonesia, Egypt and, Algeria.

Post-colonialism, Third Worldism, the Non-Aligned Movement, the center-periphery debate, and the position of Islam in politics are just some of the debates these thinkers address in their writings. As the introduction provides the reader with the necessary guidance to follow the imaginary conversations among these intellectuals, the conclusions skilfully weave together the themes in comparative perspective. Kersten opens his book with some “heuristic considerations … employed to capture the epistemological underpinnings of these new Muslim intellectuals” (p. 24). Thus, chapter two, “Refashioning the study of Islam and the Muslim world,” focuses on “the continuing importance of phenomenology and hermeneutics, the significance of the secularization debate, and the viability of employing a postcolonial vocabulary” (p. 24). While readers from outside the field of religious studies might feel cheated by the early statement that Kersten would be “going light on theory” (p. 24), chapter two is dense in names and jargon and
heavy with references (with one hundred and one footnotes for 16 pages of text). Still, as the conceptual foundations are laid down, Nurcholish Madjid, Hasan Hanafi, and Mohammed Arkoun come to life through the narrative.

The author has selected Madjid, Hanafi, and Arkoun as representatives of the “first generation of Muslim thinkers reaching intellectual maturity in the post-colonial age” (p. xiv) and re-engaging Islam’s philosophical legacy, strong in “their acquaintance with contemporary achievements of Western scholarship in the human sciences” (p. 10). Thus, Madjid, Hanafi, and Arkoun find themselves in the “liminal cultural hybridity” created by their dedication to applying the knowledge they acquired in Western academe (at the University of Chicago and the Sorbonne) to Islamic methodology, epistemology, and philosophy. The book has a well-defined composition, with nine core chapters—three per intellectual. Kersten has chosen to apply parallel structures to the examination of these individuals: He covers their early years and education, their political context and engagement, the influence of Western scholarship on their thinking, a detailed analysis of selected works from their publications, and the responses of others to their writings. All sections lead to the ultimate consolidation of Madjid, Hanafi, and Arkoun as both “cosmopolitans” and “heretics.”

Chapters three to five examine the intellectual life of Nurcholish Madjid. Known as the “young Natsir,” this leader of Indonesia’s Muslim students (Himpunan Muslimin Indonesia) was more inspired by Natsir’s interest in Western and Islamic philosophy than in his political leadership (53). Beginning in the mid-1960s, Madjid is exposed to international academe in America and in the Middle East; he starts advocating for a modernization that would avoid “Western secularist ideologies,” yet he retains terms such as liberalization, secularization, and desacralization, “which provoked a storm of criticism from fellow Muslims” (pp. 55-56). At the same time, he calls for cultural Islam, Islam as a “living tradition,” and Islam rasional (p. 66), embracing both Indonesia’s geographical specificity (pp. 77, 85, 88, 99) and Islam’s inherent pluralism (pp. 86, 93-94).

These are the seeds of Madjid’s pembaruan, a renewal of Islam that would balance between political Islam and secularism (p. 102), tradition and modernity, stimulated in Chicago by his encounter with Fazlur Rahman and the study of the classical Islamic heritage. This approach was later translated in the slogan “Islam Yes! Islamic Party No!” which would grant him protection under the New Order regime of General Suharto with the bestowal of the title of guru bangsa (p. 80) but would also cost him a fatwa in 2005.

Chapters six to eight link Indonesia to the Arabic-speaking world through Hanafi, the Egyptian philosopher who “found an audience among Indonesians with an interest in innovative and progressive interpretations of Islam” (p. 105). Hanafi was primarily concerned with the universal validity and chronological particularity of Islam, which led him to seek a general philosophical method of enquiry based on the heritage of ‘ilm usul al-fiqh. After completing his undergraduate studies in Cairo in the mid-1950s, Hanafi joins the Muslim Brotherhood. His acquaintance with Sayyid Qutb and his “personal disillusionment over the demise of the Muslim Brotherhood … was alleviated by the exposure to the new intellectual influences he received in Paris,” at the
Sorbonne (p. 110). There, influenced by Riceour and Husserl and his concerns with the crisis of Western philosophy, Hanafi approaches his philosophical studies with the aim of emancipating the Third World. Not only do these chapters include detailed analysis of Hanafi’s selected works (The methods of exegesis, The exegesis of phenomenology, and the Heritage and Renewal Project), but they also reveal the lens through which Kersten illustrates the shift of Hanafi’s focus from philosophical enquiry to political engagement, itself followed by a scholarly transformation of his understanding of the field of Islamic studies from theology to anthropology (Chapter 8; p. 165).

Chapters nine to eleven delineate “various intellectual influences which have [had an impact not only] on Arkoun’s reassessment of the Islamic heritage but also [on] his proposition for a different conceptualization of the study of Islam as an academic specialization” (p. 179). Arkoun had studied in French and Arabic schools in Algeria before moving to the Sorbonne at a time of great political turmoil. Kersten identifies Arkoun’s prose and scholarship as fragmented (p. 178), a characteristic that has made it difficult for his innovative methodology—“Applied Islamology”—to have a strong impact. Like Hanafi’s, Arkoun’s foremost concern is the development of a new method of enquiry. But his exposure to the Annales school, Le Goff and Duby’s ethnohistoire, and Bourdieu’s micro-history, structuralism, and post-structuralism, pushed Arkoun towards a “vision of critical history as an all-embracing discipline among the social sciences” (p. 181) and inspired him to seek “interdisciplinary cooperation within an international community” (p. 186). It is this “eclecticism that underlies the cosmopolitan attitude of culturally hybrid intellectuals” (p. 184), which earns him the label of border crosser. He had “to cope with a considerable degree of disregard for his innovations,” and often even his own students were reluctant “to adopt his radical methodologies” (p. 225). Despite this, Indonesian students, activists, and young intellectuals have instead proven to be particularly receptive to his ideas (p. 226).

Rather than contrasting and comparing the details of these three intellectuals’ paths towards the contested status of cosmopolitans or heretics, Kersten attempts a macro analysis of post-colonial “Muslim Islamicists” using McCutcheon’s taxonomy then seconding Mark Taylor and Tylor Roberts in their rejection of McCutcheon’s “methodological reductionism or agnosticism” (p. 230). Then, claims Kersten, “the respective approaches of Madjid, Hanafi, and Arkoun can be related to the increasing critical distance reflected in the taxonomy” (p. 230): Nurcholish Madjid is the theologian, Hanafi, the humanist phenomenologist, and Mohammed Arkoun, the “anthropologist of credibility” (pp. 18, 27-28, 230-231).

Kersten goes well beyond the boundaries of the lives and ideas of these three figures, providing the reader with their contextualized and expanded intellectual genealogies. With this approach, resembling a Chinese box structure, Cosmopolitans and heretics offers a deep insight into the state and development of the study of Islam— and of the study of religions in general—in Paris, Chicago, Germany, Cairo, and Indonesia in the second half of the twentieth century. It is the very fact that these three individuals occupy a “Third Space,” a terminology borrowed from Homi Bhabha and applied to the intersection of cultures and academic disciplines, that they earn the
double label of both cosmopolitans and heretics. Their influence appears to be fairly weak and unimportant amongst fellow Muslims, other intellectuals, and institutions, and this is mostly because of their obscure jargon. Indeed, often enough, those who do understand their overall “westernized” message call them heretics. Yet Kersten is confidently positive, saying: This strand of Muslim intellectualism can be expected to grow in importance because of future demographics throughout the Muslim world. In the decades to come, the middle classes will increase not only in absolute numbers but also proportionally as a cohort of the total population. This, in turn, will lead to an expansion of the student body in higher education, which is the constituency producing and consuming these particular discourses. (p. 13)

If one had to find a fault in this work, it would be Kersten’s overuse of quotes, which often leads to confusion over who is the voice, and also perhaps the fact that the analyses of Madjid, Hanafi, and Arkoun too often appear to be developing in parallel rather than in conversation with each other. Overall, however, Kersten illustrates well the dynamics of cultural hybridity and the reception of culturally hybrid notions, placing these concepts in the context of the intellectuals’ home-countries and situating them within the scholarly debates that have been circulating the academic world in the past half-century.

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Picking up Ahutosh Misra and Michael E. Clarke’s edited volume, one is first struck by the cover image of a demonstration featuring gun-toting Pakistani youth and bearded men, with banners held aloft against an overcast sky. The image is one that has been popularized by mainstream media due to the central place that Pakistan has come to occupy in what is known as the “War on Terror.” Coupled with the title of the book, the image draws the readers’ attention to the instability of Pakistan and the lurking threat of its collapse. Yet, if one looks carefully at the image on the cover, the faces of those youth, with guns held high, are striking for their wide-grinned smiles, as if they are posing for the camera, trying to appear angry and tough but unable to hold back their light-hearted laughter.

The discrepancy between what the image on the cover intends to portray and how the youths in the photograph may perceive themselves is reflective of a broader paradox in which the security threat Pakistan poses is a presumed truth, regardless of not only the ways in which the U.S. has “created” this truth but also the ways in which the people of Pakistan may perceive their own involvement in the “War on Terror.” However, seeing that this edited volume is a result of a three-day conference organized by the Griffith Asia Institute and held in Brisbane, Australia in November of 2009, where “security experts” from Pakistan, India, Australia, and the United States addressed “some of the most pressing challenges facing the country,” it is not surprising that such paradoxes are not addressed in the text (p. xvi). While the “mediatization” of Pakistan’s role in the “War on Terror” is not addressed, Misra and Clarke have set out to pull together a series of papers that do address the domestic, regional, and international challenges facing Pakistan. In the preface, they begin by pointing to the 2.5 per cent GDP growth rate, double-digit inflation rate, and US$56 billion in foreign debt. They write that there is unanimous recognition that the failure of the state would have devastating consequences for international security “and must be prevented at all costs.” At the same time, the picture that emerges from the essays is that while Pakistan does face significant challenges, the state is unlikely to collapse.

The first five of the book’s twelve chapters focus on Pakistan’s domestic sphere. Ashutosh Misra begins with a look at the interplay in Pakistan between the three forms of government (FOG): military dictatorship, democracy, and Islamism. Using a stability-instability model in which these three forces compete with each other and engage in co-option, he argues that the interplay between these three forms of government lies at the core of Pakistan’s political instability. The author suggests that for the sake of Pakistan’s stability, this jostling among political parties must cease; still, he acknowledges that “this may only be possible when one of these FOGs becomes self-reliant and does not have to align with the other two in order to stay in power” (p. 3). Misra concludes his essay by pointing to developments within Pakistan’s judiciary system and by asserting that such developments reflect positively on the future of democracy in Pakistan.

The conclusion of the first chapter provides a fitting transition to the excellent second chapter by Tasneem Kausar. Kausar focuses on the Pakistani judiciary system during the 2007 lawyers’ movement and provides a helpful historical overview of the Pakistani Supreme Court and its historic role in the development of democracy in the country. Underscoring the historical significance of the strides made by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry in helping the court establish “its own identity, [secure] its legitimacy and [win] its independence” (pp. 28, 32),
the author goes on to show how Pakistan’s case demonstrates the inability of existing scholarship on judicial empowerment to account for these historical shifts. She ends by suggesting that the democratic government should learn from the success achieved by Chaudhry’s Court and should likewise respond to the interests of the common Pakistani.

In the third chapter, Aneela Babar, provides a helpful firsthand account of seminaries (or “madrassas”) in Pakistan. Her essay serves as a corrective to other scholarly accounts that have relied on official data about the number of seminaries in Pakistan without taking into account the fact that many of the newer seminaries are identifying themselves as private schools rather than madrassas. Calling them “hybrid seminaries” (and thus including them in her analysis), Babar builds on fieldwork she previously conducted at 15 seminaries in Rawalpindi, Quetta, Malir, Khairabad, Karachi, and Peshawar. She claims that madrassas (including “hybrid seminaries”) deprive their “students of the will to change or challenge all that is flawed in the Pakistani society” because of their singular focus on the cultivation of a religious sensibility that has little concern with issues of governance. (p. 58). In short, she argues there are two populations of Muslims in Pakistan: (1) those who challenge the Pakistani state in the name of Islam using violence and (2) those that feel they have no mandate to address “Pakistan’s problems with governance and class differences” and that “their religious duty lies in subcontracting the just war to the militant fringe” (p. 59). The author suggests that the government should address society’s extreme inequalities, which would make it more difficult for these militant fringes to position themselves as the only alternative to an ineffective system of governance.

In the fourth chapter, Tasneem Ahmar addresses the way women are portrayed in Pakistani media. She writes passionately that media portrayals of women as “content” remain “largely negative, stereotypical, and biased” (p. 62). She provides suggestions as to ways in which the media in Pakistan might work to change the way society perceives women (as opposed to simply reinforcing prejudices). In the following chapter, Muhammad Amir Rana provides an account of the different militant groups operating in Pakistan and the history behind their respective rises. He argues that militant organizations are a threat to the country’s internal security and outlines the ways in which these threats manifest themselves.

Happymon Jacob begins the second section on regional dimensions with an essay summarizing the history of the India-Pakistan peace process that lasted from 2004 to 2008. In order to avoid the fate of previous attempts, in which the peace process starts afresh after each crisis, he suggests that an incremental approach would provide the most promising path forward. In this way, the peace process itself could help to facilitate trust between the two nations through a heightened level of sustained dialogue. Ashok K. Behuria provides an informative seventh chapter on jihadi organizations in Pakistan and their regional and international links. While recognizing the logic behind Pakistan’s use of non-state actors like the jihadist group Jaish-e Muhammad (The Army of Mohammed) to weaken India, he argues, “This tactic has been pushed beyond its limits” (p. 119). He calls on the “Pakistani ruling class” to abandon their reliance on such groups for political change before it is too late; otherwise, he says, a “bloody civil war like those experienced in Algeria and Afghanistan” may erupt in Pakistan’s future (p. 119).

In his essay, William Maley provides a historical summary of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. While he points to the drawing of the Durand Line in 1893 and the Khudai Khidmatgar[s’] (‘Servant[s] of God’) movement (incorrectly written by Maley as the Khuda-i Khedmatgaran, (‘Servants’ God’) as two important historical moments with far-reaching ramifications, he provides little context of the longer history of the politicization of religious identities in South Asia, which did not merely begin in 1978 when Zia-ul-Haq assumed the presidency. One of
Maley’s better points is that the rise of the Taliban did not emerge from traditional Afghan society but from the “breakdown of Afghan social structures over decades of war, conflict and strife” (p. 127). In conclusion, he suggests the leadership in Pakistan should reflect on whether it is possible to confront the threat presented by the Pakistani Taliban without also attempting to eliminate the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, and the Hezb-e Islami (p. 132).

Claude Rakisits ends this section with a look at the Pakistani Taliban. He argues that the growth of militancy in Pakistan is due, in part, to several internal factors including “the poor governance of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the socio-economic under-development of FATA and its slack of political integration with the rest of the country, and the domestic and foreign policies of successive central governments, civilian and military” (p. 137). He encourages the civilian government to economically and politically integrate the people of the tribal areas with the rest of Pakistan as a first step in tackling the militant problem.

In the section on international dimensions, Moeed Yusuf turns the reader’s attention to relations between Pakistan and the U.S. Utilizing the rational institutional design framework, he moves away from popular discourse, which blames Pakistan for its failure to tackle militancy and instead demonstrates that given “Pakistan’s own threat perception and self-defined regional objectives,” it is completely rational for Pakistan to help the U.S. achieve its objectives only half-heartedly (p. 155). He suggests different approaches the U.S. could take to address some of Pakistan’s concerns. In the next essay, Srikanth Kondapalli provides a helpful historical overview of relations between China and Pakistan. While not furthering any innovative argument, the reader will walk away with a greater knowledge of the different ways in which the two nations have cooperated in the past and may cooperate in the future. Michael E. Clarke’s essay concludes the volume with an assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Through a detailed analysis of each possible nuclear terrorist scenario, he concludes that the nuclear threat has been overstated but that due to a high level of mutual mistrust between Pakistan and the U.S., a more transparent approach from Pakistan regarding its nuclear facilities and their security is unlikely to transpire.

While the quality of scholarship in this volume varies from essay to essay (and a few essays could have used a heavier editorial hand), the collection as a whole provides a helpful introduction and, at times, a nuanced reading of Pakistan’s political and historical complexity. The volume would have benefited greatly from an introductory essay to tie the readings together in a more thorough manner while providing a broader conceptual framework for the volume. Instead, the reader is provided with little more than a two and half page preface, which fails to bring the individual essays into conversation with each other. Of course, a collection like this cannot possibly address the full range of challenges facing Pakistan, but it at least provides a helpful analysis of the topics it does address and gives balanced policy recommendations that policymakers would be wise to heed.

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This book examines the conditions under which globalization can lead to pro-poor growth in developing countries. Globalization in this context refers to liberalization of a country’s external and internal economic environments. The main analytical framework used in the text is a computable general equilibrium (CGE), which is calibrated using data organized in a social accounting matrix (SAM). This framework is applied to examine different strategies that may be adopted to achieve pro-poor growth with liberal economic reforms. Nepal is the focus of the study, but it is suggested that the findings and policy implications are also applicable to other small developing countries characterized by widespread poverty, traditional agriculture, a low industrial base, and a weak external sector.

Prior to a detailed discussion of the CGE model and its applications, four interrelated issues are addressed. The first issue is the nature of the theoretical relationship between economic liberalization and pro-poor growth; economic theory suggests that liberalization can lead to pro-poor or pro-rich growth. The second is the empirical evidence on the link between economic liberalization and income distribution. The vast empirical record points to an inconclusive relationship—liberalization-led economic growth may reduce or exacerbate income inequality. The third issue is the formulation of international and national policies in light of the liberalization-inequality nexus. In this regard, the World Bank and IMF were the main forces that promoted the controversial Structural Adjustment Program in the 1980s. Following the program’s limited success and widespread criticism, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was subsequently introduced. The fourth issue is the relationship between liberalization and poverty in Nepal amidst the liberalization policies that were adopted over the past two decades.

The second chapter examines Nepal’s trade policies, which have witnessed a gradual transition from import substitution to export promotion, a trend characteristic of most developing countries including India. The discussion includes Nepal’s trade and transit treaty with India in 1950, its regional trading arrangement, which is dominated by trade with India, and its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2004. In order to improve its international trade position, it is argued that Nepal needs to reduce transactions costs in production and trade, negotiate market access to other developing countries, and seek preferential treatment for its exports to industrialized countries. The study emphasizes that poor reliability and access to power as well as weak physical connectivity represent the most critical bottlenecks to international trade and investment in Nepal. Trade policy should focus on Nepal’s comparative advantages, which have shifted in recent years from agricultural raw material to labor-intensive manufactured products.

Chapter 3 provides a survey of the literature on liberalization and reform in developing and transition economies. The review includes liberalization of the international economy under fixed and flexible exchange rate systems, as well as that of the domestic economy, mainly budgetary reforms. The extensive empirical evidence on the effects of economic liberalization on economic growth, income distribution, and poverty during the past two decades is mixed and inconclusive. While most studies show a positive impact of external and internal liberalization on economic growth, the effect on income inequality is ambiguous. It appears that economic growth that results from globalization will not necessarily lead to a reduction in poverty; specific and targeted interventions are often required. In Nepal, it is claimed that economic liberalization has worsened poverty and income inequality. This claim is inconsistent with data from the Nepal’s
National Living Standards Surveys, which show a substantial decline in poverty and an improvement in income equality over the past decade.

The next chapter discusses the SAM for Nepal, which serves as the main database for calibrating the CGE model. This study incorporates a Nepal SAM developed by Sapkota (2001), which is based on data for 1996. A SAM shows the circular flow of income and expenditure in an economy, with each cell representing a payment from a column account to a recipient in a row account.¹ A SAM is square, and, following the conventions of double-entry bookkeeping, each actor’s account must balance: income must exactly equal expenditure. Column sums must therefore equal the corresponding row sums. A SAM is a large scale macroeconomic data scheme and is a suitable conceptual framework to analyze the interrelationships between major economic variables in the system. It integrates the supply side of the economy, represented by input-output transactions, with the demand side, which is represented by households and other final demand for output. A SAM also contains other accounts found in the economy such as the government sector, trade, and the financial system. The main motivation for organizing data in a SAM framework is to describe the economic transactions in their entirety and to capture all economic linkages and feedbacks which exist in an economy so that a more complete policy analysis can be undertaken.

Chapter 5 provides the specification and calibration of the Nepal CGE model, which is largely based on the one developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute. The chapter also reports the economic effects of reforms of the external and internal economic environments. External liberalization policies simulated include (1) reductions in import tariffs by Nepal and export barriers by trading partners under fixed and flexible exchange rate systems and (2) a devaluation of the domestic currency. Internal reforms simulated include a reduction in the government’s budget deficit. The simulation results show that external liberalization leads to expansions in agricultural and industrial trade, resulting in higher economic growth. Households also tend to benefit from these reforms, mainly due to higher wages and lower average prices. However, wealthier households gain more than poorer ones, who realize insignificant gains. Similarly, budget reform policies also have a favorable effect on economic growth. It is worth noting that the CGE model discussed in this chapter focuses on the operation of the model in a given year (1996) and is thus static; it does not show the effects of changes in investment spending over subsequent time periods. By contrast, a dynamic model assumes that each period solves independently and variables assumed to be exogenous within each year are updated between periods. Such a dynamic model is presented and discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6 explores the conditions under which liberalization and reform measures can lead to pro-poor growth in Nepal. For this purpose, the static CGE model in Chapter 5 is transformed into a dynamic one. The baseline for a restructured economy in 2006 is projected, a prospective SAM for 2006 is constructed, and the dynamics of the economy’s path towards the end of the ten-year gestation period is modeled and examined. The results of these simulations are compared to those from the static model to examine the potential for liberalization policies to achieve pro-poor growth. The major differences between the static and dynamic models is the treatment of capital stock and labor supply, both of which are treated as endogenous in the dynamic model. Overall, the dynamic model performs better with regard to controlling the price level, promoting export growth, attracting foreign investment, and reducing the budget deficit. These results suggest that liberalization and reforms can lead to higher and pro-poor economic

growth provided that the poor and low-skilled workers are able to participate in the fastest-growing economic activities. The provision of skills training pertaining to employment in the high-growth sectors can help in the transformation of labor from low to high skills. Employment promotion programs that facilitate the entry of low-skilled workers will result in higher wages of high-skilled labor, help to raise the return on capital, and promote higher economic growth. Thus, the sectors with the highest growth potential should be identified and public policy should seek to channel the factor endowments of the poor into the fastest growing sectors of the economy; these interventions can help external liberalization and internal reforms achieve pro-poor economic growth.

CGE models have been developed to study a wide range of issues. In order to analyze the effects of economic liberalization on economic growth and income distribution (a policy question with potentially significant macroeconomic effects) a CGE model is an appropriate tool. The CGE model used in the study is properly developed and contains an appropriate specification of the optimization problems facing the actors in the economy. Outcomes can be traced to the relevant structural features, and it is possible to analyze the importance of model assumptions with respect to results. The limited data requirement of the CGE model makes it particularly useful. While it is customary to use econometrically-based macroeconomic models to study policy issues, the lack of adequate disaggregated time series data for Nepal often renders this approach impractical. Lack of data means that many parameters required by such models cannot be estimated, making such models subject to uncertainty. By contrast, CGE models are calibrated around a base-year SAM with a small amount of additional data used to estimate certain parameters. Based on the functional forms, most model parameters can be calibrated without reference to additional data, which, when required, is usually limited to elasticities of substitution and transformation. These parameters may either be estimated or adopted from studies of countries with a similar industrial structure. Policy analysis based on partial equilibrium models can sometimes be misleading in that the same policy has the potential of producing conflicting final outcomes. This weakness provided one of the important motivations for the development and use of general equilibrium models for policy analysis. This class of models also has other useful appeals for developing countries, one of which is the incorporation of distributional aspects within the overall analytical framework, an issue this study addresses quite effectively.

Although analysis based on CGE models has strong claims to policy applicability, it has its shortcomings, just like any approach to the analysis of any economic issue. Many assumptions are made to calibrate and run the model, and data problems further constrain the accuracy of the analysis. Given these considerations, it is important to emphasize the broad themes of results rather than attempt to draw direct policy conclusions.

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Howard starts with the observation that much of the recent debate involving religion and the theory of evolution has been marked by a shrill tone, set by neo-Darwinist atheists like Richard Dawkins, to whom the pseudo-scientific claims of both evangelical and Islamic creationists lend credibility. According to the author, such polemics blur the underlying fact that the theory of evolution poses a challenge to conventional religious worldviews, a challenge to which religious thinkers of different traditions have a variety of responses. Howard’s intention to analyze Islamic theological anthropology, specifically, does also reflect his own intellectual and religious background, since the Catholic Church and the Jesuit Order, to which Howard belongs, had its own problems coming to terms with the theory of evolution. Howard’s religious background is reflected in his heightened awareness of the problem; although most of his analysis is strictly scholarly he comes forth with his own suggestions regarding how an innovative Islamic response to the theory of evolution might look like in the final chapter. However, these suggestions which reflect Christian experiences with the challenge of the theory of evolution are clearly marked as his standpoint and not forced upon the reader.

In the introductory chapter, Howard argues that the ways in which new concepts are received in a given society are determined by the notions that are already present in that society. He asserts that the central problem any society faces in accepting the theory of evolution has to do with the challenge that evolutionary theory poses to that society’s Anthropological Imaginary (AI)—their understanding of human nature, or the humanum, as he calls it. He sketches the way in which the theory of evolution, which he sees as a product of the pantheist philosophy of romanticism, has lead to a variety of philosophical and theological responses in the West. He pays special attention to case of the Roman Catholic Church, for which the theory of evolution appeared to undermine both the idea of the original sin and the concept of man as the purpose of creation, the premise on which the dignity of the humanum rests. According to Howard, the reformulation of evolution as a secondary means by which God actualizes His will, a theory proposed by Teilhard de Chardin and Karl Rahner, paved the way for the acceptance of the theory of evolution within the Catholic Church. Next, Howard describes Islamic conceptions of the humanum, which emphasize man’s vicegerency—i.e. man’s representation of Allah on Earth—and less so the body-soul dualism known to Christianity. Islam also asserts that man’s ability to acquire knowledge distinguishes humans from all other living creatures. As such, the theory of evolution appears to undermine Islam’s conceptions of man as a unique species. Howard concludes with an outline of positive and negative responses to the theory of evolution by both Muslims and Arab Christians in the late 19th and early 20th century.

The second chapter is dedicated to the influence of Henri Bergson on Islamic thought and on Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938, British India), Mohamed Aziz Lahbabi (1922-1993, Morocco), and Souleymane Bachir Diagne (b. 1955, Senegal), with cursory remarks on a number of other authors. According to Howard, Bergson’s importance in the Islamic discussion of evolution is based on Bergson’s disassociation of the idea of progress from “scientistic reductionism,” the reduction of complex interactions to the sum of their parts. Although Bergson’s theory of “creative evolution” (évolution créatrice) was intended to oppose to the “randomness” of Darwinian theory and in spite of the condemnation of Bergson’s ideas by the Catholic Church, it was Bergson who inspired those who contributed to the reconciliation of the Church with the
theory of evolution. However, in this chapter, interesting as it is in itself, the question of biological evolution gets lost. According to Howard, Bergson was attractive to a “certain elite class of Muslims” because “man could no longer be analyzed as substance and so became thinkable as a unique kind of action within the movements of the cosmos” (p. 85). Furthermore, Bergson’s differentiation between “closed” and “open” forms of religiosity inspired those who longed for a dynamic reinterpretation of Islam. However, except for the case of Iqbal, this desire, says Howard, was a desire mainly of people whose intellectual formation was based on Western foundations.

The next chapter examines the ideas of Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933, Iran then USA), who was to become one of the most vocal opponents of the theory of evolution in the Islamic world. Hossein drew his inspiration from the “perennial philosophy” of the “traditionalist school” of René Guénon and Frithjof Schuon, whose consciously anti-modernist school of thought dismisses most of Western thought after Enlightenment with the argument that all intellectual endeavors have been disassociated from the “search for transcendent truth.” Hence, the “perverted” natural sciences have to be overcome by a “sacred science,” which accepts the cosmos as holistic and meaningful. Howard demonstrates that the traditionalist approach itself is anthropocentrist and that the use of Islamic and other (Catholic, Asian) religious traditions is basically instrumental, (or as he calls it, strategic). The theory of evolution is hence a priori rejected because of the role randomness plays in the theory of genetic mutation, for example, and because the theory of evolution deprives man of his privileged position in the cosmos.

To reestablish science as something meaningful is the intention of the Malaysian author Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas (b. 1931), one of the thinkers with whom Howard deals as an exponent of the movement for the “Islamization of science.” Al-Attas insists on the primacy of traditional scholarly disciplines such as tafsīr the pursuit of which remain the duty of the all religious individuals (farḍ al-ayn)—as opposed to the pursuit of secular, pragmatic knowledge, which remains a pursuit incumbent upon only a specialized minority (farḍ al-kifāya). Al-Attas’ anthropology is based on the idea that man is unique because of his rational abilities and on the concept that the animal soul impedes the rational soul. His rejection of the theory of evolution does hence reflect his understanding that evolution is perceived to question this uniqueness of man.

Whereas the frame of reference for al-Attas is the moderate Sufism of al-Ghazali, Ismail al-Faruqi and those associated with his International International Institute for Islamic (IIIT) thought have a Salafi background. Unlike Nasr and al-Attas, the Salafis are less prone to question empirical facts. Instead, they focus on giving Islamic explanations and on refuting what they see as inherently non-Islamic assumptions in scientific theories. Nevertheless, they agree with Nasr and al-Attas with regard to a holistic and teleological worldview (one in which purpose and design appear to exist in nature). A main difference between the Sufi and Salafi understandings, however, is that the Salafis’ show a stronger interest in human sciences and anthropology in particular than in biology and cosmology. For example, Ma’ruf, a Sri Lankan Muslim associate of the IIIT does accept human evolution as a biological fact. He even argues that it competes with the Islamic understanding of creation as a continuous process. His criticism, however, takes as starting point the standard evolutionist explanation for the emergence of civilization. Whereas Western evolutionism regards the development of technology as the decisive step in the development of civilization, for a Muslim, the most influential catalyst was the acquisition of knowledge about the creator. The role of struggle as source of progress is another aspect of the theory of evolution which the advocates of the
“Islamization of science” denounce because that allegedly contradicts the religious imperative to foster cooperation. Howard describes Salafis’ position as “refreshing” but he points to the fact that Ma’ruf, for example, evades the problem of randomness inherent to Darwin’s evolution. According to Howard, this gap is part of the larger dilemma of the IIIT’s approach. He claims, although it may well “[…] salve the consciences of Muslims working in the established sciences and […] ensure them that their Islamic identity is dependent more on their moral intent than on the content of their research,” it fails to address the hermeneutical issues related to the Anthropological imaginary (p. 145).

The last author Howard deals with is the Welsh convert Wyn Davies (b. 1942), who belongs to Ziauddin Sardar’s Ijmali group. Her stance on the theory of evolution is also primarily based on anthropological and not on biological concerns. She argues that culture is a common phenomenon among all humans and groups of humans, not something which divides mankind into more and less “advanced” groups. As Howard shows, however, critics like Richard Tapper have already pointed out that Davies creates a bogeyman by misrepresenting a materialist minority position as the standard concept in anthropology. Whereas Davies accepts biological evolution, she insists on a teleological interpretation of evolution as a part of her efforts to integrate all sciences into a holistic framework.

With his study, Howard provides an interesting and thorough overview of the responses of an elite spectrum of Muslims on the challenges of an evolutionary worldview. One could argue that his selection of authors who write in Western languages is far from representative. However, he points out correctly that it is far from improbable that some of their arguments indeed trickle down, given that such arguments are widely discussed among Muslim intellectuals. Howard shows that no matter whether or not the chapter authors accept evolution as a biological fact, they remain strictly committed to a teleological perspective, wherein the existence of a “designer” of the universe is assumed, typically presented as God, and are skeptical of independent causality fundamental to Darwin’s theory. At his point Howard addresses the question whether Islamic theology might profit from considering Christian responses to the theory of evolution other than anti-evolutionist fundamentalism. In this context he states that the positions of Polkinghorne, Bowke, and Rahner deserve particular attention because their ‘consonance approach’—because (quoting Polkinghorne) the “[…] the ‘world of becoming’ that evolutionary theory implies has a theological corollary in a ‘conception of cosmic history as an unfolding creative improvisation rather than the performance of a divinely pre-ordained score’ suggesting that the future is unknown to God” (p. 165). Furthermore they do not try to demonstrate that there is an ‘objectively spiritual dimension to reality’, instead they restrict to themselves to showing that it plausible (p. 165). On this basis they are able to accept that the human spirit has emerged rather than been implanted. According to Howard this is also the point where a new Islamic theological approach to the theory of evolution can be imagined. Centered on a more holistic understanding of science than is common in the West and taking into account that Islamic thought tends to base the uniqueness of man on “those aptitudes – language, culture, etc. – which draw people together and to God” such an approach might rather emphasize ‘man-in-the-world’ and ‘man-in-society’ rather than man as an individual (p. 171).

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Disentangling the connections between China and Southeast Asia throughout history has been a complex undertaking because of the diverse and overlapping nature of those connections. Migrants from China, for example, have ranged from wealthy merchants capable of establishing thriving mercantile networks linking the region’s coastal cities with its mineral and natural product production sites to individual coolie laborers aiming to find a better life through diligence and luck. A similar mixture of migrants is evident today in Laos and Myanmar, establishing their own businesses and households and building the very infrastructure that will more tightly bind the countries of the region together, namely the Asian Highway Network.

Kinship, cultural, linguistic, historical, and logistical connections are created and reproduced through the presence of migrants, who may subsequently be absorbed into a society that is itself changed by their ongoing presence. These changes are very often small in scale and receive little attention. Nevertheless, they are as important for societal formation as any state-level interaction between the governments of the migrants’ home and host nations might be.

In recent years, China has utilized a particular form of state-level interaction with the governments of other nations. As China has begun to reach out to Southeast Asian governments with a view to both resource and market-seeking activities, among other motivations, the actors involved in such interactions are very likely to be Chinese corporations. Just as the Korean and Japanese governments, (among other rapidly industrializing East Asian states, ) have in the past used their corporations to enact a variety of developmental goals, both internally and internationally, the Chinese government is following the same path: its corporations are used throughout Africa, for example, both to capture scarce resources and also to build the hospitals and sports stadiums that persuade host governments to sign the exclusive concession agreements. The means by which the governments can cause the corporations based in their territory to pursue these developmental goals vary over the course of time and according to the relative power of the corporations and the ability of the state to leverage its control of the corporations’ finances and licenses and the like. Unfortunately, neither this sort of corporate-state interaction nor the individual interactions between migrants and their home and host nations receive much attention in Ian Storey’s book, which instead focuses almost entirely on state-state interactions in the strictest sense (i.e. of the policy-based, government to government type) and is written, without overt discussion of its theoretical framework, from a species of the realist form of thinking that suggests states are in competition with each other in the search for security, along with some secondary goals.

Storey, in fact, offers a pragmatic interpretation to China’s actions to the south (the flow of intentions and actions is generally assumed to be in this direction), with little overt interest in the time from the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War to the end of the Cold War; he focuses instead on the subsequent period of engagement (or “sunshine diplomacy”), from the 1990s onwards, which has increasingly come to be characterized by economic cooperation in a variety of fields. Storey’s interpretation is laid out in the first section of the book, which provides (after a short introduction) three chapters detailing the evolution of Southeast Asian-Chinese relations in chronological sequence: during the Cold War; during the 1990s, and then in the current century. Attention is paid to the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Navy (PLAN)

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1The Asian Highway Network is a cooperative project among countries in the region to improve the highway systems in Asia. Agreements have been signed by 32 countries to allow the highway to cross the continent.
and its potential use in the South China Sea and other operations. (The book is slightly hampered here by the fact that it cannot spend too long dealing with Taiwan, despite the island’s proximity to Southeast Asia and its importance to the stability of the region as a whole.) Attention is also paid to aggregate trade figures and their changes; the environmental impact of dams on the Mekong; and to the workings of various international institutions in which China and Southeast Asian nations might participate, principally in the areas of economics and politics. These areas of activity mark out the territory that Storey’s text inhabits; in the two subsequent sections, he then examines the progress of relations between China and each of the eleven Southeast Asian states, first with the states of the Mekong Region and then with the island states. Each of these chapters is full of details in each of the areas of investigation and occasionally also touches on some cultural or human issues where these are deemed to be of particular importance. There is a danger with this approach, not entirely avoided here, of the successive chapters becoming somewhat predictable and even slightly repetitive. Perhaps it is better to imagine that the book will be used by readers interested in one or a small number of the states involved, rather than of the region as a whole.

In the individual country chapters, Storey’s judgment generally appears to be sound and is, in any case, well-supported by the level of detail provided. For presumably practical reasons, each of these chapters is approximately the same length, with lower page counts for Cambodia, Laos and, of course, Brunei and Timor Leste. A great deal more could, nevertheless, be said in some of these chapters: those on Thailand and Burma/Myanmar in particular would have benefited from a closer evaluation in the first case of Thai companies becoming active in southern China and in the second case of the role of Chinese capital in converting much of the northern part of Myanmar into a kind of para-state outside the control of normal state regulations and policing. In addition, the chapters on Malaysia and Indonesia in particular seem to rely too much on a small set of discrete events, such as treaty signings, and not enough on other levels and forms of interaction. The impact of technology in the form of modern telecommunications and the internet might also have been profitably introduced into these arguments. Additionally, although again this would be extending the book before its scope, it would have been interesting to see some consideration of how the relationships studied may be affected by the changes in global climate conditions and the implications of these changes and, also, of China’s potential elevation into a global superpower in its own right with all the responsibilities and threats associated with such a development.

Within his remit, Storey has successfully managed to provide a detailed account of state-level interactions between China and Southeast Asia. The coverage of disputes in the Paracels and the Spratlys is particularly impressive, and he appears to have a clear grasp of the nature of the Chinese military, how it has been changing, and the reasons underlying those changes. It is a pity that the many facts could not be marshaled in a way that provides greater understanding by reference to an emergent theoretical framework, rather than appearing as one damned thing after another. It would also have been helpful if a little more attention had been paid to cultural or sporting interactions between the countries involved, but perhaps that would have required too ambitious a piece of work. Nevertheless, this will be a very useful resource for readers interested in both Southeast Asia and in Chinese diplomacy and politics.

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Against the backdrop of shifting economic weight and hyped public discourse, scholars of Asia these days do not typically suffer from any symptoms of an inferiority complex. Only two lines into reading the introduction of the volume under review, we find the claim that Asia “is clearly the most dynamic and arguably the most important region in the world” (p. 1). One is tempted to ask what could possibly make any one world region more important than another and, more provocatively, whether “Asia” constitutes a region at all. Where does this region start? Where does it end? And would this “Asia” be homogeneous enough, in whichever way, to be meaningfully referred to as one region? It is a great merit of this handbook that its editors are, despite the self-aggrandizing opening line, well aware of the definitional pitfalls and discursive limitations of studying “Asian regionalism.” In fact, the introduction and conclusion by editors Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs belong to the best essays of this handbook, as they critically assess the terminology and state-of-the field (introduction) and propose a balanced vision of the future of Asian regionalism (conclusion).

As Beeson and Stubbs concede in their introduction, regionalism in Asia is a process in the making; it is more of a political and intellectual project than a reality. Moreover, “many of its key aspects are highly contested” (p. 1). Most fundamentally, this contest concerns the geographical scope of “Asia” and the kind of regional integration “Asian Regionalism” denotes. As the cover of the book already suggests, “Asia” here refers to East Asia consisting of Northeast Asia (mainly PR China, Japan, and South Korea) and Southeast Asia (mainly ASEAN). In other words: ASEAN plus Three. There are only brief references to Taiwan, North Korea, Mongolia, and India and none to former Soviet republics, Sri Lanka, or Western Asia. This geographic focus also informs the editors’ definition of “region,” which denotes the intended result of a state-led project and “a conscious, coherent and top-down policy” (p. 1), which they call regionalism. According to Beeson and Stubbs, Asian regionalism is different from other regionalisms. In their view, seven material and ideational characteristics distinguish the “Asian way of regionalism” from European or American regionalism; among them are “commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference” and “attention to performance or output legitimacy,” which both contribute to a preference for cooperation over integration. The subsequent thirty-three chapters succinctly explain the state of affairs (and mostly the state of research, too) of a wide range of topics related to Asian regionalism as defined above. Subdivided into five sections, the handbook addresses theoretical and conceptual issues of regionalism and Asia (Part I); economic, political, and strategic matters such as financial cooperation, development, and regional leadership (Parts II-IV); and different regionalist organisations such as ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Part V).

One of the greatest merits of the handbook is not only its coverage of all crucial issues but also its inclusion of topics that are usually side-lined in IR-focused works on regionalism. For example, it is of great value that the reader finds a historical contextualisation of China’s role in the region (David Kang). Additionally, in order to understand today’s rhetoric of regionalism discourse in Asia and the difficulties of regional integration processes in a war-traumatized and essentially nationalized political sphere, it is also praiseworthy that memory, historiography, and identity are included for analysis. Peter Preston’s chapter on “war, memory and regional identity” provides a macro-historical outline of interlinks between East Asia, Europe, and the US and explains why nationalism is still a predominant and positively viewed factor in political discourse and reality in East Asia today. It is problematic, however, that only in passing does he mention the prevailing controversies...
over history and historical consciousness that continue to challenge cooperation in East Asia (e.g. territorial claims, naming disputes, war compensation, questions of guilt and apologies, history textbooks, etc.). There is no mention at all of the various activities of civil society groups to overcome these “history problems.”¹ John M. Hobson’s proposition of a “non-Eurocentric global history of Asia” places Asia (specifically China, India, and Japan) in a macro-historical economic context in which Asia was the driving force of trade globalization, which eventually facilitated the intermediary rise of the West. Hobson is less concerned with regionalism than the growing relevance of Asia in toto, which he calls a “return to historical normalcy” (p. 49). His positive evaluation of the “voluntary” Sinocentric tribute system appears at times too apologetic and is indirectly refuted in the following chapter by David Kang, who compellingly demonstrates that early modern international relations in East Asia were “hegemonic, unipolar and hierarchic” (p. 72). Regarding economic data, Hobson’s suggestions are convincing, but as far as economic systems (e.g. capitalism) and socio-political systems (e.g. democracy, nation) are concerned, it cannot be denied that the legacy of the Western world’s historical interlude as the dominant global power (although relatively brief compared to the “period of Oriental globalization”) appears to have left rather lasting marks on Asian and global history. The relevance of this excursus for understanding the past, present, and future of Asian regionalism remains obscure. A historical contextualization of efforts at Asian cooperation and integration from the mid-19th century onwards—which were rife with constraints (both in theory and in practice) similar to those complicating today’s regionalist projects—would have been more enlightening.²

Other particularly noteworthy and important contributions for understanding the multi-dimensional character of regionalist activities in Asia focus on semi-official or civil society activities. Helen E. S. Nesadurai’s chapter on the ASEAN People’s Forum (APF) and Howard Dick’s contribution on corruption are important to understand facets that are usually not immediately associated with regionalism. Nesadurai’s study of the ASEAN People’s Forum highlights an alternative form of regionalism, namely regional civil society activism, known as “regionalism from below.” Nesadurai examines the institutionalized character of fora such as the APF and its predecessor, the ASEAN People’s Assembly (2000-2009). Because official government representatives participate in such meetings, the meetings facilitate not only horizontal debate among non-elites of different Asian countries but also vertical exchanges between political leaders and citizens. Given its restraints and resistance on the official level, it may be too optimistic to predict that these debates could develop into a sort of “people-centred” or “participatory regionalism.” Nesadurai concludes that they are nevertheless significant as “part of a growing Asian-wide transnational web of networks and people’s forums through which solidarity is being forged amongst civil society actors, and through which alternative regional projects are being articulated across Asia” (p. 175).

One predictable focus of discussions of Asian regionalism is the role of China. Min Ye argues that China’s rise will not only greatly impact regional (and global) politics, but also that the rise of China is a result of regional economic integration. For example, China’s shares of trade and investment in East Asia have been at least three times higher than those of Japan and Korea combined. According to Ye, while “market forces have integrated China into East Asia since 1978” (p. 252), China’s participation in regional frameworks was hesitant at best. However, the “domestic political crisis” of 1989, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, and the 2005 Sino-Japanese and Sino-

Taiwanese crises have gradually engaged China more closely with its Asian neighbors. In particular, Ye emphasizes how the PRC changed its attitude from that of a “passive participant” to that of an active leader in multilateral regionalism after 1997, with active roles in ASEAN plus Three, the Chiang Mai Agreement, the promotion of SCO, and the hosting of the Boao Forum for Asia. By the late 2000s, the goal of a “harmonious Asia” (hexie Yazhou) had been incorporated into the official diplomatic goal of a “harmonious world” (hexie shijie). Ye stresses that China’s approach to regionalism is highly reflective of its domestic political priorities, a reminder that is important also regarding regionalist discourse and practice of other countries in Asia. Christopher Dent supplements the analysis of China’s role by characterizing the quest for leadership in East Asia between China and Japan as a contest to determine who plays the role of “the most significant ‘regional leader actor’ . . . in East Asia” (p. 263). Dent claims that “each nation has championed its own vision and project of East Asia community-building” (p. 264), unfortunately without providing much detail on their contents and differences. Due to the tense bilateral relationship between the two countries, Dent argues, we should not expect that “China and Japan could agree to any kind of co-leadership arrangement” (p. 264). Dent concludes that it is unlikely China and Japan will become a joint motor of regional community-building as France and Germany have done in Europe. Yet he sees potential for Sino-Japanese regional co-leadership growing out of bilateral collaboration on some less controversial issues like energy and environment.

In their conclusion, Beeson and Stubbs take a similarly ambivalent stance towards predicting the consequences of China’s rise for international relations within Asia and between Asia and the rest of the world. They say that while some think China’s role may lead to an inevitable conflict within the region and/or between East and West, at the same time, as a part of China’s rise, we witness growing interdependence of all nations in a globalized world due to common economic interests and the consolidation of cooperative mechanisms. The institutionalization of ASEAN plus Three, together with increasing transnational linkages may help not only to deconstruct perceptions of China as a threat but also to balance its real impact on political, economic, strategic, and social practices. Most significantly, perhaps, the question whether Asian regionalism has achieved anything at all seems less relevant than the future perspective: what will Asian regionalism achieve in the next decades? How will it change the lives of billions of people living in East Asia? How will it affect global politics? These questions already explain why Asian regionalism matters. As the editors rightly state, “whatever happens in East Asia in the future will profoundly influence the rest of the world” (p. 421). Therefore, “getting Asia right” is both a theoretical and a policy challenge” (p. 421). Readers of this volume will certainly be well equipped to “get Asia right” by understanding processes of cooperation in East Asia in a highly informed and critical way. Among the very few weaknesses of the book is its heavy reliance on scholarship in the English language, which not only excludes many important works on Asian regionalism in other Western languages but also gives a relatively weak voice to the region that it studies.

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Mark Harrison’s credentials as a historian of medicine in South Asia are beyond dispute. During the last two decades, he has published extensively on various aspects of disease, medicine, and science, with a particular focus on their intersections with British imperialism and war. In this new contribution to the field, Harrison joins efforts with Biswamoy Pati, whose name is familiar to scholars of South Asia for his wide-ranging work on the social history of colonial India, particularly in the state of Orissa. The volume under review is the second to be published as a result of their collaboration, the first being *Health, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Colonial India* (Orient Longman, 2001).

Like its predecessor a decade ago, *The Social History of Health and Medicine in Colonial India* brings together an eclectic range of scholarly contributions which testify to the vitality and continued relevance of this field of research. As the editors themselves suggest, the book is a survey of recent research trends, addressing not only topics that have received attention in the past, such as sanitary reforms and preventive medicine, mental asylums, and colonial attempts to regulate religious pilgrimages but also less explored themes such as medical research in colonial India, the practice of morbid anatomy, and the use of medical advertisements. In their introduction to the volume, Pati and Harrison provide a useful thematic overview of previous research on the history of medicine in colonial India, highlighting the essays’ contributions to our understanding of public health, institutional history, race, and Indian medical traditions.

One of the most appealing features of the volume is the wide range of research materials and analytical approaches on which the authors draw. Some of the essays revolve around the analysis of selected texts, such as medical topographies, anatomico-pathological publications, and botanical treatises, as well as the newspaper and periodical press of the time; others, however, are less reliant on textual analysis and focus predominantly on archival investigation. For example, Partho Datta’s essay uses Ranald Martin’s well-known text *Notes on the Medical Topography of Calcutta*, published in 1837, to provide an alternative reading of the emergence of “public health” in this town, which highlights the connections with ideas of public good and utilitarian reformism in currency in Britain at the time. Like other works of a similar type published in Britain during that period, Martin’s *Topography* emphasized the link between environment and disease; in so doing, Datta argues, the text helped to delineate the “public” from the “private” and to mark the former as an arena of intervention for the colonial state. A similar approach is employed by Mark Harrison in his essay on morbid anatomy in India. Analyzing the writings of James Johnson and William Twining, two popular medical authors, Harrison convincingly argues that unlike in Britain, where post-mortem dissections were still rare until the end of the eighteenth century, in India they were commonly practiced in military and naval hospitals since the middle of the eighteenth century. Like Datta, Harrison is also concerned with gauging the impact of such writings on colonial attitudes and practices. His analysis leads him to conclude that the texts were instrumental in the development of new ideas of racial difference between Europeans and Indians at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Disease, Harrison argues, came to be explained not only by reference to environment but also in terms of “constitutional differences.”

Saurabh Mishra’s essay on the Haj pilgrimage also discusses the connections between environmentalist arguments and disease pathology, this time in order to document the changing
nature and organization of the pilgrimage during the period 1865-1920. By examining the responses to cholera epidemics of the colonial administration and various European countries, as well as of the pilgrims themselves, Mishra shows how political and economic considerations led the British Indian Government to explain cholera as a “disease of locality,” thus ignoring contagionist explanations, which had already gained acceptance in Europe. The connection between British Indian sanitary strategies and geopolitics is also discussed in Sanchari Dutta’s essay on plague, quarantine, and empire, albeit in a different regional setting (i.e. Central Asia). Her conclusions are similar to Mishra’s, highlighting the extent to which British opposition to quarantine in the Persian Gulf—as well as Russia and France’s support of it—were connected to rival commercial and political interests in the region. As Dutta argues, plague quarantine was no less than “a viable means of exerting informal imperial control in Central Asia” (p. 87).

Another common thread which binds some of the essays together and should probably have been identified as such in the introduction to the volume is the issue of class. This issue is particularly visible not only in Amna Khalid’s essay on the role of the indigenous staff in implementing public health measures, Biswamoy Pati and Chandi P. Nanda’s discussion of leprosy in colonial Orissa, and Waltraud Ernst’s contribution on lunatic asylums in Bengal but also in both Projit Bihari Mukharji’s piece on pharmacology and indigenous knowledge and Madhuri Sharma’s discussion of medical advertisements. Khalid, for example, reminds us that colonial policy and practice were two distinct and not necessarily overlapping domains and that subordinate civilian, non-medical staff composed of Indian vaccinators, sweepers, constables, and chaukidars (guards) were instrumental in enforcing preventive and quarantine measures. Class hierarchies were particularly visible in the differential treatment to which members of the subordinate police subjected the higher and poorer sections of the population, a situation vividly illustrated by the print media of the time. In a similar vein, Pati and Nanda also reconstruct the class dimensions of leprosy in colonial Orissa and the extent to which colonial response to the disease was shaped by its implicit association with the poorer strata of society, a position sanctioned by the Oriya middle class. Finally, Mukharji’s account of botany during the colonial period shows how, during the nineteenth century, the colonial state came to derive its knowledge about Indian medicinal plants less from local intermediaries and more from its association with representatives of “elite/learned strands of ‘indigenous’ botanical knowledge” (p. 199). All these essays illustrate the condition of scientific knowledge and practice under colonial rule, reminding us, as Irfan Habib and Dhruv Raina have pointed out in a different context, that this was not simply a case of colonial transfer of science but an example of “science in struggle” (Irfan & Raina, 2007, p. 230).

Madhuri Sharma’s essay on medical advertisements explores another dimension of the history of medicine in colonial India that certainly deserves more attention in the future: the role of print in disseminating medical knowledge and information. Although some of the other essays touch on this topic as well—like Pati and Nanda’s discussion of the role of print propaganda in changing attitudes towards leprosy in early twentieth-century Orissa—Sharma is the only author who focuses explicitly on the interactions of print media and medicine. Her essay shows how the English and Hindi-language press was used to create a consumer market for medical products, in particular for medicines. Her findings are revealing in that they highlight the fact that print advertising had the potential to overcome, to a certain extent, barriers of “race,” as both Indian and European entrepreneurs drew on discourses about tradition and modernity to advertise their products to a middle-class audience. Still, print media could not actually overcome barriers of
class, given the fact that none of the products promoted addressed the health issues of the poorer sections of the population.

In sum, this collection of essays is an invitation to discover the fascinating history of medicine in colonial South Asia, as well as a potential source of inspiration for both junior and senior scholars who wish to engage further with the subject. Written in a concise and accessible style, the book is likely to become standard reading not only for scholars of South Asia but also for those with an interest in the comparative history of medicine.

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There is often a disjuncture between political economists and development economists in their view of a country’s process of liberalization, the impacts of national reforms on local life, and the successes and failures of trade on a country’s poor. The authors of *Trade Liberalisation and Poverty in South Asia* argue that economic liberalization, generally, and trade policy reforms, specifically, have a role in the success (or failure) of economic performance poverty reduction efforts in South Asia.

The book can be divided into three parts. Chapter 1 sets the stage with some reflections of the relevance of analyzing the interrelationship between trade liberalization and poverty in the context of South Asia. Editors Athukorala, Bandara, and Kelegama place an emphasis on how South Asian countries have often turned to import substitutions due to the ideological value of such a strategy and its potential to help move developing countries away from commodity-dependent economies, which were allegedly created strategically by ex-colonial powers. The ability of (particularly small) South Asian countries to implement reforms that enable them to promote their domestic products while achieving economic independence from former colonial powers as well as from other regional and international powers remains a key struggle that is highlighted and revisited throughout the book. At the source of the book, there appears to be an underlying question: By understanding the liberalization process of a country, can we begin to understand why poverty is created and sustained? And further, can trade liberalization act as a potential solution to reducing poverty?

In Chapter 2, Bandara goes on to theorize the trade-poverty nexus while discussing lessons learned from other countries. Bandara rightly points out that the biggest difficulty with linking trade and poverty is that doing so relies upon the assumption that trade leads to growth, which is further presumed to lead to poverty reduction. However, such postulations leave out complex understandings of globalization and poverty and tend to create a linear result. Further, an in-depth literature review demonstrates that the search for a direct link between trade and poverty is elusive, as some research has shown that trade liberalization has decreased poverty, while other liberalization policies have increased poverty, thus making it impossible to see trade liberalization as a “magic bullet” for poverty reduction. However, this may be also seen as given, as no single factor could possibly begin to address as broad-based and challenging an issue such as poverty.

The third part of the book then consists of discussing the “problematique” from the perspective of seven South Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Each country chapter focuses on themes such as the history of trade liberalization in the country as well as some specific objectives that were targeted; trends in trade, poverty, and inequality; and conclusions and policy recommendations.

How does one begin to implement trade liberalization and ensure that other reform processes follow suit? The Bangladesh case has shown that a lack of institutional reform alongside trade policy reform has made it challenging for the country to significantly contribute to economic growth and poverty alleviation strategies simultaneously. Thus, one challenge of implementing trade liberalization is ensuring that complimentary reform processes go hand in hand with one another.

The book highlights that in order to get out of the “dependency trap,” countries often place an emphasis on limiting imports to key goods while focusing on the export
of important domestic products, despite some adverse effects. For example, the Bhutan chapter shows how despite an impressive rapid growth of exports, the country’s dependence on imports and its small market continue to be inhibiting factors for the country to achieve a more liberal economy. Its reliance on trade agreements with Bangladesh and India and its over-dependency on public sector investment and on sectors such as construction and hydropower prevent it from diversifying its economy and adequately addressing poverty and unemployment.

The Maldives chapter, in contrast, outlines how even small countries with an economy based on few sectors (tourism and fisheries) can achieve rapid economic growth and trade liberalization while addressing poverty. However, although GDP growth has been exceptional in the Maldives and there exists a visible link between trade liberalization, economic growth, and national poverty reduction, there is still a need to diversify the country’s economy towards other industries. Further, poverty reduction has not been effective nation-wide due to the geographic disparity between the capital, Malé, and the islands of the atoll (which affects access to transport, services, markets, price reductions and better quality commodities); a dependence on an expatriate labor force; and a lack of skilled local labor.

The chapter on India shows how the country’s export and import trade has grown at an extraordinary rate, making it number two in the world for the fastest growing economy. The authors of this chapter ascribe this to the positive impact of liberalization measures such as the diversification of key sectors like agriculture, manufacturing and services; a competitive labor market; and a reduction of custom tariff rates. However, does an effective trade liberalization process equal poverty reduction? Not necessarily. The India chapter demonstrates that different sector reforms lead to distinctive impacts on the poor in terms of employment and wage rates. Thus, despite possessing a diverse and high growth economy, India’s ability to address poverty reduction through trade liberalization remains relatively minimal, showcasing the difficulty in attributing high trade reform to low poverty indices.

The Nepal case demonstrates that it is possible to reduce absolute poverty while experiencing low economic growth. One of the factors behind Nepal’s reduction in poverty levels despite conflict and low growth can be assigned to the country’s high level of remittances that families receive from workers abroad. However, the author stresses that there remains an inconsistency between urban and rural poverty in Nepal, with the latter experiencing a slower decline from 1996-2004. Further, it is mentioned that while national poverty might be reduced, such a reduction in national poverty may in fact cause higher income inequality as the gap between rich and poor becomes wider.

While the liberalization-poverty nexus is discussed in detail in each case study, there appears to be a lack of analysis in some chapters of how conflict has played a role in these issues. The Nepal chapter, for example, does not take the country’s political crises or conflicts into consideration when analyzing the successes and failures of the trade liberalization processes. Considering this nation’s history of conflict, this is a rather glaring omission.

Sri Lanka presents an exceptional case in which, despite a twenty-six year civil war and macro-economic challenges, GDP growth and macro-economic reforms have remarkably been sustained. While the interrelationship between political leadership and economic reform is highlighted, the chapter, like that of Nepal, fails to adequately take the conflict factor into account. However, the authors feature key insights into how trade, industrial employment, and poverty reduction have been successful in some geographical regions and sectors. Comparatively, they explored how other major sectors such as garment manufacturing and tea production have not only been
unsuccessful in reducing poverty but have instead contributed to its exacerbation.

The Maldives chapter discusses how the country’s economy is extremely susceptible to external shocks such as economic crises or security issues. At the time of writing, the country was facing a crisis of leadership and violent riots after a presidential coup, which was having an effect on its main service industry, tourism. This will undoubtedly have an impact on the country’s economy generally and the distribution of income within the tourism sector specifically.

The Pakistan chapter is one of the few chapters that does explicitly discuss the way in which conflict and political crises made the country vulnerable to shocks and how such crises have affected the country’s ability to establish reliable trade partners, implement economic liberalization policies, and ensure competitiveness in South Asia. Moreover, the authors acknowledge the impacts that financial and political instability have had on Pakistan’s poor, particularly vulnerable with limited access to markets. The inclusion of politics and conflict as analytical factors in this chapter helps provide a more in-depth look into not only how but also why the country’s economy has fluctuated the way it has.

The chapter on Pakistan notwithstanding, the book generally lacks an in-depth reference on how conflict and political crises have affected the economic development and policies in most of the South Asian country cases. While conflict should not take center stage in the discussion, it is undoubtedly a key factor that, when present, contributes both to the impact of trade liberalization reform as well as poverty reduction strategies. Additionally, although mentioned in a few of the chapters, there are also other factors that would have warranted more emphasis as related to the trade-poverty nexus, including gender, caste, religion, and spatial issues as all of these issues have an impact on one’s access to wage rates, employment, and resources.

As there is a dearth of statistical and empirical data analyzing the trade-poverty nexus, there remains a need to continue to carry out both quantitative as well as qualitative research on this topic. This book is an important contribution to literature on understanding how trade liberalization in South Asia has developed, but more specifically, how this has had both a positive and negative impact on poverty reduction in these contexts.

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Ken’ichi Ikeda, a professor in the Department of Social Psychology at the University of Tokyo, and Sean Richey, Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at Georgia State University, have written a concise book describing the empirical research undertaken to investigate the role of social networks in Japanese politics and democracy. Most of the studies on social networks that show the role of both informal and formal networks on democracy and political life are focused on Western democracies. As such, the role of social networks in East Asia and the ways in which such networks influence East Asian democracies are not often considered. Thus, the authors of this work raise the question of democracy in East Asian countries, specifically, and the influence that East Asian culture and social networks may have on democracy.

The book is organized into eight short chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. It examines East Asian values, with a specific focus on Japan; describes social networks, including the measures and determinants1 of participation in such networks; follows with an analysis of the influence of several aspects of social networks on politics and democracy; and finally, shows how some programs in Japan benefit democracy. In their research, Ikeda and Richey used the Japanese Elections Study (JES) III, which is the largest academic political survey ever conducted in Japan (p. 7). The JES III consisted of a panel survey conducted by mostly face-to-face interviews between 2001 and 2005 and analyzed several topics that are of great interest in Japanese society, such as the influence of social hierarchy and group heterogeneity on social networks. Obedience to hierarchy and the maintenance of group harmony so that disagreement is avoided are two fundamental Japanese cultural practices, and the JES III sought to analyze the extent to which such practices are observed within the realm of social network interactions.

Among the questions that the authors of this book sought to answer was whether Japan can be considered to have a more East Asian or more Western culture. The statistical results of the research presented indicate that Asian societies, specifically Japan, have well-functioning, liberal democratic societies that share both East Asian and Western characteristics. For example, the authors find that while many Japanese citizens perceive the existence of social hierarchy and the pursuit of group harmony to be important forces in their lives, political disagreement is indeed common in Japan. Another important finding is that social networks have a powerful influence on Japanese political behavior; this is a particularly interesting finding since it is a result that differs from prior research on the subject.

Ikeda and Richey examine the Asian values that are based on the Confucian cultural tradition and the extent to which these values have been accepted in Japan. While Confucian elements are a part of Japanese culture, Confucianism never became the dominant state ideology in Japan as it did in China and Korea; Japanese society also incorporates some values from the Buddhist tradition as well. The authors make a distinction between public aspects and private aspects of Confucianism in Japanese society behavior. (In this case, public aspects are related to government behavior and not to the behavior of Japanese people in public situations.) For the purpose of analyzing whether Confucian values are present in twenty-first-century Japan, the authors used the East Asian Barometer (EAB) Survey. This

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1 What were some of these determinants? Some measures of social networks are: activeness, hierarchy, and harmony in informal and formal networks. The authors describe the variables that have been found to be significant causes of each of these three measures, such as age, male, education or income.
Social Networks and Japanese Democracy

survey compares how Confucian values are distributed in eight East and South East Asian countries and finds that the Japanese keep the vertical hierarchy and harmony values in both public and private interactions but do not maintain other Confucian values related to public aspects.

After examining the foundation of Japanese interactions in the public and private spheres, Ikeda and Richey move on to study social networks, specifically. In order to do so, they measure three important aspects to social interaction in Japan: (1) activeness, which is considered the basic deliberative democratic norm, (2) hierarchy, and (3) heterogeneity (or “non-harmony”) and discuss the influence of these three aspects of social interaction on both formal and informal social networks in Japan. The authors find that Japanese networks are stable over time and that membership in social networks in Japan is determined largely by the same factors that have been found to be determinants of social network participation in the US and Europe.

Ikeda and Richey test the effects of social networks on the essential elements of democracy in Japan, and to that end, they measure the influence of social networks on (1) political participation and voter preference, (2) the sources of political knowledge, (3) policy preference, and (4) tolerance (p. 83). The authors explain the measures used to test how social networks influence on each of these items. For example, political participation is measured as the number of political activities in which an individual participates, weighted for frequency (p. 62), and the results show that social networks increase political participation in Japan. The authors also found that while hierarchy in social networks does not alter political participation, it does affect voter preference, increasing the similarity of voting outcomes among socially networked voters (p. 67). Concerning political knowledge, the results show that political discussion itself does not necessarily increase Japanese knowledge of politics; however, speaking with opinion leaders did increase it (p. 76). Thus, social networks did allow for the spread and increase of political knowledge among social network users in modern Japan.

A significant body of literature stresses the non-rational nature of decision-making, yet rational policy preferences require learning about specific details in a competitive political environment. This research finds that political discussions in social networks serve as a means of helping Japanese citizens to form an opinion on public policies (p. 89). Lastly, studying tolerance in Japan is particularly important since Japanese society has strict beliefs about which behaviors are acceptable (and a generally negative attitude is taken toward any deviation from such behaviors). Despite this, Ikeda and Richey find that not only do Japanese individuals have political disagreements but also that social networks with a highly diverse membership have significantly greater levels of political tolerance than would otherwise be expected (p. 100). However, the authors note that the level of political tolerance may not be influenced by the trust in the democratic system. In other words, in their research, political tolerance refers only to a “tolerance for diverse political opinions” and not to an understanding among citizens that political institutions will necessarily protect them (p. 95).

After showing the positive influence of heterogeneous non-hierarchical social networks on Japanese democracy, the authors examine how the government might intentionally generate this type of network through programs called community currencies, created to increase trust in local government. These programs in Japan create new social networks by giving individuals incentives to participate in these networks and cooperate with unknown people, which has been shown to increase political trust and benefit democracy, generally.

I agree with Ikeda and Richey’s approach of incorporating questions in the survey measuring aspects related to East Asian values that have not been previously asked in Western surveys to test the validity of model in countries like Japan. Nevertheless, since the
research is focused on Japan, it is not appropriate to extend the results to other East Asian countries, such as China, Korea, or Taiwan. Like the authors, I also believe that the need for group harmony in East Asian societies limits open disagreement. Perhaps, however, it is not suitable to investigate harmony within social networks in terms of “homogeneity” (p.38) since it is not clear that group heterogeneity necessarily implies disharmony within a group in Japan. In addition, I think that diversity within networks does not necessarily involve cooperation with unknown people (p. 117).

In sum, however, this is an interesting book that deals with the essential topic of the generalizability of democracy in countries with East Asian cultural values and, specifically, Confucian values in Japan. But this book is not easy to read. It seems that some parts are more than a little confusing, perhaps because it includes quite a wide range of research information that has been sharply condensed to fit into this brief book. Nonetheless, the text will be of clear benefit to scholars of politics and democracy in Japan as well as those interested in Japan studies, in general.

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In this volume, Sáez and Singh succeed in assembling an interesting group of specialists with the purpose of reviewing the management and public policies of India's present governing coalition, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which represents a new dimension in the Indian political scene. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the governments that have come to power have been the result of both federal and regional party coalitions. However, none of these coalitions has managed to remain in power for the normal five-year period of a legislative body (except for the coalition headed by the Congress Party between 1991-1996 and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), between 1999-2004) or be re-elected in by Indian voters for a second consecutive term, mainly due to the ideological and programmatic divergences of their members. The UPA, formed after the 2004 elections, and succeeding the leadership of the more nationalist NDA coalition, has ended the apparently inevitable one-term only fate of minority governments in the Indian political system. This book adds to the recent literature devoted to the theoretical rethinking of minority governments. Both during its first term in office (2004-2009) and its current term, the UPA has been made up of a group of primarily secularist political groupings, the social democracy promoting Congress Party being the majority force.

The purposes set by this collaborative effort are “… [to] understand the new innovations in UPA’s policies… [and to] evaluate the effectiveness of these policies as measured against their proclaimed aim and objectives” (p. 6). The book intends to focus on the analysis of public policies designed and implemented by the UPA-I and on its ongoing second term of governance. However, the assessment of the UPA’s performance is also made both implicitly and inevitably on the basis of the past performance of the NDA, which consisted of right-wing nationalist parties—mainly the Bharatiya Janta Party, or Hindu Nationalist Party, (BJP). The chapters may be grouped together in three major themes: governance, secularism, and security.

The re-election of the UPA (led by the Congress Party) in the 2009 general elections caused several myths: It was argued that the victory of the alliance headed by the Congress Party was the result of the “youth majority vote.” It was also said that Rahul Gandhi’s participation was a sign of the generational change in the structure of the party and, therefore, of the government itself, making the Congress Party an attractive option for the nation's younger population. Paradoxically, that sector of society did not contribute significantly to the re-election. In fact, they were the group least enthusiastic about supporting a second UPA government. So, what was the real reason for their second term success? Had they been successful in fighting poverty? James Manor states in his chapter “Did poverty help re-election?” that government programs focusing both on alleviating conditions specific to the rural poor and on improving urban citizens' quality of life with no distinction among citizens’ demographic profiles partially contributed to the party’s triumph at the polls. Manor explains:

The Congress-led government in New Delhi also reinforced its spending on poverty initiatives with several new laws that sought—in part or entirely—to benefit poorer groups … These include the Right to Information Act 2005 (which reinforced the demand-driven character of some other programs), the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, and the Forest Right Act 2006. (p. 17)

If other schemes are taken into account (i.e. midday meals, the total sanitation campaign, a national rural employment guarantee), then we may conclude that the most marginalized groups
of society and the beneficiaries of those programs were indeed decisive in the elections. However, after analyzing official election figures regarding economic backgrounds, Manor concludes that many parties implemented such programs; the Congress Party was not alone in using such initiatives. Further confounding the election results was the finding that it was not only the poor who had voted for the Congress Party. As the authors note, “The figures also show that as we move up the economic ladder, the Congress share of vote increases slightly. That suggests that its victory is not explained by inordinate electoral support from less prosperous groups” (pp. 19-20).

Shailaja Fennell’s chapter, “Educational Exclusion and Inclusive Development in India”, analyzes the role played by the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) scheme in the UPA’s educational policy and concludes that this scheme, adopted and adapted by the UPA as an educational policy, was actually an order issued by the Supreme Court of India in 2005, resulting from a petition submitted by non-governmental organizations. Explains Fennell: “It was the interim order of the [Supreme] Court, on 28 November, 2001, that directed all state governments to provide children in government and government-assisted schools a prepared mid-day meal as a measure to relieve ‘classroom hunger’” (p. 42). It can therefore be deduced that the program implementation benefited the governing alliance. In this regard, Harihar Bhattacharya (“UPA (2004) and Indian Federalism”) claims that it is noteworthy that the execution of the central government's public policies depends on the will of state governments.

The second section of the book tackles the UPA’s management and public policies, particularly the UPA’s emphasis on the de-communalization of Indian policies. In his essay “UPA and Secularism,” Gurharpal Singh analyzes the implications, importance, and meaning of the UPA’s reinstatement of the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) for the education system. Singh reminds us that the NDA had not eliminated the NCERT, but neither had it renewed the organization’s mandate, resulting in the creation of a body essentially specializing in the production of textbooks. One of the first actions taken by the NCERT upon its reinstatement by the UPA was to revise the books being used in the public education system in order to amend the “[saffronization]” of education that had taken place under the NDA, which included the “raising [of] the profile of Hindu cultural norms, views, and historical personalities” and the negative “[portrayal of] other religions” (p. 58). It is worth reiterating that the 2002 Gujarat incidents, which occurred under NDA leadership, could have been caused by the high level of society’s polarization at that time regarding other religious groups, particularly Muslims, resulting from the ultra-nationalist discourse spread in classrooms.

Steve Wilkinson in “The UPA and Muslims” tackles the state of religious minorities after the return of the Congress Party in 2004. According to Wilkinson, the fact that the UPA-led

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1 Saffronization is an Indian political neologism used by critics to refer to the politics of right-wing Hindu nationalism (Hindutva) that seek to make the Indian state adopt social policies that recall and glorify the ancient Hindu cultural history and heritage of India while de-emphasizing the more recent Islamic or Christian heritage.

2 The 2002 Gujarat incidents refer to a series of violent incidents including the Godhra train burning and Naroda Patiya massacre and the subsequent communal riots between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian state of Gujarat.
government created the Sachar Committee\(^3\) proves its commitment not only to improving the living conditions of minorities but also to guaranteeing their access to education. However, the committee’s recommendations, as well as those of other committees, have not been implemented through the schemes that were set out:

Instead of a focus on diversity and mainstreaming Muslims into caste-, income- and poverty-based programs in the private and public sectors, the party’s leaders highlighted the delivery of more funds to minority-concentration districts, special measures for Urdu, and reservations for Muslims ‘on the basis of their backwardness’ (a caveat to avoid the constitutional prohibition on religion-specific measures). (p. 75)

This theme is linked to a wider one: that of affirmative action. Historically, the Congress Party has not taken a favorable stance on the creation of quotas for religious minorities. However, Rochana Bajpai, author of the chapter “Social Justice and Affirmative Action,” identifies a change in the party’s ideology and, therefore, the alliance it leads. Bajpai arrives at this conclusion after a thorough analysis of the party’s legislative debates. The author compares the position of the Congress Party at the time of the Mandal Commission\(^4\) and then again during the 2005 debate regarding the creation of educational quotas for the Other Backward Castes (OBCs). Bajpai states that prior to 2005, the party’s reluctance to favor such schemes was based on the perceived ineffectiveness of identity-based mechanisms for the achievement of social justice. Bajpai explains:

… [S]ocial justice was understood primarily in terms of inequalities in the distribution of material goods, and while it was accepted that these often overlapped with an inferior position in the ritual hierarchy, the implicit contention was that historical discrimination was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for socio-economic disadvantage. (p. 87)

At the time, it was considered that supporting “positive discrimination” of religious groups could be a new threat to national cohesion, bearing in mind the incident of the Partition.\(^5\) By 2005,

\(^3\) The Sachar Committee, appointed in 2005 under the UPA-I, was commissioned to prepare a report on the latest social, economic and educational condition of the Muslim community of India. The committee found that Indian Muslims lived below the minimum required conditions set by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and that while the Muslim population in the country was 14%, Muslims representation in the government was only 2.5%. To increase equity and opportunities for Indian Muslims in residential, work, and educational sectors, the committee proposed multiple strategies.

\(^4\) The Mandal Commission was established in 1979 with a mandate to "identify the socially or educationally ‘backward’." The commission was to consider the question of seat reservations and quotas for people to redress caste discrimination. In 1980, the commission's report recommended the implementation of affirmative action, whereby members of lower castes would be given exclusive access to a certain portion of government jobs and slots in public universities.

\(^5\) The partition of India was set forth in the Indian Independence Act 1947 and resulted in the dissolution of the British Indian Empire and the end of the British Raj. It resulted in a struggle between the newly constituted states of India and Pakistan and displaced up to 12.5 million people, with estimates of loss of life varying from several hundred thousand to a million (most estimates of the numbers of people who crossed the boundaries between India and Pakistan in 1947 range between 10 and 12 million). The violent nature of the partition created an atmosphere of mutual hostility and suspicion between India and Pakistan that plagues their relationship to this day.
however, a change was seen, not only in the approach towards religious minorities but also in the
social inclusion of the most economically deprived groups. Quotas are no longer seen as a
divisive factor but as a mechanism to foster national and social integration.

The final section of the book focuses on foreign, energy, and security policies. Kanti
Bajpai analyzes the UPA’s management of India’s international relations, concentrating on, in
three separate sub-chapters, India’s relationship with the U.S., Pakistan, and China. Bajpai’s
work is descriptive and rather uncritical; I elaborate as follows. The United States sub-chapter is
actually concentrated on the implications of the negotiation and execution of the nuclear deal
between the two countries, also known as the “123 Agreement.” In this section, there are
numerous contributions from another author, Raja Mohan. The reader wonders whether there
should be a limit for quotes used by an author in order to avoid the risk of becoming the
spokesperson for another’s arguments. In this sense, both authors emphasize the fact that
negotiations were not only started by the NDA and continued under the same terms and
conditions by the UPA, but also that this meant the culmination of one of the most transcendent
aspirations for Indian scientists and both left- and right-wing politicians: that India be de facto
recognized as a nuclear state.

I disagree with both authors regarding their assertion that India is “using” democracy as a
foreign policy strategy. (Mohan has used this argument in other works in order to point out that
this precise topic is the foundation of the “quasi-natural” alliance between the United States and
India). Were it the case, however, that India’s apparent efforts to implement democratic policies
served only to achieve certain foreign policy goals, U.S. diplomacy would refer to India as an
“ally” (an associate with whom to cooperate) but not, as it does, a “partner,” which implies a
fundamentally shared set of objectives and a close, personal relationship. Bajpai also has a
remarkably hard-headed approach to India’s relationships with Pakistan and China; thus, India’s
relationships with Pakistan and China are portrayed as being in a state of a permanent conflict. I
consider that such an assertion implies a Manichaean view of reality. Are the dynamics of a
bilateral relationship reduced simply to conflict and cooperation? If so, it is no wonder that
Bajpai has considered India’s relationship with the United States a significant point for the UPA,
since it is evident and essential, at least for him, that the U.S. act as the mediator between both
India and Pakistan and India and China.

In his chapter “India’s Energy Security During the UPA Government,” Lawrence Sáez
carries out a wide and interesting projection of India’s energy needs. This subject has both
political and economic implications, taking into account the fact that India is not only not an oil
producer but is one of the top ten oil importers. Sáez therefore states that “energy security has
become one of the most important challenges for India’s domestic economic development,
namely in terms of the ability of energy supply to make economic growth sustainable as well as
redistributive” (p. 113). Rahul Roy-Chaudhury finishes this collective work by analyzing the
government’s security strategy, particularly emphasizing the management of terrorism threats.
Roy-Chaudhury’s work is noteworthy, considering the few studies recognizing in Hindu
nationalist groups an internal threat to the country's stability.

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The phenomenon of migration has long been the subject of scholarly attention from a variety of perspectives and disciplines, including political science, media studies, sociology, and cultural studies, all of which attempt to identify and describe migration’s changing dynamics along with the social, political, and economic consequences of migration. For at least two reasons, the edited volume by Myna German and Padmini Banerjee emerges as a truly unique and important voice in the academic discussion of migration. Firstly, the book goes well beyond previous collections in both its theoretical and geographical scope; the editors manage to bring together views from different areas of expertise and continents while avoiding the impression of methodological hybridization or thematic disjointedness. Secondly, the triad of migration, transculturation, and technology offers promising theoretical and empirical potential, which the editors and chapter authors successfully explore to shed light on the current status of a migrant in the globalized and mediatized world.

The book consists of fourteen chapters, placed within three thematic sections. In their introductory essay, Banerjee and German do an excellent job introducing the field and explaining the rationale of the volume. Their insightful overview of current theories and methodological frameworks concerning global migration and the technologically mediated interactions between diasporas and home cultures highlights the main themes and concepts discussed by chapter authors. These include, among others, a multi-dimensional construct of “transculturalism,” technology vis-à-vis the experience of migration, and the notions of “connected migrants,” and “digital diasporas.”

Section One, titled “Migration, Technology and Global Identities: Being Oneself and Becoming Global” comprises four chapters. The first chapter, by Peter Buzzi and Claudia Megele, discusses the impact of social networking and virtual reality on the dynamics of contemporary global migration. In their comprehensive characterization of the figure of an “in-between-migrant” in an “in-between-space,” the authors point to important differences between physical and virtual migration and the implications they have for our understanding of the notions of transnationalism and transculturalism, the changing status of nation-states, citizenship and borders, and, last but not least, government surveillance practices. In the second chapter, Ruth Lijtmaer elaborates on how migrants use technology to both reconnect with their homes and cope with the problems of adjusting to their new environments after migrating. Setting out to explore the psychological reality of the migration process and the role of communication technology in this process, the author succinctly describes pre-migration factors, including types of migration; the role of cultural differences; attitude of the host country; age at migration; and the psychological impact of migration in the form of culture shock, mourning, nostalgia, assimilation, and the sense of self and identity. In a similar vein, the third chapter, by Ekaterina Sergeevna Krestinina, investigates the role of Internet communication in creating “virtual diaspora” and the implications such diasporas have for migrants’ integration into the host society. Having discussed the concept of identity in its various dimensions and contexts, the author looks specifically at the role of media in the diaspora identity formation process and, specifically, Internet use by migrants. The empirical data concerns both blogging practices of Russian speaking migrants in other countries and the situation of migrants in Russia. Although the next chapter, by Marta Margherita Cordini, also elaborates on the role of the Internet in the process of identity construction, the author adopts a different theoretical and methodological angle. While pointing to the advantages of applying Castells’ (1996) paradigm, Cordini explores the dynamics of Internet use by young migrants.
Section Two, titled “Technology and Transculturation: Building Bridges across Worlds,” consists of five data-driven chapters offering compelling ethnographic studies of selected diasporas all over the globe. Chapter five, by Lidia K. C. Manzo, is an interesting voice in the discussion on Chinese diasporas and the notion of “Chineseness.” Both a comprehensive review of literature on Chinese identity in contemporary global-cities and the discussion of the empirical data from a field study conducted in Chinatown in Milan, Italy shed new light on the role of technology in the complex process of identity formation of “Asian Betweeners.” The role of technology in shaping the behavior of migrants and their relationships with the environment is also the focus of the next chapter, written by Suchismita Roy, who applies the social network theory in his study of migrants in Giridih in India. The study convincingly demonstrates the impact of social structure on the formation of migration networks and the role of technology in social control. Chapter seven, by Rashmi Singla, adopts a longitudinal perspective in exploring the psychosocial consequences of global migration among the South Asian immigrants in Scandinavian countries. In his analysis of diasporic identity formation processes, the author examines social relations and strategies as well as psychological and cultural consumption to conclude that media technologies play an important, though ambivalent, role in the process of diasporic identity formation among South Asian young adults in Denmark and that the process itself, viewed from a diachronic perspective, is marked by both continuity and change. In chapter eight, Clifford Pereira discusses the process of transculturation among the communities constituting the Goan diaspora in the North Atlantic. Implementing a novel approach, combining biotechnology and the potential of cyberspace in DNA sampling for genealogy, the study identifies six generations of Goan migrants and makes an attempt to characterize their referential identity, affiliated identity, and origin as terms of personal reference and the role of the Internet as a new space for both individual transculturation and preservation of collective identity. The last chapter in this section, authored by Reynaldo S. Anderson and Kandace Harris and positioned at the intersection of transnationalism, communication, and politics, examines the impact of the Obama presidency, with its extensive use of new media and communication technologies, on the Black Atlantic diaspora. In addition to providing insights into the political and social dynamics of the Black Atlantic community, the study raises important questions concerning political communication, along with change and stability in the “networked” world.

Section Three under the title “Lived Experiences of Global Migrants: Impact of Economic-Political Structures and Processes” comprises five articles. Chapter ten, by Peter Gale, discusses the concept of transculturation in the context of personal and national security and the rights of immigrants and citizens. Focusing on the Indian diaspora in Australia, in particular the media coverage of the violence against Indian students, the author highlights an urgent need to address the issues associated with the growing transnational labor and educational markets. In the chapter that follows, Divyesh Raythatha also takes under scrutiny the problem of human rights violations and the situation of the Indian diaspora in Australia, the Unites States, and the Middle East. This time, however, the author is interested in how the convergence of technology and media plays a role in disseminating information may affect migrants’ decisions.

Chapter twelve, by Magdalena Bielenia-Grajewska, examines the impact of technology on business expatriates in host countries. The study gives a relatively good overview of types of expatriates, including the notion of a “virtual expatriate,” of motivations behind their using technological devices, and implications this use has for their personal and professional development and relationships. The penultimate chapter, by Igor Kotin, also expounds on the phenomenon of migration of professionals, addressing the issue of long-term government strategies involving migration and settlement. The author discusses the status and living conditions of Indian immigrants, primarily IT specialists, in Germany and provides...
a critical assessment of immigration policy in this country. A similar focus of investigation—
migrants’ stages of citizenship transition vis-à-vis government strategies of immigrant
naturalization—can be found in the final chapter, Frederico Bertagnoli’s ethnographic study
of Brazilian immigrants in the United States. This detailed and compelling analysis of
“technologies of documentation as a social process of mediated production of values in the
polis” (Bertagnoli, 2011, p. 266) highlights yet another (often neglected) dimension of
technological impact on migrants’ lives and identities.

Exploring “migration” is not an easy task, especially if one wants to do it under the
umbrella of interdisciplinarity. So much has already been said, so much is always changing,
and, finally, so many variables and perspectives must be considered. Hence, the editors set
themselves on a difficult and ambitious mission to “connect and bridge,” “to translate across
[...] different areas so that the whole experience of migrants can be appreciated,
apprehended, perceived, and understood for greater insight, and appropriate interdisciplinary
frameworks can be created for a closer examination of our present-day realities” (Banerjee &
German, 2011, pp. 23-24). Despite the magnitude of the task, this mission they complete
successfully. By linking migration to technology, they “sharpen” their focus of interest and,
at the same time, address one of the most compelling issues of our time: mediatization of
contemporary society and culture. By choosing authors and empirical data from different
geographical locations, they avoid ethnocentricity and, instead, provide a comprehensive
overview of diverse migrant settings. The volume is coherent and engaging and can be
recommended as both a teaching text and a reference book for students and scholars
interested in the study of migration, media, and identity.

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The 2004 tsunami that devastated the Indian Ocean region has generated a great deal of scholarship on disaster, recovery, and the intersection of state, donor, and beneficiary. This slim, edited volume contains seven essays examining the post-tsunami recovery efforts in Sri Lanka from multiple perspectives and an introduction by the editors that situates the chapters in relation to each other and to the broader body of literature on the tsunami and its effects.

In Chapter One, political scientist Alan Keenan explores the political context in which tsunami recovery took place. Keenan briefly fleshes out the various political parties and ethnic factions and the history of the civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) before describing the contents of the controversial Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) agreement and the anti-NGO political rhetoric that has circulated in the region post-tsunami. Keenan argues that the P-TOMS agreement was primarily a foundation from which to establish cooperation between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE for the purpose of aid distribution and, consequently, give shape to a more stable peace process. Despite cooperation across factions in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, however, long-standing distrust between the predominantly Sinhala Sri Lankan state and the LTTE, coupled with a centralized, ad hoc administration that suppressed local initiative, fueled the perception of biases favoring one ethnic group or region over another. While large numbers of Sri Lankans in general came to see recovery efforts as corrupt, many Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslims additionally experienced them as ethnically biased. Keenan concludes, cynically if correctly, that the international out-pouring of aid to Sri Lanka highlighted existing ethnic tensions and "strengthen[ed] habits of zero-sum political calculation and ethnicized governance...help[ing] 'build back better' the pre-tsunami conflict" (p. 36).

Randall Kuhn's second chapter provides a demographic study of risk and vulnerability by comparing antecedents, recovery efforts, and outcomes at the two lowest levels of administrative organization in the Sinhala-dominated South Province and the Tamil and Muslim dominated Eastern Province. He describes variations in objective and subjective measures of tsunami recovery based on ethnic and regional differences in order to demonstrate that the vast majority of aid administered in Sri Lanka had political consequences. Kuhn documents a greater emphasis on recovery in the Southern Province over the more heavily affected east and north, which he attributes to several factors, not least of which is political/ethnic bias but which also include "tarmac bias"—or the ease of delivery to the more developed and heavily populated south—and the challenges of delivering assistance to conflict zones in the north and east. And while Kuhn's study does not show substantial differences in the scale or effectiveness of relief efforts between Muslim and Tamil communities in Eastern Province, he does show that distribution failed to take into account the greater vulnerability of Tamil communities.

Michelle Gamburd's "The Golden Wave" examines the reception of aid in a Sinhala-Buddhist village in Galle District where negotiations over aid focused not just on meeting the physical needs of food and shelter but also the social need for status and respectability. Gamburd's chapter offers an analysis of the performative and agentic functions of critiques of distribution and reception of aid to suggest that "discussions about entitlement and debates about morality are strategic action" (p. 65). She documents a series of critiques that center around, on the one hand, the generalized corruption and favoritism of NGOs towards one or another set of
recipients and, on the other, the (im)morality of taking unneeded aid from those more deserving. Gamburd suggests that such narratives reveal a dual-level strategy to get more aid from donors via accusations of cheating or sponging supplies and to enhance the status of one's family or oneself by refusing aid. She concludes her chapter with a description of post-tsunami iterations of the Vihara Maha Devi myth, the telling of which she argues serves to reinforce certain ideas about Sinhala-Buddhist identity.

In "The Sea Goddess and the Fishermen," Patricia Lawrence uses vivid narrative to piece together a picture of contemporary religious belief in a Tamil fishing village in Batticaloa District. The residents of Navalady, a mixed Catholic and Hindu community, seemed both baffled and angered by the inability of their traditional Tamil amman (mother) deities to protect them from the tsunami. Nevertheless, Lawrence demonstrates that despite this anger, all religious responses to the disaster shared a cultural allegiance to the protective powers of the feminine, either in the force of Hindu sakti or in the form of the Catholic Virgin Mary. Lawrence notes, too, how the tsunami offered residents of Batticaloa an opportunity to speak openly of death and trauma, a freedom barred to them prior to the tsunami because "to speak knowledgeably and frankly about the human-made deaths of the civil war was to endanger one's life and the lives of other family members" (p. 102).

Lawrence joins with Dennis McGilvray in Chapter five to discuss the effects of tsunami reconstruction on the matrilocal household and dowry system found in the eastern Batticaloa and Ampara Districts. "In the haste and confusion associated with the provision of temporary shelter," they write, "the fact that mothers, wives, and daughters had traditionally held sole title...to domestic dwellings in Tamil and Muslim communities was largely overlooked" (p. 106). Despite the almost universal granting of ownership rights of donated houses to men, the authors describe the processes through which families in affected communities developed strategies to reassert traditional, matrilocal practices of ownership and dowry giving, often in the span of a single generation.

In Chapter six, disaster studies expert Timmo Gaasbeek provides from an insider's perspective an account of the operation and recovery efforts of NGOs in the aftermath of the tsunami, which he describes as a masala movie: "primarily a chaotic and colorful jumble of a large number of standard elements" (p. 125). While Gaasbeek agrees broadly with this characterization, which he borrows from an interview he conducted with an Indian government official, he argues that the initial response in Sri Lanka was not chaotic at all. After decades of nearly annual flooding and twenty years of civil war, local mechanisms for the coordination of emergency resources were already in place and ready to be activated by aid organizations at the local level. These mechanisms worked as intended in the initial days of the recovery until supplanted by overseas experts unfamiliar with the historical and cultural situation on the ground. Many well-meaning administrators, he contends, failed to understand local dynamics or efficiently use available resources. These shortcomings, coupled with the need of many international NGOs to curry reputations at home, resulted in the inefficient and improperly directed delivery of disaster relief. Gaasbeek offers a cutting critique of generalized aid delivery in local contexts and underscores the importance of approaching disaster recovery with ethnographic sensitivity.

Georg Frerks’ final essay, "Principles Ignored and Lessons Unlearned," gives the reader a final review of the recovery efforts in Sri Lanka along four trajectories common in disaster studies literature: (1) sensitivity to the complex nature of disaster and political context, especially in conflict zones, (2) notions of vulnerability and resilience, (3) local narratives and discourses of
disaster at local and national levels, and (4) the impact of the culture of (local) governance and patronage. The chapter offers a close reading of this "cluster" of issues in the context of the disaster studies literature before placing each in the context of the Sri Lankan recovery. Like Gaasbeek, Frerks sees positive, cooperative, and truly altruistic behavior in the early stages of recovery but critically concludes that the tense political dynamics of the long conflict between the Sinhala majority and Tamil-speaking minority resulted in an "ethnicized, politicized, and communalized distribution of aid based on politically charged patron-client relations" (p. 162). McGilvray and Gamburd tie together the threads of the preceding chapters in a brief concluding chapter.

Because of its format and varied disciplinary approaches, this book might be difficult to use as a textbook, but overall, it offers an excellent overview of the recovery in Sri Lanka from multiple perspectives. Surveyed in its entirety, the volume does suffer somewhat from a lack of editorial direction: for example, three of its seven essays begin with what have become boilerplate rehashings of the devastation of the 2004 tsunami, and one wonders if Frerks' essay might be better placed in the beginning. Notwithstanding these very slight complaints, this book will be found to provide course readings for a variety of classes in the social sciences—from disaster studies to political science to development to anthropology and beyond—and the references alone are worthy of study for anyone interested in the study of disaster, recovery, and development. In the words of its editors, this book is meant to "offer a well-rounded, triangulated, multidisciplinary overview of the island as it was before the tsunami, during the events of the tsunami, and during the relief and reconstruction process that followed the disaster" in order to explore the degree to which "culture matters" (p. 11), and largely it succeeds.

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“Where women are respected, the deities rejoice there, but where they are not respected, all rituals are fruitless” (Manusmrti, p. 3.56). Mandakranta Bose’s *Women in the Hindu Tradition. Rules, roles and exceptions* tackles the predicament of Hindu women as goddesses and divine beings on the one hand and housewives and submissive beings on the other. *Women in Hindu Tradition*, published in 2012 as part of the Routledge Hindu Study Series, attempts to show that the fundamental notions of gender in Hindu ideology are more accessible and debatable than one might expect. Her account of the role of women, from divine to mortal, from the ancient times to today is an important contribution to existing literature that bridges gaps in the existing knowledge. Bose takes an original approach to recurring discussions of gender ideology within the Hindu belief system and traces both the origins of women’s roles in modern India and the authority of the ancient and medieval texts on the subject. Within this context, she discusses issues like female ownership of power, widow remarriage, the birth of baby girls, inheritance, and the nature of women. Right from the start, Bose clarifies the limitations of her work, acknowledging the vast array of sources, rituals, opinions, and interpretations as well as contradictions existing on the topic. The author notes that “the conception and evolution of the major Hindu goddesses, placed against the judgments passed by texts of Hindu sacred law on women’s nature and roles, illuminates the [existing] Hindu discourse in gender, the complexity of which is further compounded by the distinctive spirituality of female ascetic poets” (p. 1).

Her work benefits immensely from the use of primary sources and original Sanskrit texts of the ancient tradition as well as the inclusion of English translations. The Hindu sacred texts paradoxically position women at the core of Hindu thought, admiring and praising them while at the same time condemning and limiting them. While reading *Women in the Hindu Tradition*, the pressing relevance of these ancient and medieval texts, including all the contradictions and categorizations placed on women, emerge. Goddesses are an essential part of the Hindu pantheon, and women are indispensable for worship, yet when not categorized as goddesses and mothers, they are often neglected and mistreated. What sets Hinduism apart from other religions and schools of thought is its longevity, uniqueness, and the absence of a single authority or voice. Bose succeeds in her intention “to pull together the views enshrined in the authoritative texts of the Hindu tradition on a historical basis, and on that basis to construct a textually grounded, general framework within which one may make sense of women’s lives in Hindu society” (p. 3). In addition, she draws attention to the continuities and contradictions in Hindu thought and the sacred Hindu laws and texts while emphasizing that fact that the “readiness to rely on past authority is certainly a striking feature of [Hindu] culture” (p. 4).

*Women in the Hindu Tradition* is divided into four major parts or chapters based on a chronological and thematic scheme; each chapter is complemented by a wealth of primary sources. “Gendered divinity” focuses on the goddess figure in general and some Hindu goddesses in particular while addressing the paradox of the divine and the mortal in a gendered context from the ancient to the classical and medieval ages. Bose also attempts to define the meaning of ‘feminine’ based on the significance of the goddesses and how they have shaped the roles and expectations of mortal women. The ambivalence between protection and destruction is striking, and Bose affirms that such an ambivalence demands “close scrutiny because of [the goddesses’] continuing and undiminished power to mobilize vast numbers of worshippers irrespective of caste, class and gender” (p. 6). The roles of goddesses and the very idea of feminine divinity evolved over time, adapting several
personalities and identities such as mothers/nurturer, wielder of power/protector, wife/helper/daughter, and destroyer (p. 13). Apart from a few exceptions, such as Saraswati, goddesses, like mortal women, are always associated with a male figure, as the author discusses in great detail, supported by several examples of goddesses like Usas, Kali, and Sri/Lakshmi. Bose also draws attention to the fact that the opposing portrayals of women might derive from the concurrent respect for and fear of the goddesses. It is important to note how the status of the goddesses and their worship shifts throughout the time periods Bose covers, particularly during the Puranic period, which brought goddess worship to the forefront. Once again underlining the contradictions and continuities of the feminine, both divine and human, Bose recognizes “a particularly sophisticated aspect of Hindu thought on femininity, [one which] acknowledges that there is a part of female nature which resists conventional social roles without subverting them” (p. 44).

“Shaping women’s lives” highlights how the religious, social, and literary texts as well as social customs have shaped ordinary women’s lives, with all their contradictions. Bose argues that the “continuing discourse on gender … is facilitated by the idealization of women as icons of virtue and the deification of the female” (p. 58). Despite the variety of texts and opinions, most sources, according to Bose, do not consider women political beings and refer to women as existing within the home and associate women’s status in society with the family (the exception to this being the discussion of learned women and female sages). “That the denigration of women was founded on an understanding of women not only as lesser beings to men but also as moral defectives are amply evidenced in texts at every age, although why they are so viewed remains a mystery,” (p. 65) Bose explains. She further provides numerous examples of these texts, such as the Manusmrti, which exercised and still exercise continuing authority over the perception of women and women’s status in Hindu thought.

“Women Poets of Hinduism” explores women’s self-expression, self-construction, and self-determination in form of poetry and the contribution of such poetry to the gender discourse in Hinduism. Bose states that “women poets of Hinduism find freedom in a direct, unmediated relationship with God, whom they feel, imagine and express in their poetry” (p. 8). Poetry and songs provided an escape from their gendered identity within Hindu thought and helped women express themselves as individuals outside the realm of the family and society. Bose discusses several poets from different regional, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds and concludes that despite the variety among poets and their work, “the thread that runs through these poems is the determination with which the authors launched their spiritual journey from their childhood, pursuing their love for god despite all the obstacles that conventional social regulations and expectations could throw against them” (p. 115). The final chapter, “Sanctuary,” addresses women’s power and influence over religion in the family and returns to the idea of subject and authority. Bose claims that “though here, as in every other part of their lives, women put the family before themselves, these ceremonies provide room for women to act on their own” (p. 137). The performance of vratas (religious practices performed to carry out certain obligations in order to achieve divine blessing) especially provides women with a place of authority and authenticity.

Bose concludes in the introduction and conclusion that Hinduism and the perceptions of women that are derived from it are not homogeneous and that no single authority exists. She says, “Hindu thought forges links between goddesses and women, and invests women with mystical authority even as it locks them within subservient social roles” (p. 10). The variety of sources and voices on the matter, both men’s and women’s, accentuates the contradictions within gender discourse in Hindu thought. Women in the Hindu Tradition emphasizes the complexities of Hindu thought on women, both divine and mortal. Bose explains, “By setting goddesses and mortal women within a shared framework, Hindu
thought has historically conflated power and dependency within the idea of womanhood, no matter how irreconcilable the two positions might be” (p. 153).

Overall, Bose’s work is indispensable to the field of women’s studies in general and to the study of women in Hindu social and philosophical thought in particular; the author manages to bridge gaps in the existing knowledge, and her work will hopefully spark new discussion, especially given the preoccupation with women by men throughout history. As mentioned earlier, the wealth of primary sources and their translations represent a particular nuance of *Women in Hindu Tradition*; however, especially in Chapters 2 and 3, the sources could be incorporated into the chapter rather than being placed at the end of each chapter. In addition, images used are missing references. Nonetheless, this textual analysis of the feminine, both divine and mortal, contributes to the larger gender discourse on women in India from a historical, social, and political angle, shedding light on women’s lives and status in contemporary India.

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In *Chinese Among Others* (2008), a sweeping yet fine-grained account of Chinese migrants across the world, Philip Kuhn argues that the history of China and the history of the Chinese overseas cannot be separated—that the study of one requires an understanding of the other. Glen Peterson’s *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China* lends powerful support to this argument. It does so from an angle that is distinct from much of the existing literature in overseas Chinese studies, which tends to concentrate on (1) the socio-economic, cultural, and political links between ancestral homeland and diasporic communities or (2) on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign policies towards Chinese living abroad. Instead, Peterson delves into an under-studied and fascinating area: the roles and experiences of Chinese with emigrant pasts or connections, whom he calls “domestic overseas Chinese,” in the PRC during the early decades of the Communist regime.

By now, the courting of overseas Chinese investment and global economic connections by the Chinese Nationalists in the early twentieth century and the PRC government from the 1980s onwards is a well-worn trope. However, Peterson’s contribution is to show that this effort never waned, even during the “high Communist” decades of the 1950s and 1960s, a period typically but not entirely accurately linked to the PRC’s disengagement with its diaspora. By examining the Chinese government’s motivations for this apparent contradiction in policy and exploring the deeply unstable status of some 11 million domestic overseas Chinese, Peterson suggests that there has been more continuity than rupture in official attitudes towards the country’s transnational subjects.

This is not to say that those official positions have not been complex and even paradoxical. Overseas Chinese, domestic and abroad, were “by turns valued and despised for their economic assets and foreign connections” (p. 8). Still, this tension reflects the non-linear development of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies and its struggle to reconcile revolutionary ideology with the practical realities of transitioning to a socialist state. The abrupt replacement of preferential treatment and pragmatic accommodations for domestic overseas Chinese with condemnation and persecution in the 1960s was not a foregone conclusion in the years before the radicalization of the late 1950s. Similarly, the group’s eventual rehabilitation during the economic liberalization of the 1970s was not a sudden innovation on the part of the post-Mao administration but rather a partial resumption of policies that had already been in place just over a decade earlier.

Peterson stresses the importance of the Cold War global context in shaping PRC policies towards overseas Chinese, accounting for the seemingly contradictory relationship between the government and its diasporic subjects. Eagerness for valuable economic and political alliances with Southeast Asian states led the PRC to encourage ethnic Chinese abroad to adopt local citizenship. This policy of apparent disengagement by China from its own emigrants was primarily to allay foreign governments’ fears of Communist infiltration. At the same time, the PRC could not afford to give up access to overseas Chinese capital, expertise, and trade networks while facing the threat of US-led attempts at economic isolation. The domestic overseas Chinese thus became a vital bridge for sustaining and amplifying these connections.

Building on a legacy from the late Qing and Republican eras of cultivating overseas Chinese connections, the PRC maintained state bodies such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs
Commission (OCAC) that were devoted to managing these relations domestically and abroad. Within China, officialdom identified three distinct sub-groups with diasporic connections: the *qiaojuan* (family dependents in China of emigrant Chinese), *guiqiao* (former emigrants who had returned to China), and *guiqiao xuesheng* (ethnic Chinese youth born overseas who “returned” to China for education). Gathered into a general category of *guonei huaqiao* (domestic overseas Chinese), these sub-groups were both recipients of preferential treatment designed to encourage the inflow of foreign exchange and expertise, and targets of state efforts to manage a valuable but fraught conduit to foreign worlds. Although these official statuses bestowed unusual privileges—such as the private right to keep remittances from abroad, special investment opportunities, and even work and housing assignments—they also marked an individual as a permanent outsider and, hence, a potential threat to the socialist order.

The book’s chapters proceed in chronological and thematic fashion, with each focusing on a particular stage and set of CCP policies for domestic overseas Chinese, offering the rationale, implementation, and (often unintentional) consequences of each. Chapter 2, “Transnational Families Under Siege,” examines state intervention in three important means of diasporic family linkage: letters, marriage and divorce practices, and property ownership. In all three areas, government attempts to manage these sentimental and material interactions for state purposes undermined the delicate balance required to maintain these attenuated family ties.

Chapters 3 and 4, “Youdai: The Making of a Special Legacy” and “Open for Business: The Quest for Investment and Remittances” continue the theme of state efforts to use transnational familial and economic connections to achieve socialist goals. There is a powerful irony in the OCAC’s extension of *youdai*, or privileged treatment, in the forms of exclusive entitlements ranging from the protection of *qiaojuan* families’ overseas remittances to special access to consumer goods beyond the reach of the general public. Although overseas Chinese capital could no longer enter the country through traditional investment channels such as native place associations and corporate institutions after 1949, OCAC officials sought to attract this precious resource through *qiaojuan* in China, and then to direct it to state-run companies. Attendant benefits included dividends that would be paid to *qiaojuan* relatives, options for residency or citizenship, or even educational opportunities for investors’ children. These efforts actually intensified from 1955-57, coinciding with the CCP’s abolishment of private property in China and the policy of disengagement from overseas Chinese. The logic behind this seeming paradox is that many in the government regarded the transition to socialism as a decades-long process, and the education and integration of domestic overseas Chinese into the socialist order as a gradual, organic phenomenon.

However, the system of preferential treatment was unable to sustain the gale winds of rising political extremism. By Chapters 5, 6, and 7, “Patriots, Refugees, Tycoons and Students: ‘Returning’ to China in the 1950s,” “Socialist Transformation and the End of Youdai,” and “Cultural Revolution and Beyond,” the potential for a severe backlash against the domestic overseas Chinese—in the 1960s, including several hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese from other countries migrating to China—becomes a tragic reality. Peterson traces in detail the shift from idealism and optimism to disillusionment and despair through the development of overseas Chinese “state farms,” the thwarted ambitions of many “returned” overseas Chinese students, and the sad outcomes for the majority of these individuals. These unhappy dénouements included physical and emotional suffering during the Cultural Revolution, legal and illegal re-migration out of China, and in some cases, death at the hands of others or through suicide during outbreaks of violence against overseas Chinese.
In both adjusting some broader contours in the historical picture of post-1949 China and capturing the confused pathos of individuals caught in a political storm, Peterson shows his mastery of a topic that he has been researching and publishing on since the 1980s. His is an important contribution to a thinly populated field—the few other scholarly works that are on this topic are from the 1980s, and the number has only slowly increased during the 2000s. The paucity of research is likely due to the political sensitivity of the topic, as well as the difficulty in accessing source material. Peterson overcomes both of these challenges. Now that overseas Chinese investment is a publicly lauded strategy in the PRC, perhaps it has become more acceptable to explore its troubled history. Peterson also draws from an impressively large and diverse corpus of sources. These include official publications, speeches, and planning surveys from PRC authorities; Chinese-language newspapers targeted at domestic overseas Chinese; publications from non-PRC locales with large ethnic Chinese populations, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Jakarta; and documents from US and UK national archives.

This history of the domestic overseas Chinese subtly, but significantly, shifts our understanding of economic pragmatism and ideological flexibility during the early years of the PRC. During this period of flux, the state found it useful to create an entire social category and class of people that seemed diametrically opposed to the ideal of the new socialist state. Although the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries seem to testify to the ultimate economic wisdom of this strategy, this book shows that the long relationship between the Chinese state and its prodigal subjects has often been vexed, complicated, and sometimes tragic in nature. While deeply sympathetic to the victims of this dynamic, Peterson is careful to prove that these outcomes were not simply the upshot of irrational government action, even if policy implementation was often incompetent or damaging. Rather, he masterfully conveys that significant official resources and energy were directed towards this relatively small population because they were a valuable segment of the domestic economy. The results speak to the complex and still-evolving history of the overseas Chinese and the risks involved in state efforts to keep its transnational population within orbit of home.

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While much originated in Europe and the United States, a significant proportion of the new and global popular culture has been produced in and disseminated from East and Southeast Asia. Since too less attention has been paid to the role of States and cross-state cultural interactions, the book edited by Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin and Eyal Ben-Ari is appealing. With Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia, readers are provided with a precise analysis on State, political power, and industrial and economic policy as they both shape and are shaped by popular culture.

In the past, cultural policies represented ways for governments to emphasize and reinforce nation-building or prevent infiltration of “foreign” cultures. Cultural policies often involved regulating, shaping, and managing cultural tastes. Implemented though building museums and monuments or promoting “national sports” (sumo in Japan, taekwondo in South Korea, etc.) for example, the strongest expression of cultural policies is found in censorship.

It is only recently that issues related to popular culture have been added to bilateral and multilateral negotiations between East Asian countries (with a special emphasis placed on intellectual property violations). Since the 1990s, the production and export of popular culture products has reached a massive scale, gradually gaining the attention of governments and the mass media. The success of the cultural industries generated a major shift: State policies centered both on its potential for enhancing countries’ so-called “soft power” and the possibility of cultivating lucrative exportations.

The concept of popular culture has actually to be questioned (Otmazgin & Ben-Ari, 2012, pp. 6-7), especially because the Western-based distinction between high and popular cultures is less relevant to the way massively produced cultural commodities are perceived and consumed. Moreover, in East Asia, the distinction between popular culture and high culture is less evident in everyday life than in the West, since many practices that might be labeled as elite have become the domain of a huge middle class.

Popular culture and soft power

Nye (1990) used the term soft power to describe the growing importance of non-traditional means a country can wield to influence another country’s wants. Throughout the book, many contributors discuss why and how popular culture can be investigated within the soft power frame. Even if the discourse over soft power that has emerged over the past 15 years has increased awareness of the potential for extracting the “power” of popular culture to serve State ends, soft power as a concept may not be able to fully capture the dynamics of how people consume, appropriate, conceive, and indigenize imported culture and norms (p. 16).

Several case studies show the methodological challenges authors face with the use of the concept of soft power. For example, Galia Press-Barnathan (Chapter 2), who examines the links between popular culture and international relations, makes clear the distinction between the use of soft power as an analytical tool and its employment in political, popular and intellectual discourses. She also warns about the difficulties to establish a clear link between the diffusion of cultural products and the acquisition and exercise of soft power by Asian major powers.

Even if some States engage in systematic public policies to promote them, the export of content industry goods that are supposed to provide soft power is determined in the last resort by economic logic and economic actors. Even if pleasure is said to be the main motivation for consuming cultural goods, Jean-Marie Bouissou (Chapter 3) underlines that
this consumption stems primarily from their availability, quality, and price, like the consumption of any other good (p. 47). It is meticulously illustrated in his research about the “Manga diplomacy” in four European countries and the use of characters from Manga and animation in order to convey abroad messages that intend to promote Japanese interests or policies.

**Policy making and popular culture**

Several contributors examine popular cultures in the context of policy-making and the inspiring role of South Korea governmental policy throughout Asia since it has initiated in the mid-2000s its own digital content promotion to support its digital media industry. According to Jung-Yup Lee (Chapter 7), South Korea’s policy exemplifies one specific way in which the State managed different geographical scales and how national culture was redefined less as the source of coherent cultural identity than in relation to transnational trade.

Two authors investigate Japan’s aspiration to become a “content superpower” and the Japanese government shift, around 2004, from a century-long practice of promoting traditional arts to supporting the popular culture industry under the banner “Cool Japan”. Souichirou Kozuka (Chapter 6) examines the use of copyright law as a new industrial policy and Kuhee Choo (Chapter 5) investigates Japan’s global promotion of its content industry. It appears that what initially began as an economic strategy to establish Japan’s economic and cultural power within the global, mostly Western, market later turns into an image promotion that has been adhering to Japan’s long history of self-essentialization and orientalization in face of the Western “other”.

**Cultural policy and the dynamics of censorship**

The last section of *Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia* questions cultural policy and censorship. It is actually noteworthy that popular cultural products may promote inter-Asian hate and may also manipulate historical animosity to stimulate sales. Kwai-Cheung (Chapter 10) gives an accurate insight on this issue through several popular culture productions and their relations with some of the major historical controversies and enmity between China, Korea, and Japan.

Two contributors, Laikwan Pang (Chapter 8) and Marwyn S. Samuels (Chapter 9), investigate on the State censorship in China. The first one examines China’s first importation of foreign (Japanese) cultural products after the Cultural Revolution. He shows how a depoliticized notion of “cultural policy” replaced “cultural politics” as the normative State-culture relations. He also argues that State attention to culture shifted in late 1970s and early 1980s from political propaganda to pacification, and while both entertainment and intellectual culture manifested a pluralization, they were also increasingly depoliticized.

Contrasting with a monolithic view of State censorship, the study of Marwyn S. Samuels about “the vagaries of State censorship” in China echoes Cherian George’s (Chapter 11) contribution about Singapore’s theatre and film practitioners who have successfully negotiated for the relaxation of censorship rules. The concessions sought and secured are limited, but they are significantly greater than the regulatory reforms requested by professional journalists. According to the author, one reason for this difference could be contrasting levels of autonomy; some fields of cultural production are less tied than other fields to the political and economic powers.

The picture that emerges from the chapters in this volume underscores a number of contradictions and tensions between State policies and the creative industries. As many of the contributions demonstrate, there is an inherent tension between the policy side with its emphasis on intentionality, planning, and foreseeable consequences, and the dynamic, unintended, often not fully planned nature of the production and dissemination of popular culture. Some contributors like Kwai-Cheung Lo (Chapter 10) discuss the diffusion of
cultural products that may also spur fears of cultural dominance and invite resistance from importing societies.

As underlined by Jean-Marie Bouissou (Chapter 3), the effects of soft power based on popular culture are almost, by definition, slow and work best when not pursued by governments. But while older economic and cultural policies were used to be pursued separately, popular culture is nowadays an interface of cultural and economic policies. As Jung-Yup Lee (Chapter 7) explains, the process we can observe now is both the culturalization of the economy and the economization of culture.

The twelve contributors of *Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia* have various disciplinary perspectives (political science and international relations, political economy, law and policy studies among others). Although comparative and multidisciplinary perspectives are predictably both stimulating and limiting, the book will certainly provoke more research in a near future. *Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia* will be of interest to students and scholars of Asian culture, society and politics, the sociology of culture, political science, and media studies.

References


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In this new volume in the series “Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies,” Jivanta Schöttli explores three key developments in newly independent India: the founding of the Planning Commission (1950), the Panchasheela Agreement with China (1954), and the Hindu Code bills, seen as a step towards a Uniform Civil Code (1955-56). All three developments are key to understanding the nature of Indian modernity and its transformation from a colonial to a postcolonial democracy, and for Schöttli, all three developments owe their origins to Jawaharlal Nehru’s political worldview, which Schöttli studies in terms of both Nehru’s vision and his strategy. “New Institutionalism” and “Historical Institutionalism” are the two main political frameworks through which she conducts her examination, but for Schöttli, understanding the worldview of Nehru “the individual” is critical to understanding Nehru “the political actor.” Thus, while she explicitly argues against the separation of the man from his times, such a separation is at times implemented in her analysis as a methodological tool in order to understand the nature of Nehru’s political action. Schöttli’s primary sources for excavating this worldview are Nehru’s speeches and writings, from which she quotes copiously but judiciously. The book is thus at once a biography and a study of the process of Indian modernization in the Nehruvian period.

Schöttli explains her choice of theoretical structures by presenting the argument that both the New Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism schools of thought allow room for an exploration of the processes by which an institution comes into being; both frameworks also assert that the existence of an institution is, itself, not a guarantee of its validity. Schöttli points out that in the case of India, traditional models of modernity, which tend to be teleological, seem to falter because of the integration of the processes of modernity within an entrenched indigenous tradition that is often extremely hierarchical and feudal and informed by considerations of class, caste, and religion, which modern institutions do not succeed in displacing. As Schöttli argues, Nehru, as the middle ground between the conservative right and the radical left, and propped up by Mahatma Gandhi, was constrained by his political opponents and supporters as well as by the specific organizational policies of his political party, the Indian National Congress (INC), and this, as much as his worldview, shaped the nature of his actions. The three institutions he developed, therefore, were not solely driven by his unique vision, as is often promoted in Nehruviana, but were instead developed within the constraints of his political situation. Schöttli argues that Nehru’s evolving worldview in the context of Indian modernization is itself a product of the historical circumstances that Nehru the political actor was trying to negotiate.

To distinguish Nehru on the basis of his worldview vis-a-vis the other dominant leaders of the time risks falling into the trap of psychological individualism, and detracts from a historical methodology. Vision and strategy are not mutually exclusive categories, as Schöttli successfully shows, but are, rather, meshed together in political choice. As such, Schöttli presents what she calls the “structure of opportunities,” meaning that the constraints that shaped Nehru were also the very reason for his success and that he was ultimately able to alter such conditions in his favor. Nehru’s decisions were affected by the actions of his contemporaries (Subhas Chandra Bose before independence and Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad after), and Nehru strategically highlighted or compromised on specific issues in order to gain ascendancy within the party and promote his own vision of progress.

Schöttli’s approach is particularly useful in understanding Nehru’s position on the first of the three institutions she examines: the Planning Commission. As Schöttli shows, the Planning Commission serves to demonstrate both how Nehru consolidated power and
translated his specific vision into policy. The origins of the commission lie in the Congress National Planning Committee (NPC), established under Subhas Chandra Bose, with Nehru as chairman. The NPC, which saw in industrialization the solution to India’s economic problems, was nonetheless opposed by Gandhi and Gandhians, and Nehru never openly opposed Gandhi even though he was in favor of the solution. Thus, while Bose, whose conflict with Gandhi led to the former’s disenchantment and eventual departure from the Congress party, did not feel compelled to publically defer to Gandhi’s opinion, Nehru depended on Gandhi’s support within the INC in order to rise to power within the party and was, therefore, more diplomatic in his support of the commission. Due in no small part to this sort of diplomacy, Nehru ascended to party leadership upon the country’s independence and, after the death of Gandhi, was able to bring the party more tightly under his control and, eventually, promote his socialist vision through the Planning Commission.

Schöttli’s second case study involves an examination of Nehru’s second institution: India’s Panchasheela Agreement (also known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) with China and the debate over the status of Tibet. The agreement stipulated mutual non-aggression and respect for territorial sovereignty. Schöttli claims that getting involved in the Tibet debate was both an opportunity for India to assert itself as regional power in relation to China and to establish relations with China immediately after India’s independence. Schöttli argues that unlike his difference of opinion with Gandhi regarding the creation of the Planning Commission, Nehru did not have any particular opponents when it came to foreign policy decisions, and he was, therefore, directly responsible for the nature of the Panchasheela Agreement. The preamble to the agreement, which emphasized “peaceful coexistence,” was to Nehru an extension of India’s non-aligned position and its wider aspirations regarding its role in world affairs. The agreement itself, however, which also sought to establish trade ties, was tipped in China’s favor and is, ultimately, an example of Nehru’s political short-sightedness, says Schöttli. It is important to note in this context that while none of Nehru’s plans produced long lasting positive results, the Panchasheela Agreement with China soured much more rapidly than many others. In opposition to the more right wing Patel, Nehru rose to power within the party by aligning himself to a certain extent with Gandhian principles. After previous less successful attempts at international diplomacy in the years after India’s independence, the Panchasheela Agreement became a mark of Nehru’s success as a diplomat, if only in the immediate context.

Finally, the Hindu Code bills demonstrate yet another aspect of Nehru’s aspirations of nation building. India, founded as a secular nation, was nonetheless predominantly Hindu. The premise of a secular state necessitated religious reform not merely to ensure secularism but also to ensure uniformity for Hindus. The approach itself was controversial; it was not a Uniform Civil Code but was aimed at reforming a specific religion and was intended to subsequently serve to unify the entire country. While four bills were passed between 1955 and 56, as Schöttli shows, Nehru’s personal involvement in the passing of these bills was quite limited; he merely saw these as a step towards modernization and did not invest any personal interest in resolving the nature of the conflict with individual groups over religious rights and, hence, expedited the process without careful consideration. It was, Schöttli argues, a triumph of “strategy over vision,” driven by short-term goals rather than long-term planning.

The Nehru that emerges from Schöttli’s book is a complex figure. Nehru the political actor is shown to be politically capable in gaining and retaining power and decisive enough to see his personal vision realized. Yet the same figure is also shown to be at times personally limited and driven by the need for power and, like any other political figure, influenced by political exigencies and often short-sighted when it came to understanding the nature of political events and necessities. His three institutions, while serving some limited purpose, ultimately failed to lead to the prosperous India he envisioned. In the final chapter, when
Schöttli considers the “shelf life of Nehru’s institutions,” we see the eventual uselessness and failure of all three institutions that Nehru built. This appraisal by Schöttli also leads her to put forward the proposition that where personal vision without personal expertise motivates the establishment of an institution (namely the Panchasheela Agreement), institutions are likely to be driven by “risk-taking” and remain largely untenable; where formed out of political exigency and instrumentalized by the author (such as the Hindu Code bills), likely to remain contentious; and where built on consensus and personal expertise, rather than individual vision, more likely to be adapted, as necessary (such as the Planning Commission). According to Schöttli, while the Planning Commission serves no real purpose in India’s liberalized economy at present, it can nonetheless be made to adapt to a changing circumstance. The Panchasheela no longer survives, and the mess created by the Hindu Code bills continue to present problems not only because of the bills’ ambiguity but also due to the interstices between Muslim personal law and the Uniform Civil Code that often flare up in communal unrest.

Jivanta Schöttli’s contribution in this volume is less in terms of detail, for the material itself that she uses has been utilized in Nehruviana before but rather lies in her methodology, to which she brings her careful interpretation of the shifts in Nehru’s vocabulary across time and in response to the shifting needs of a newly independent nation. The book is a timely volume at a time when founding figures in a space such as India have been deified to the point where even mild criticism leads to extreme governmental backlash; her work also restores to one of these figures his rightful, if unelevated, place in history.

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Goenka and Henley's appropriately titled collection of essays offers a broad perspective on financial institutions in Southeast Asia with a specific focus on microfinance, which the editors define as “...the provision of financial services to the poor, on a scale appropriate to their needs” (Goenka & Henley, 2010, p. 1). The broad aim of the book as stated in the introduction is, “...to evaluate, in a critical spirit, the microfinance experience in Southeast Asia” (p. 8). Understanding the microfinance experience in Southeast Asia entails answering the central questions of how and why the microfinance revolution was possible and necessary in the region. The book aims to answer these questions and to identify and understand outcomes of the microfinance revolution for borrowers and lenders alike. Notably, the book investigates the development and impact of formal microfinance institutions (MFIs) but does not overlook the importance of informal financial institutions including money lenders, cooperatives, and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) that fill the formal financial institutional void. The essays of the contributing authors provide insights and expertise using both qualitative and quantitative data from economic, sociological, anthropological, entrepreneurial, and developmental perspectives in a truly interdisciplinary approach to the study of finance in Southeast Asia.

Each of the twelve chapters in the book contains interesting and important information, but space does not allow for a thorough discussion of each chapter here. Aditya Goenka discusses the challenges of financial intermediation among rural populations. Specifically, Goenka points to the problem of information asymmetries—that borrowers have more information about their ability to repay than do lenders. Material collateral provides insurance against default, but the poor who are often the target population of microfinance often have no such collateral. Goenka outlines strategies that might be used by lenders to enforce contracts such as joint liability, progressive lending, and reputation management, which are particularly powerful in high-transparency rural settings. Each of these bypasses the material constraints upon the poor, relying instead on relationships and reputations to overcome risk.

Subsequent chapters offer specific histories of microfinance. Turnell outlines the history of microfinance in Burma, one of the poorest countries of Southeast Asia. Included in this chapter is a description of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) poverty-alleviation initiatives as well as MFIs founded by the Grameen Trust, by Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT), and by the *Groupe de Recherche et d’Échanges Technologiques* (GRET). The microfinance situation in Burma is fragile owing to undercapitalization of MFIs, legal questions surrounding interest rates, broad macroeconomic instability, rising inflation, and little savings mobilization among MFI borrowers. In contrast, Quiñones’ account of microfinance in the Philippines is encouraging. In the Philippines, policy and regulation create a competitive market and encourage innovative products. For example, the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) established a rural bank that is now fully self-sufficient. Similarly, “banks engaged in microfinance operations” (BEMOs) as well as “microfinance oriented banks” (MOBs) are making their way into economically depressed rural areas. Nonetheless, Quiñones voices a concern that, like microfinance elsewhere, these institutions are not reaching the poorest of the poor.
Hans Seibel provides a brief history of early European microfinance including accounts of informal associations, later formal MFIs of Ireland and Germany, and a description of “linkages banking” in Indonesia whereby formal financial institutions are linked to informal self-help groups either directly or indirectly by way of a non-governmental organization (NGO). Steinwand similarly provides a history of microfinance in Indonesia. By way of historical comparison, Steinwand offers some lessons learned in the Indonesian microfinance experience, particularly in regards to decentralized small banks as being more accessible to the rural poor than are large, centralized banks. Henley also provides a chapter on the history of microfinance in Indonesia. Henley’s chapter includes sociological content pertaining to shifts in sentiments such as “community spirit” and the [mis]characterization of indigenous peoples as economically naïve. Henley points out some important distinctions between Indonesian microfinance and other MFIs. Specifically, he notes the following unique characteristics of Indonesian microfinance: the use of individual loans rather than group loans; the lack of financial institutions and programs that specialize in serving women, which is a mainstream strategy of many MFIs; and the administrative advantages of state-owned MFIs. Henley concludes that despite widespread praise for the BRI, microfinance was not solely responsible for poverty alleviation in Indonesia but rather was coupled with other economic, infrastructural, and technological developments as well as favorable political and macroeconomic conditions.

Other chapters are more ethnographic. Appold and Thahn discuss credit provisioning among Vietnamese small businesses. In this case, the authors argue that social capital must be important in credit provisioning because there has been rapid economic growth but the state lacks the capacity to adequately administer credit. The authors conclude that while microfinance is crucial for starting small businesses, credit is not deeply or widely embedded in the community. Instead, financial help often came from family in the form of intergenerational transfer of wealth rather than credit. Relationships are useful as a safety net, but they do not cross over into the business sphere.

Chan and Owyong’s chapter provide a fascinating qualitative account of Chinese pawnshops in Singapore. The pawnbroker community in Singapore is “closed,” and the members of the community typically know each other or are related. These relationships are characterized by cooperation, not competition and pawnbrokers reduce information asymmetries by sharing information among themselves. The pawnshops of Singapore, like pawnshops everywhere, meet the needs of the poor in ways that conventional lenders cannot. By accepting household removables as collateral, pawnshops establish a means to recoup losses associated with default and eliminate costs of monitoring and credit screening. Further, pawnshops are able to make small loans with short maturities that would be too costly for a bank.

Singzon and Shivakoti write a thorough account of the financial challenges faced by farmers in Northeast Thailand. They emphasize important variables that are often overlooked such as the growing importance of cash and the associated risk of debt among cash-poor farmers, the costs associated with the quality of the infrastructure and the distance to market where farmers sell their produce, the problem of limited access to public support services and the greater reliance on middlemen and moneylenders, land disputes related to ownership and usufruct rights, and indebtedness resulting from low crop yields and income in the context of primary reliance on cash crops.

Finally, Ames and Ames discuss the impact of microfinance use among the women who are orang asli, or indigenous peoples, of Malaysia. Specifically, they focus on the development initiatives of Persatuan Pembantuan Kristian Malaysia, The Malaysian Christian Association for
Relief (CARE) as well as informal means of generating business capital. Aside from the operational measures of success of the program (e.g. income, technology, links of participants to the wider economy) the authors also address some important but less-tangible aspects of microfinance participation. For example, the entrepreneurial Orang Asli CARE participants were hesitant to take their produce to market because they did not want to be seen selling their products themselves. Further, there was a reported “pain of failure” if they failed to sell their products as well as a fear of gossip among other Orang Asli. Despite this, the authors conclude that CARE has resulted in positive outcomes at the community level and that women’s access to credit has open up access to other economic resources and claim that “empowerment was evident” in a number of aspects of participants’ economic and social lives.

Each of these chapters provides a glimpse of microfinance throughout time and in a variety of Southeast Asian environments. The authors write from a diversity of perspectives and approach the issue using qualitative and quantitative methods and with an eye toward the historical trajectory of institutional development. Importantly, the book includes discussions of informal financial institutions as well as some ethnographic data that helps to contextualize the microfinance revolution. However, despite the specific intention of including informal institutions in the accounts of microfinance in Southeast Asia, only a few chapters thoroughly discussed participation in informal institutions. This relates to another area for improvement of the book—a consideration of locally established and operated financial institutions that extend microfinance to members of the community. In Indonesia in particular, a country that was a major focus of these essays, many people have had little access to the acclaimed programs of the BRI and instead have developed their own formal and semi-formal institutions. An investigation of this phenomenon elsewhere in the region would be interesting. Additionally, framing MFI development in the broader economic context is important. Livelihood strategies, especially in rural locales, are in flux around the world as people find that household agricultural production is no longer a viable option as plantation agriculture, logging, manufacture, and mining expand. This economic transition influences decisions about work, education, mobility, and whether or not to use financial products. Although cash is more important as people in rural locations move toward off-farm labor, not everyone is inclined to pursue formal financial alternatives. The reasoning behind these decisions is an area for more exploration.

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Although this work has an interesting title and premise, it might be better considered a collection of articles rather than a scholarly monograph. Its author, Nancy Rosenberger, is a full professor at the University of Oregon. Her prior research has been on Japan; however, in this text, she seems to have expanded the scope of her studies to include Central Asia, as she lived in Tajikistan for at least two months during the 2011-12 school year in addition to the time she spent in Uzbekistan as a result of the Fulbright scholarship she received to do this research. This work adds to a corpus of article-length works that address food security in the region. In her preface, Rosenberger indicates that she intends this to be a text for beginners, “to introduce readers” to the region, to give “readers practice in thinking through the meaning of food rights in a certain time and place” and to note “channels for considering power differences that exist within a nation” (pp. vii-viii). The text consists of nine chapters, not all of which fit well with the book’s stated topic. Rosenberger has divided her study into sections which perhaps could have intersected more than they do: urban environments, with “class differences”; rural areas, here the Ferghana Valley; women; and ethnicity. Three of her chapters (the second, on Uzbek history; the seventh, on the Andijan uprising and suppression in 2005; and the eighth on food security in the author’s local area in Oregon) fit less well into the book’s concept. For Central Asian studies, only the chapter on the Andijan uprising is particularly significant.

Rosenberger’s research was apparently profoundly affected by her being in-country during the Andijan uprising in 2005. While the subtitle of the text includes the words “inequality and repression in Uzbekistan,” Rosenberger’s work includes little authentic political analysis. An explicit discussion of the Karimov regime and the backdrop against which issues of food insecurity were examined might have made a better article, but unfortunately, Rosenberger’s research contained minimal analysis and was instead only colored (by her own admission) by political rumor and generalization (p. 135). While some of Rosenberger’s criticism of the government is not unfounded, it failed to help her achieve a true understanding of the people of Uzbekistan. Her analysis is largely self-centered, and as such, her understanding of food distribution is limited. Most disappointing, perhaps, is Rosenberger’s underestimation of the role of individual agency among the Uzbek people. In short, in her analysis of food insecurity and distribution in Uzbekistan, Rosenberger fails to grasp the significance of four major factors: (1) the role of family networks in food distribution; (2) the range of meanings of an ethnic identity in Central Asia; (3) interpretations of “tradition” as performance; and (4) religion.

First, the author notes but fails to consider seriously the role of family networks in food distribution. For example, in her presentation of the city of Tashkent, which she notes is less food-poor than the rest of the country (given that it interacts with its suburbs and with the rest of the country), she fails to consider many of the networks and pathways along which food actually travels: Students and others with Tashkent residency permits often bring food into the city and send money or goods back to their families in Tashkent. Family members who do not reside in Tashkent often visit and stay with family for weeks or months. These familial networks also function in the other direction, as Tashkenters also often send their children out to more rural areas for the summer or to find a healthier atmosphere in which to live, typically with relatives outside of the city; likewise, gifts and support flow out of Tashkent to other parts of the country on the occasions of weddings and other life rituals. Family dynamics often involve food, with
visitors trying to establish ties by bringing substantial gifts. All of these are normal family
interactions, the significance of which vis-à-vis food distribution Rosenberger failed to perceive,
either because she was not looking—Tashkenters were taking her to family in the Ferghana
Valley, so the networks were being utilized for her benefit—or because her isolation from the
eyeveryday life of families precluded it. For instance, from my own personal familial experience,
an uncle from Bukhara, when visiting my family in Tashkent, would regularly bring meat and
bread from his home and would often do what amounted to a week’s worth of food shopping
when he arrived. His visits always meant extraordinary treats. These experiences are not
reflected in Rosenberger’s description of the “food security” paradigm, which seems to be based
on a nuclear family model rather than the extended kinship networks that are more common in
Uzbekistan. Her assumptions based on middle-class American life are manifest when talking
about families in Uzbekistan, who, she asserts “stick together” “because they have no choice” (p.
45) or when observing that younger “relatives had to [provide] the primary caring [sic.]” for
elderly parents (p. 62, emphasis added), not considering that Uzbek children may, in fact, want to
provide such care. These general failures to see beyond her own cultural perspective also meant
that Rosenberger was apparently unaware of the role that even guests typically play in providing
staples; I can only imagine how the economically disadvantaged family she visited in Tashkent
felt when she brought, apparently, little more than tea (pp. 42-45). Descriptions of these extended
kinship networks could have been integrated in Rosenberger’s tack-on chapter covering
Oregon, where networks may also be observed, in this case a network of exclusion (p. 158).

In addition to her failure to cite family networks as integral to food distribution, she also
only minimally grasped issues of ethnicity and identity. Indeed, for a scholar of Uzbekistan, the
presentation of ethnicity and identity are naïve at best. Rosenberger seems to have known little
about the region’s history; her chapter on Uzbekistan’s history is a catch bag of summaries of
excellent works on the history of the early Soviet period, such as those by Doug Northrop and
Marianne Kamp, along with some lesser-known articles and a few, altogether unknown to this
historian, for which there are citations in the text without references in the bibliography (pp. 29-
30). Her conception of ethnicity is never explicitly stated. She seems unaware of the depth and
richness of the integration or intermingling of Central Asian ethnic identities, an integration one
may readily find in Central Asian works spanning hundreds of years and in sophisticated
discussions of Central Asian identity readily available in English-language scholarly
publications. Although she mentions the fact that identities have been structured around regions
(p. 27)—as a result of being from Samarqand or Bukhara, for instance—she does not seem to
have considered the reality that people of varying language groups or economic statuses in the
same region might share more similarities than differences. One might even suggest that this
work is more in line with nineteenth-century ideas of anthropological research than the twenty-
first; her description of a “Tajik” face (p. 118) as “narrower . . . . with more chiseled features”
might have come from nineteenth-century travel literature.

Not only did Rosenberger miss the boat with respect to family networks and issues of
ethnic identity, so too did she stumble in her attempt to deconstruct the role of tradition. Despite
her assertion that she is a “modern” anthropologist (pp. 108-9), the author seems oblivious to her
own construction of “traditional” customs and foods in Uzbekistan. For example, her suggestion
that “palov” (a spelling that I have never seen during my years in Uzbekistan for the word
“pilow,” “plov,” “pilaf,” or “pilav”—for the traditional dish pilaf) came from somewhere else
(pp. 6, 121) and is, therefore, somehow not “local,” when it has been a regional staple for at the
very least hundreds of years (longer than North America has been populated by Europeans) may
make it difficult for her beginner readers to differentiate her thinking from the “primordial”
constructions to which she objects. In one particular example, her focus on the “traditional”—for instance, the tradition of taking a bite of bread for a departing family member and saving the loaf until the person’s return (p. 10)—ignores the many citizens of Uzbekistan who might consider such a “tradition” no longer relevant, not being “contemporary,” (“sovremennii” in Russian) or “modern” (“zamonavi” in Uzbek) and therefore not bother with it. Such an oversight betrays Rosenberger’s most amateur of anthropology mistakes: conflating “tradition” with “old fashioned” (i.e. traditional). As such, she fails to appreciate the possibility of “modern tradition” or of city-dwelling citizens capably performing tradition. The reader is left with the impression that Rosenberger believes that cosmopolitan citizens of Uzbekistan are “less authentic” than their rural counterparts and that their use of alcohol or their multiethnic, transnational outlooks are somehow less representative of “tradition” than the behaviors or attitudes of their village-dwelling cousins (pp. 46-48). Nor does she seem to have considered (even more surprisingly given her anthropological background) the possibility that her hosts might have been performing “tradition” for the foreign professor.

The last of Rosenberger’s shortcomings has to do with her limited understanding of the role of religion in Uzbekistan and many of the basic tenets of Islam itself. Although a discussion of religion is a basic element in her examination of the government’s repression of its population, Rosenberger’s understanding of Islam and how to describe it in an academic setting is weak. She repeats Islamophobic notions like “Islam can act as a center of power that could compete with his [Karimov’s] government” (p. 25). She does not seem to understand even basic terms such as “imam,” which she translated as “Islamic priest” (pp. 91, 96, 148) when a more accurate definition might range from the leader of salat, the five-times-a-day prayer, to a government-sanctioned religious leader, depending on context. She says that President Islam Karimov is “Islamic” rather than “Muslim” (p. 25); she calls the Friday midday prayer “Sabbath in Islam” (p. 100), when the term “Sabbath” is not, in fact, a term invoked in Islam, which has no religiously constructed “day of rest”.

She is not clear about the differences between Sunnis and Shi’a (p. 141) and seems to think that men “bare their souls” during Friday midday services (p. 148), which is no more likely to happen during the Friday salat than any of the other 34 prayers of the week, and might even be less likely, given that public displays are generally considered unseemly. She mentions “veils” (p. 28) and “conservative Islamic beliefs” (p. 84, 88, 92) without indicating what these terms mean in this context since there are multiple ways of wearing headscarves in Uzbekistan, and even an expert on religion among Uzbeks could only guess what beliefs or clothing these words were intended to represent. Finally, the part food plays in Islamic charity was apparently surprising to her (p. 74) despite extensive literature on the topic.

Thus, while food security needs study in Central Asia, sadly, this book’s utility is largely as a window into what it was like for an American in Uzbekistan during the Andijan uprising. Nonetheless, the abundant quotes from research subjects and plentiful photographs will engage readers. In a classroom lead by someone with experience in the region, the book would likely provide a platform for discussion. The presentation of Koreans and multi-generational interactions of women are useful in a beginning text. However, professors will want to consider how the problems with family, identity, “tradition”, and religion might be ameliorated before using the book in the classroom.

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In the introduction to *Configuration of the Real in Chinese Literary and Aesthetic Modernity*, Peter Button is quick to reveal that the ambitious and fascinating intention of his work is to examine the fate of the modern concept of literature in 20th century China. As Button puts it in the first pages of his book, investigating the “assimilation and formation” of this concept in modern China necessarily implies redefining and historicizing the concept of “literature” within global capitalist modernity. Following the “romantico-modern” period, described by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s *The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism*, the genealogy of the modern concept of literature goes back to the birth of aesthetics in the 18th century and the way in which the new discourse of aesthetics was taken up as a central political project by German romanticism at the turn of the 19th century, especially in the philosophical fragments produced by Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) between 1797 and 1804. Helped by Nicholas Brown’s *Utopian Generation: The Political Horizon of Twentieth-century Literature*, Button’s work claims that the “romantico-modern” notion of literature is intimately linked not only to philosophy but also to literary criticism/theory.

Through the relationship established between this genealogy and the global postcolonial context of 20th century China, the author manages to rethink the historical and theoretical issues related to the introduction of modern (Western) texts, theories, and concepts in China. In his introduction, Button vigorously contests as “false and a-historical” the Eurocentric dichotomy involving, on one hand, Western theory, and, on the other hand, modern Chinese literary texts. His approach goes well beyond the storied “ambivalence” employed by classical postcolonial criticism, putting into question the very notions of “origin” and “influence” that have caused most histories of modern Chinese literature to be read as “derivative discourse.” Rejecting the recurrent use of terms such as the “West” and “Western” to refer to the origin of cultural texts and practices, Button offers readers the highly provocative assertion that “there is nothing remarkably ‘foreign’ [or] ‘Western’ and, hence, ‘extraneous’ to contemporary literary theory when it comes to 20th century Chinese literature and criticism” (p. 8).

Button brilliantly shows that the essential link between philosophy, literature, and theory, as described by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy to be the trademark of the modern concept of literature, which is as present in modern Chinese literature and literary criticism (especially in Chinese Marxist aesthetics—the principal but not exclusive subject of this book) as it is in the so-called classical theoretical current in the West, as described in New Criticism or Poststructuralism. To demonstrate this thesis, Button discusses selected texts and authors from classical May Fourth writers like Lu Xun (1881-1936) and Mao Dun (1896-1981) to the literary and theoretical works written following the establishment of the Popular Republic of China, including works of Marxist aesthetic philosophy, like that of Cai Yi (1906-1992); socialist literary production, like that of Yang Mo, particularly his *Song of Youth*; and that of contemporary Chinese thinkers on continental philosophy (of Kant or Hegel, for instance), like that of Li Zehou (1930–). As Buttons puts it, “The complex relationship between literature, theory/criticism, and modern philosophy was one that Chinese writers and critics [have] been negotiating in an astonishing variety of different forms from the beginning of the century.” (p. 28) From Button’s perspective, Chinese and Western texts share the same temporal location. As a consequence of this synchronicity, which insists on the inscription of China within modernity since the end of 19th century, China has been, in Button’s estimation, just like the West, a producer as well as a consumer.
of theory, a subject as well as an object of history. This transcolonial perspective brings him to question the traditional position of subalternity and secondarity attributed to Chinese texts in relation to Western theory. In his book, Button offers equal analytical treatment of both primary and secondary texts, which is to say, of both modern Chinese literary texts and North American Chinese studies texts dedicated to critical interpretation of the former.

Button’s fine and accurate critique of North American institutions of knowledge portraying China, and especially Chinese literature, as an object of study does not lament the absence of theory within Chinese studies. Rather, in his critique, Button worries about the inability of North American Sinology to perceive that “the role of theory was a given at the outset of the emergence of modern Chinese literature” (p. 24) and to recognize the importance of modern philosophical thought in China. Significantly, Button argues that this blindness is intimately related to the absence of continental philosophy within the North American Academy. For the author, this disappearance of continental philosophy in the late 1940s played a leading role in the impossibility for American Critics to perceive the presence of this complex relationship between literature, theory criticism and modern philosophy within twentieth century Chinese literature.

Following this discussion, his incisive evaluation of the now classical *History of Modern Chinese Fiction* by Chih-tsing (C.T.) Hsia brings back complex theoretical and historical questions about the difference and similarity between Hsia’s New Criticism-orientation and modern Chinese literature. Button ironically observes how Hsia’s *History*, while showing unmatched knowledge of modern Chinese literature, tends to delegitimize these texts and exclude them from the canon of World literature. The inability of these texts to match up to the criterion of “disinterestedness” leads to an inevitable and instrumental dimension that Hsia condemned. In spite of Hsia’s ostensible rejection of modern Chinese (and especially socialist) literary realism, Button convincingly demonstrates the existence of strong philosophical links between Hsia’s New Criticism and modern Chinese Marxist aesthetics that make impossible simple opposition between the two. He notes not only the separation between science and literature/art but also the emphasis upon universality and faith in an onto-theological conception of literary art, saying, “[B]oth share a similar origin in what each understood as a modern cultural crisis brought on by the rampant cultural predations of positivist science, which threatened the fundamental integrity of human being” (p. 26).

Under the title of “The Trials of Chinese Literary Realism,” chapter one engages a complex discussion of Tang Xiaobing, Marston Anderson, and David Wang’s authoritative studies on Chinese modern literature, especially realist literature. By investigating the theoretical foundation of these contemporary critics, and by criticizing the anachronistic use of postmodern/structuralist conceptions of language in their commentaries on Lu Xun’s earliest work, Button proceeds to re-evaluate Chinese realist literature. He argues that the critiques of Xiaobing, Anderson, and Wang reflect a far-too-simplistic reading of realist theory; he also questions these authors’ presumption that realist literature necessarily represents the Real, leading them, Button believes, not only to miss the *eidaesthetic* dimension of Chinese realism already ingrained in Lu Xun’s earliest work but also to obscure the complex filiation between Lu Xun’s literary works and later Chinese realist philosophical aesthetics. Through an analysis of Lu Xun’s “True Story of Ah Q” and its philosophical relation to Nietzsche’s philosophy, Button advances his argument in the next chapter by demonstrating Lu Xun’s inscription into the realm of what Nicholas Brown has called the “eidaesthetic itinerary,” or literature-as-theory camp. In this chapter, Button also focuses on the emergence (with the work of “True Story of Ah Q”) of the crucial philosophical and literary concept of the “type.” In showing that “Ah Q,” like Zarathustra, is the perfect example of “type,” (a literary figure embodying a philosophical idea about human being),
Button shows how the notion of “type” and the concept of typology not only saturates Nietzsche’s work but also Lu Xun’s writing. Button goes further in his analysis by linking the creation of “Ah Q” as a “type” of what Nietzsche called a “gruesome hybrid” (full of both rebellion and resentment) and the construction of the discourse of Chinese national character. Supported by Lydia Liu’s illuminating work on Lu Xun, Button is convincing when he contests the position which insists on the subordinated relation of Lu Xun to American missionary Arthur Smith’s racist and essentialist book on the so-called “Chinese character.” Button notes the gap between Smith’s (and also Chiang Kai-shek’s) conception of the “Chinese character,” grounded in Christian faith, and the notion of the active construction of the “Chinese” or of “Chinese-in-becoming” in the discourse of national character, attributed to Lu Xun. Button argues that “Lu Xun would choose to fashion a literary retort to Smith in the form of a quasi-Nietzschean, and hence, (post-)metaphysical type, taking the very first step in the process of China’s assimilation of modern eidaesthetics” (p. 115). Lu Xun effectively transformed Smith’s faith in a Christian god, Button argues, into an “onto-typological investment in the human.” In chapter four, Button pushes this line of discussion further by arguing that “what marks the postcolonial moment in China is the appropriation of the very aspiration to realize the completion of metaphysics by means of the figure of the human” (p. 169). The affirmation of the “type” in Lu Xun and other modern Chinese writers can thus be construed as a critical response to the onto-theological discourse (e.g. Hegelian or Smithian) deployed by European imperialism—a critique whose critical force is accomplished by virtue of a displacement toward onto-typology.

The results of this displacement and its aftermath have yet to be accounted for. Indeed, the problem of accounting for this displacement—already enormously complex in itself—has been magnified immensely by the general trend of intellectual life since the 1970s, namely, the abandonment in China of a universalizing critique of modernity in favor of a particularistic one combined with the turn, in the West, toward postmodern philosophies of difference without passing through a critique of colonial ontologies. In the context of this new historical mis-match, Button’s discussion in the last three chapters of the book is paradigmatic. Here, Button proposes an extensive (and difficult to summarize) discussion of the oft-ignored Chinese Marxist aesthetic theoretician Cai Yi, dialed-in on questions surrounding the concept of the “type” and Cai Yi’s sophisticated dialectical materialist aesthetic critique of capitalist instrumental modernity. He points out, in particular, Cai Yi’s sharp critique of positivist science and the abstract mode of thinking of “enlightenment rationality.” Here, Button provides a comprehensive re-evaluation of Chinese realist literary criticism by offering an extensive explanation of Cai’s concepts like “type” and “image thought.” He shows how the Marxist theoretician adopted the position that literature/art (differing here from the abstract knowledge of science), is able to produce knowledge of reality through the realization of the “concrete universal”—which is, precisely, the artistic type.

Button also examines the aesthetic critique of modernity in Chinese Marxism through a clever comparative perspective, which brings together, synchronically, Chinese aesthetic Marxism and Western cultural critique concerning the instrumental dimension of capitalist modernity such as New Criticism, the Frankfurt School (represented by Adorno), and Heidegger. The author proposes again, as he does in chapter one, a judicious comparative methodology which enables him, in the very same text, to evaluate the interpretation made by Western critics of Chinese texts on the one hand, and to enact the common theoretical approach shared by Chinese realist literary criticism and those secondary sources on the other hand. Again, Button points out that “what Lukacs terms ‘isolating abstraction’ in modern thought animates the project of New Criticism no less powerfully than Chinese Marxist aesthetics” (p. 137).
In the last two chapters, Button proposes a close reading of two realist socialist popular novels of the 1950s: Yang Mo’s *Song of Youth* and Lin Guangbin/Yang Yiyan’s *Red Crag*. He assesses these texts using Cai Yi’s Marxist aesthetic theory, especially the concept of “image thought” and “type.” Button proposes also to read these novels by taking into account their philosophical dimensions. He examines, for example in *Song of Youth*, the way in which the novel stages the passage from a Kantian-bourgeois aesthetic understanding of the relation between art and life to a Hegelian-revolutionary one through the principal protagonist Lin Daojing. What is particularly striking is Button’s ability to avoid the lure of the normative, allowing him to reveal the ways in which *Song of Youth* challenges many elements in both the Party-State appropriation and the Western sinological repudiation of the eidaesthetic elements in the Chinese revolution. *Red Crag* deals with political revolutionary struggles in the concentration camp run by the Sino-American Cooperation Organization (SACO) in Chongqing at the end of the 1940s. Through a new reading of these famous but underestimated novels, Button proposes a reflection on modern Chinese revolutionary subjectivity, dealing with the question of Freedom (i.e. being free to believe in—or not believe in—communism) and the possibility for the heroes, Lin Daojing or Li Siyang, to overcome their class origin. Button’s primary goal is evidently not to rehabilitate Chinese socialist realist literature, since the evaluation of the “quality” of artistic production is always coined by political and historical limitations. However, his reading of these novels demonstrates that these texts are far more open-minded and complex than they appear when evaluated by the criteria used in the past or by the dominant critique of this so-called “literary propaganda.”

This extremely stimulating and richly complex book offers a wide range of global and transhistorical theoretical and literary references, making it an invaluable working tool for students and scholars of comparative literature, philosophy or Chinese studies aiming to familiarize themselves with aesthetic theory in China’s twentieth century, and particularly Chinese modern Marxist literature and criticism. Button’s fascinating and ambitious work offers a completely new reading of China’s modern literary history by proposing to read Chinese literary and theoretical texts, like those of Lu Xun, Yang Mo, or Cai Yi, from the geohistorical perspective of a capitalist modernity that is thoroughly global.

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In her latest anthology of readings, Clara Sarmento has drawn together scholars from around the world to comment on the recent state of migration. Drawing from history, sociology, political science, and communications, "Permanent Transit: Discourses and Maps of the Intercultural Experience" builds examines migration traffic and routes, technology communication, regulation, arts, literature, and other intercultural processes, in the context of past and present times.

Emphasis is placed on hybridity, and hence, the eponymous “In…Transit” title, since migration is no longer considered a permanent state, with reproductive options evolving which lead to joint biological and cultural heritages. However, in diaspora, new marital arrangements emerge that, coupled with employment opportunities and the Internet, lead to a second or third migration within the same co-joint ethnic communities.

Sarmento makes the distinction in the introduction between “interculturalism”—based on dialogue, interaction, groups influencing each other, and “multiculturalism,” which is more of a mosaic of ethnicities. “Interculturalism,” she says (p. xiv) “is more likely to lead to criticism of illiberal cultural practices, as part of the process of intercultural dialogue.” Hence, she strives to give voice to the dispossessed and the “other” of the intercultural conversation. She stresses the need for openness and communication about diversity rather than mere tolerance (p. xv).

The authors in her collection formulate hypotheses from varied yet ever-convergent perspectives honed in quite disparate social science and humanities perspectives, but heading toward the same place: the existence of a “second” or “third” space where bi-lateral and tri-lateral identities are formed, amalgamating in new host countries that offer economic opportunity. Yet, just as quickly, the scenario can shift back to the home country if economic conditions improve and the brain-drain is reversed.

The first section is labeled “Communication” and looks at various forms of media—film, Internet—and the development of global audiences segmented not by nationality but more iconographic themes, a common interpretation of graphics and visual imagery. World film festivals with multi-national draw illustrate a common yearning, yet the communities that develop at the festivals are based on shared meanings and modes of interpretation rather than background geography. Audiences then reflect a common appreciation of “othering” or “marginalization” rather than continent or linguistic grouping, a trend that has been developing since around 1990.

In Chapter One, Gabriela Borges, author of “Representations of Cultural Identities in Contemporary Audiovisual Narratives,” focuses on three renowned audiovisual narratives, all documentaries, about the role of immigrants in Portuguese society over the last decades. She maintains that Portugal, as much as exporting migrants in past centuries, has now become a bastion of receiving migration, as nationals came back from Angola fleeing the Civil War in 1965 to current African communities growing in Lisbon. After the fall of the Salazar dictatorship and return of draft-dodgers from the Angolan War, Portugal has developed as a much more diverse and multi-ethnic nation, but had not seen itself as such in the past. The author examines what has been the effect on the nation of absorbing “the other” from within, returning with new cultural orientations.
In Chapter Two, Anabela Mesquita discusses the digital spaces, the role of the computer-based knowledge society in developing an all-European shared understanding of innovation and e-learning. She uses the case study method to examine classroom learning and a common EU-understanding of the level of computer competence and skillsets needed for success wherever a student lands a job.

In Chapter Three, Hudson Moura delves into the development of world-wide cinema themes: alienation, respite, terrorism, and counter-terrorism that are creating new classic genres that are without boundaries. Whether in Japan or Brazil, audiences are the same in their interpretation of the initial spaces that develop between filmmaker and sender and audience as receiver, with individual cultures becoming less of a mitigating force and personality becoming more of a common denominator.

In the second section, “Regulations,” themes range from human rights to body trafficking to cooperative responsibility for household management. In chapter eight, “The Division of Household Labour among European Bi-National Couples,” Sofia Gaspar discusses Portuguese men or women cohabiting with other European nationalities in Lisbon, finding that education and income rather than national origin shaped the division of household chores, with evenly educated participants dividing the work most democratically or using outside help. Men tended to do chores, still, that were more time-flexible such as gardening or car maintenance and women cited a higher level of perfection as prompting them to take the lead in accomplishing certain tasks.

In the third section, “Transits,” the focus is on Iberian migration to other continents, missions in Goa (India) and Macao (China) and the role of the Portuguese in both colonizations, withdrawal from colonization, and the spread of monotheistic religion outside the country. Joseph Abraham Levi in Chapter Eleven, “The Transformation of the Soul,” discusses Sephardic crypto-Jew Gracia Naci instrumental in the revival of Iberian Jewish practices in Antwerp and a financial power in her own right after her husband’s death, which was unusual in the sixteenth century.

In chapter twelve, Maria de Deus Manso discusses “Jesuit Schools and Missions in the Orient,” based on her research in Macao and Goa, also in the sixteenth century. With the Portuguese operating an empire stretching four continents, it was the Luso-Catholic missionaries who actually established the culture of the colonies. Their success, she notes, is based on the subtle understanding of long-established cultural traditions in places such as Cochin, where the Catholic missions made a complete study of local language and custom to show them the bridge between pagan rites and modern religion, creating a layering rather than stomping out of local tradition.

Another interesting chapter by Roberta Guimaraes Franco examines the link between Portugal, Angola, and Mozambique, and the development of an empire in the fifteenth century that survived until the last quarter of the twentieth century. While no longer labeled in the binary of colonizer and colonized, the theme of dispossessed exile and host-country receiver, acculturator and acculturatee, subject and object, the author maintains, still continues (p. 234). The defeat of the Portuguese in Angola (1975) ended the dialectic of “empire” for that culture and its satellites—but did not end the human trafficking, the back and forth between master and slave cultures, but now much of it is in reverse. With difficult economic times in Portugal and the boom in Brazil, the common linguistic community links lead to Portuguese parents sending their children to the former colony to gain employment. Hence, the master or sender culture is
seeking refuge in the colony culture and bringing a more fluid interpretation to the idea of colonizer and colonized.

Sarmento, has put together a well-choreographed series of essays on a very poignant theme with some very contemporary angles, the mass communications section at the beginning with the historical voyage to Portuguese outposts in the end, with a thorough understanding of empire gained and lost. The section in the middle made the toughest reading, but that had the least compelling human or media story. The macro-political angle is always the least personal and colorful in all commentaries, so an analytical or statistical study such as the chapter on household management in Lisbon is not that out-of-line with geo-political research. There is not much lively debate one can add to a chapter on criminal codes unless you have the lawyerly persuasion to I need not comment further.

What strikes me as most poignant is the selection of several very strong writers who make the Iberian outlook come alive for a widely-varied audience with a variety of motivations and reading styles. The many authors from various locations work well together to convey the outlook of the Luso-American, Luso-Brazilian, and Luso-Asian cultures, interspersed with contemporary material on hybridization, acculturation, and transculturation. In an age of mobility, the book has a takeaway message for anyone interested in the trans-migration of religion and culture.

Religion moves with culture and population flows, so whether examining the Portuguese influence on the Indian coast in the age of the great sailors to the impact on the bustling economy of Brazil, one gets a sense of a nation on the move. History and literature combine in Sarmento’s chapters within the book, where the sea gets woven into any narration and appreciation of the Portuguese-Iberian impact on the world. Politics are confined primarily to the middle section, with an emphasis then on sociology, anthropology, history, and the nexus between these disciplines. This is an informative and interesting “read” for anyone exploring the cultural sphere of communication in arts or humanities or social sciences.

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